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ABSTRAK 
China telah muncul semula dalam peringkat antarabangsa. Ia telah mencapai 
pertumbuhan ekonomi yang mengagumkan di bawah sistem politik dan menggunakan 
strategi yang agak berbeza daripada negara-negara lain. Tidak mengiktiraf sifat tersendiri 
dan menganggap bahawa sistem yang lazim "demokrasi" kerajaan memperkenalkan 
pelbagai samaran yang menjadi norma sejagat, ramai pengulas berfikir bahawa sistem 
politik China akan runtuh dan juga reformasi pasaran di bawah sistem ini tidak akan 
berjaya. Tetapi setakat ini, model China bukan sahaja menentang ramalan ini tetapi telah 
dijalankan dengan baik. 
Oleh kerana China mengikuti pertumbuhan ekonomi yang diketuai oleh kerajaan, 
perusahaan milik negara adalah instrumen utama dalam strategi ini. Para pengulas sama 
yang disebut sebelum ini juga menuduh kerajaan China menunda ekonomi.The realitinya 
adalah sejak penubuhan Republik Rakyat pada tahun 1949, perusahaan milik negara ini 
telah telah melalui banyak perubahan. Sesetengah fungsi dimansuhkan dan yang lain 
dipelihara. Akan tetapi perusahaan hari ini di China sangat berbeza daripada perusahaan 
China semasa peralihan pada tahun 1978. 
Persoalan utama kajian ini adalah sama ada model pembangunan China ini boleh 
dikekalkan dengan perubahan dalam perusahaan utama di sesebuah ekonomi. Dalam 
menilai soalan ini, kajian ini mempertimbangkan dua persoalan kajian tertentu: apakah 
peranan dinamik yang dimainkan oleh negeri China dan perusahaan milik Negara dan 
apakah perbezaan berbanding dengan teori yang dihujahkan oleh perusahaan barat? 
Adakah kombinasi pemilikan kawalan yang berbeza memberi kesan kepada hasil prestasi?  
Terdapat empat teori perusahaan awam - teori agensi, teori hak harta, teori pilihan awam 
dan neo-liberalisme - berhujah bahawa penglibatan kerajaan dalam ekonomi perlu 
dikurangkan untuk merealisasikan prestasi yang lebih baik. Walau bagaimanapun, 
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terdapat kekangan dan terhad dalam mengaplikasikannya di Negara China. Empat teori 
alternatif iaitu (peranan sejarah, embeddedness ekonomi, pasaran sosialisme dan 
pembangunan negara) yang menekankan kepentingan peranan kerajaan yang mungkin 
mempunyai aplikasi yang lebih besar. 
Khususnya, tiga dimensi telah dikaji.Pertama, kajian ini menilai sifat kerajaan daripada 
perspektif seluruh negara. Kedua, ia mengaplikasikan rangka kerja di atas untuk 
perusahaan milik negara dalam sektor-sektor strategik yang dimiliki sepenuhnya oleh 
kerajaan. Ketiga, ia meneliti perusahaan milik Negara yang beroperasi dalam "komersial" 
sektor dengan pemilikan negeri separa dan kawalan. 
Penemuan dalam kajian ini dari segi seluruh Negara adalah bahawa peranan kerajaan 
dalam perusahaan masih besar dan peranan ini telah menyebabkan banyak perusahaan ini 
berjaya menyesuaikan diri dengan persekitaran persaingan yang semakin meningkat, 
tetapi pada kos yang mengenepikan kawalan keselamatan sosial. Daripada analisis 
perusahaan strategik, adalah rasional bagi pemilikan penuh melampaui strategik termasuk 
sebab-sebab sejarah. Negeri adalah sedar tentang kos pengekalan pemilikan yang telah 
dibuat. Bagi perusahaan komersial, terdapat faktor pemisahan antara pemilikan dan 
kawalan, tetapi pemisahan antara negeri dan swasta adalah kurang jelas. Berapa rapat 
pengurusan atasan dengan perkara-perkara yang melibatkan kepimpinan politik. 
Secara keseluruhannya, fokus keputusan kajian ini adalah perlunya untuk mengubah suai 
perspektif teori barat untuk China. Ia juga menunjukkan bahawa hujah-hujah yang dibuat 
oleh keseluruhan ekonomi hanya boleh membawa sebahagian dariapda penjelasan 
kelakuan negera China dan perusahaannya. 
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ABSTRACT 
China has re-emerged at global centre stage. It has achieved impressive economic growth 
under a political system and using strategies quite different from other countries. Not 
recognizing its distinctiveness and assuming that the prevailing system of “democratic” 
government in its various guises must be the universal norm, many commentators think 
that the Chinese political system must collapse and even market reform under this system 
cannot work. But so far, the Chinese model not only defies this prediction but has done 
very well.  
Because China follows state-led growth, its state enterprises are the central instruments 
of this strategy. The same commentators referred to earlier also accuse them of holding 
the economy back. The reality is that since the establishment of the People’s Republic in 
1949, these enterprises have been going through many changes. Some functions were 
shed, others preserved. The enterprises today are very different from those when China 
began its transition in 1978. 
The central question for this study is whether China’s development model can be 
sustained with reformed state enterprises leading the economy. In assessing this question, 
this study posits two specific research questions: what is the dynamic role of the Chinese 
state and its state enterprises and how different is it from what western public enterprise 
theory argues? Do different ownership-control combinations affect performance 
outcomes? 
Four public enterprise theories – agency theory, property rights theory, public choice 
theory and neoliberalism – argue that state involvement in the economy must be reduced 
to realize better performance. However, these may have limited applicability to China. 
Four alternative theories (economic embeddedness, market socialism, developmental 
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state and the role of history) that stress the importance of the role of the state are likely to 
have greater applicability.   
Specifically, three dimensions are analysed. First, this research assesses the nature of the 
Chinese state from a national perspective. Second, it applies the above framework to state 
enterprises in strategic sectors that are wholly owned by the state. Third, it examines state-
holding enterprises operating in “commercial” sectors with partial state ownership and 
control.  
The study’s findings from its country-wide review are that the state’s role in these 
enterprises has remained substantial, that this role has resulted in many of these 
enterprises adapting successfully to the growing competitive environment, but at the cost 
of jettisoning their social safety net role. From the analysis of strategic enterprises, the 
rationale for full ownership goes beyond strategic to include historical reasons. The cost 
of ownership retention represents a conscious choice the state has made. For commercial 
state enterprises, there is de facto separation between ownership and control, but the 
separation between state and private is less clear-cut.  How close its top management is 
with the political leadership matters.  
Overall, the results of this study point to the need to modify western theoretical 
perspectives for China. It also shows that totally economic arguments may lead to only 
partial explanation of the behaviour of the Chinese state and its enterprises.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Over a century after its eclipse, China has arrived again at the center stage in the world1, 
drawing increasing attention from economists and other scholars. This attention derives 
in large measure from the fact that China has achieved impressive economic growth under 
a political system and using strategies which are quite different from most other countries. 
Chinese economic growth is built on a political system that has collapsed in many other 
countries including the Soviet Union. Its economic policies also differ from what most 
other countries do. The dominant institutional framework is what the Chinese leadership 
calls “socialism with Chinese characteristics” which keeps Chinese Communist Party 
playing the central role. But the reality is that China has a mixed economy in which the 
state had a major guiding role but with detailed economic decisions being to a large extent 
decentralized.  
China’s emergence as an economic power has brought increased scrutiny of the manner 
of its rise. That this rise has relied on state power and is at variance with the approach 
favored and followed by advanced countries has led to criticism of the state and its 
institutions over which it exercises authority through ownership or control. Criticism 
leveled at the Chinese state takes two forms. The first is that its political order of 
authoritarian rule is unsustainable and will ultimately be overtaken by forces for 
democratization. Because the dominant political system in the world is democratic 
government in its various forms, many believe China must converge to this norm. Thus, 
Pei (2006) notes: “… if current trends continue, China’s political system is more likely 
to experience decay than democracy… the very policies that the party adopted … are 
                                                     
1 Based on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by World Bank, China was the second largest country in the world. The average annual 
GDP growth rate was 9.26% in 5 years from 2008 to 2012 (World Bank, 2012). 
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compounding the political and social ills that threaten its long-term survival” (Pei, 
2006b). The second is that authoritarianism cannot coexist with a true market economy. 
Hence, efforts to graft Western institutions onto an authoritarian structure also will not 
succeed. So commentators think that the Chinese political system must collapse and even 
market reform under this system cannot work. For instance, Chang (2010) concluded that: 
“China cannot make much progress toward (the rule of law), at least as long as the 
Communist Party is around (Chang, 2010).” The second criticism, by extension, 
challenges the efficacy of China’s numerous state enterprises, which have historically 
played a major role in the economy, and they need to be reformed through privatization 
or liquidation (Lal, 2006).2  
Yet China’s experience since the late 1970s has defied these predictions. It had achieved 
rapid economic growth for over three decades, through a model of growth that, though 
not quite approaching that of the developmental state, can nevertheless be described as 
state-led. Unlike the rest of the world, China follows state-led growth, not private sector 
growth. State enterprises are at the heart of this model.   
State enterprises remain major players in the economy. They are not only the largest 
enterprises but also growing larger; while the number of state enterprises in 2009 has been 
reduced to just under one-eighth of that in 2000, their shares of output and employment 
have fallen to one-third and one-fifth respectively (Table 1.1). However, as shall be 
elaborated below, these numbers understate the size and reach of the state sector. 
(Szamosszegi & Kyle, 2011) also noted that “the observable state sector, which consist 
of state enterprises and the enterprises they directly control, accounts for approximately 
40 percent of the Chinese output under reasonable assumptions”. 
                                                     
2 In Gordon Chang’s book The Coming Collapse of China (Chang, 2001), Chapter 3 was titled ‘State Enterprises are Dying’ and 
Chapter 7 ‘The State Attacks the Private Sector’. 
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Table 1.1: Selected Statistics of Chinese State Enterprises (2000-2009)3 
Year No. of State 
Enterprises as % of 
All Enterprises 
State Enterprise 
Output as % of 
Total Output 
State Enterprise 
Employment as % of Total 
Employment 
2000 32.8 47.3 53.9 
2001 27.3 44.4 49.2 
2002 22.6 40.8 43.9 
2003 17.5 37.5 37.6 
2004     12.9 (2.0)4      35.2 (15.3)      29.8 (13.7) 
2005 10.1 33.3 27.2 
2006      8.3 (5.3)      31.2 (14.9)      24.5 (15.1) 
2007      6.1 (3.4)      29.5 (13.7)      22.1 (12.9) 
2008      5.0 (2.6)      28.4 (13.1)      20.3 (11.4) 
2009      4.7 (2.5)      26.7 (12.5)      20.4 (11.1) 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
 
As key institutions of Chinese state, China’s state enterprises had occupied a central 
position in discussions of the role of the state. This was largely because although they 
contribute declining numbers of China’s enterprises, industrial output and exports, these 
enterprises have remained major players in the economy. They are central to China’s state-
led growth strategy, but they have also been accused of holding the economy back. In 
reality, China’s state enterprises have been going through many changes, and the state 
enterprise of today bears little resemblance to that in the 1990s. 
1.2 State Enterprises as Central Institutions: A History of Major Transformation 
China’s state enterprises have been key instruments of the state’s control of economic 
activities as well as institutional reform. In these processes, they have themselves been 
historically transformed to various forms since the economic reform and opening up in 
1978. Before 1978, the state controlled over the whole economy very strictly and grasped 
so much centralized power that it resulted in the lack of incentives for the employees; 
thereby most state sectors fell into a situation of poor performance – low profit or even 
                                                     
3 Includes state enterprises which are wholly or majority-owned by the government only. Enterprises in which the government has 
minority ownership are excluded. 
4 2Includes state enterprises wholly owned by government only. 
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loss-making, so state enterprise reform was felt by the leadership to be imperative.  
Recognizing that an enterprise’s ownership structure can affect governance and 
performance, the state started to reform state enterprises through both governance and 
ownership reform. The governance reform began with enlarging operational autonomies 
to provide adequate incentives to managers. This was done in two main ways. One was 
increasing autonomies of production plans which gave managers more rights in setting 
prices and wages, hiring and firing employees, investing of fixed capital and in foreign 
trade through profit retention scheme. And another way was linking profits or losses of 
state enterprises to employees’ benefits, and managers were allowed to share part of 
profits.  
In the 1980s, because of increasing losses incurred by state enterprises, the state started 
to transfer funds to newly founded state enterprises in the format of loans instead of 
appropriations (“loan replacing appropriation”). In 1983, tax reform was undertaken that 
enabled the state to obtain fiscal revenues from the state enterprises by “taxes replacing 
profits turn-in”.  
Organizational reforms were also initiated.  The 3rd Plenary Session of the 12th China 
Communist Party National Congress in 1984 saw the dissociation of state enterprises 
from the government and the separation of ownership rights and control rights. 
Managerial positions in state enterprises were delinked from government hierarchical 
positions. Since 1987, a dual-track price system was adopted in which state-guided 
pricing and market pricing coexisted. Efforts to strengthen corporate governance structure 
were also launched in 1994. Specific measures like manager/contract responsibility 
system were introduced. Pilot state enterprises were started to apply the “modern 
enterprise system” as one of the measure of governance reform. In the same year, the 
Company Laws of People’s Republic of China was promulgated to regulate state 
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enterprises.  
During the 1990s, however, as operating losses of state enterprises mounted under the 
“loan replacing appropriation” system, massive amounts of non-performing loans (NPLs) 
accumulated in the big-4 state-owned commercial banks. Funds from the big-4 banks 
were insufficient to keep the state enterprises solvent. To remedy this situation, the 3rd 
Plenary Session of the 14th China Communist Party National Congress proposed that state 
enterprises should raise finance by public listing in capital markets. But In order to 
prepare for public listing, state enterprises had to corporatize to comply with the 
requirements set by the Company Laws mentioned above. Domestic capital and 
international capital markets were all targeted. Also, in 1994, the policy of “taxes 
replacing profits turn-in” was adopted which meant state enterprises could retain all after-
tax profits. 
Simultaneously, ownership reform proceeded. In 1986, the state introduced the joint-
stock system to state enterprises. The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges were 
founded in 1990 and 1991. Separately, the system of split-share issue became an 
institutional feature in China. Under this system, shares in listed enterprises were 
separated into tradable shares and non-tradable shares. The state and legal persons5 were 
holders of non-tradable shares which could not be traded in the stock market, so that the 
government retained absolute control over the listed enterprises. By contrast, tradable 
shares were public shares that could be traded in the two Stock Exchanges and owned by 
institutional and individual shareholders.  As will be explained later, this was to create 
problems for China’s capital market development. 
 
                                                     
5 “Legal person” is a concept relative to a natural person, which refers to legal organizations including state, corporations, institutions, 
etc. to execute rights and obligations in law. 
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Another major reform initiative was taken in 1995, when a policy called “grasping the 
large (state enterprises), letting go the small” was launched to have the state retain 
ownership/control of the largest state enterprises while smaller enterprises were to be 
either sold or privatized. As a result, a large number of small and medium-sized state 
enterprises were privatized, merged, or shut down while about 1,000 were treated as large 
and owned by the state. This policy was implemented in a number of steps. 
The first step was taken when the 3rd Plenary Session of the 14th China Communist Party 
National Congress promoted the idea of direct financing of enterprises by public listing 
in capital markets (Ifeng Finance, 2013). This was followed in 1999 when the 4th plenary 
session of the 15th China Communist Party National Congress announced plans to 
transform large and medium state-owned enterprises into joint-stock enterprises through 
listing or through directing purchase of equity by foreigners or private parties (People 
Online, 2013). 
However, conflict between holders of non-tradable shares and tradable shares came to a 
head. Because the earnings of non-tradable shares were not influenced by the share price 
and the firm value, the managerial incentives put in place could not induce managers to 
act in the best interest of the enterprise and hence also of the holders of tradable shares. 
Controlling shareholders who were politically appointed preferred to perform well for the 
government. Problems of diversion of enterprise assets and profits for their own interests 
also emerged (Jiang & Habib, 2012). To deal with the problems arising from the split-
share issue, a pilot program with two batches of 46 pilot enterprises was launched. To 
advance and supervise split-share reform, the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC)6 formulated specific suggestions to guide state-
holding listed enterprises.  
                                                     
6 In 2003, SASAC was established under the State Council to supervise and manage state assets by representing the state’s interests. 
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By then, it was clear that holders of tradable shares and non-tradable shares had to come 
to a compromise. This took the form of holders of tradable shares getting additional 
complementary shares from holders of non-tradable shares. SASAC also insisted that for 
state enterprises, there was to be a minimum state share proportion. That was because the 
state would need to retain ownership of state enterprises in strategic sectors considered 
crucial to the country’s national and economic security. Strategic industries included 
financial, mining, steel, telecommunications, transportation, utilities, oil, and military-
related production. If state enterprises operated in strategic industries, the state should be 
in a controlling position (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission, 2006). State shareholders could purchase additional tradable shares through 
capital markets to consolidate their control.  
At the same time, the state-owned/controlled shares were not to be offered for sale within 
the restricted trade period. The release of these shares for sale was a gradual process, with 
no more than 5% of the general capital allowed to be traded after 12 months, 10% after 
24 months and 37.41% after 36 months (State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission, 2005). The increasing number of shares in the market might 
make the share price instability and the share price fluctuate. However, the shares became 
valued by the market and the original problem of non-tradable shares was overcome. And 
holders of non-tradable shares have managerial incentives to make the bank act the best 
performance. Hence, the function of the stock market was to weight the value of state-
owned assets and provide performance measurement criteria. With these institutional 
arrangements in place, the trend towards more tradable share accelerated, so that by 2013, 
only a tenth of state enterprise shares were non-tradable (Table 1.2). 
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Table 1.2: Tradable and Non-Tradable Shares in China’s Share Markets (2004-
2011) 
Year Total Issued Shares 
(Billion) 
Tradable Shares 
(Billion) 
% of Shares 
Tradable 
2004 714.94 257.71 36.05 
2005 762.95 291.48 38.20 
2006 1489.76 563.78 37.84 
2007 2241.69 1033.15 46.09 
2008 2452.29 1257.89 51.29 
2009 2616.29 1975.95 75.52 
2010 3318.44 2564.2 77.27 
2011 3609.55 2885.03 79.93 
2012 3839.50 3133.96 81.62 
2013 4056.91 3674.42 90.57 
Source: Securities market yearly data by China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC), from http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/marketdata/. 
 
The third step occurred in 2007, when state enterprises under SASAC had to submit a 
part of their profits to the Ministry of Finance according to newly issued regulations 
(Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China, 2007). In 2013, the submitted 
profit rate was raised. Most of the summited profits were to be used for the redevelopment 
of state enterprises. These uses included strategic mergers and reorganization of central 
enterprises which are administrated by the central government; strengthening the 
controlling power of these enterprises in strategic industries; enhancing their capacity for 
independent innovation, energy conservations and promoting the development of 
education, agriculture, culture and other related industries; foreign investment and foreign 
economic and technological cooperation (Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of 
China, 2013). 
This account makes it clear that the corporation reform of state enterprises has been 
transformative. On one hand, the state conducted governance reform to cut down its 
control. On the other hand, ownership reform was conducted simultaneously through 
directly transferring a part of state ownership to the public (private, foreign). Mixed 
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ownership forms of state enterprises have also emerged with the state, state legal persons 
(state enterprise), other legal persons (other enterprises), and natural persons (individuals) 
as owners. 
The above reforms have produced what official sources refer to as three types of state-
owned enterprises today, only one of which fits the public enterprise stereotype in 
mainstream Western economics. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2008), state enterprises are classified as follows. 
The first type consists of enterprises wholly owned by the state – referred to as “state-
owned enterprises” – consisting of state-owned corporations and state legal person joint 
ownership enterprises. The second type, referred to as “state-holding enterprises”, are 
those in which the state has majority ownership (more than 50%), or has the highest 
ownership among other shareholders even if it is a minority shareholder (less than 50%), 
or where the state exercises control through other state-controlled shareholders. The third 
type, referred to as “state joint-stock enterprises”, consists of those in which the state has 
minority ownership and exercises no control.  
Those definitions stressed two important themes, i.e. the state’s ownership and control of 
the enterprise. However, after state enterprise reform, the state’s ownership and 
governance of a state enterprise has taken diverse forms. If a study intends to define a 
state enterprise, it has to reference these two features of state ownership and control. 
However, to make things more complex, the government also classifies state enterprises 
by the institutions under which they functioned (Ministry of Finance of the People's 
Republic of China, 2013). Firstly, “Yangqi” (central enterprises) are controlled and 
supervised by the state through SASAC. “Yangqi” cover strategic industries producing 
public goods like national defense, power grid, telecommunications and water, natural 
monopoly products like petrochemical, gas, coal and mineral, and competitive products 
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like civil aviation, shipping, architecture and trade. As of 2014, there are 113 “Yangqi”. 
Most are 100% state-owned. The subsidiaries of “Yangqi” were classified as primary, 
secondary, tertiary and lower subsidiaries (State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission, 2013). 
Secondly, the other strategic sector – that of financial institutions – is supervised by the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC), China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
(CIRC) and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE).  
Lastly, a group of state enterprises is supervised by other departments under the State 
Council or organizations belonging to collectives like tobacco, gold, railway, port, airport, 
radio and television, culture, publishing and other industries. What are called “social 
service organizations” are under this categories. They were engaged in education, 
technology, health, culture, etc., and were set up by the state to provide social welfare and 
were funded by state assets. According to regulations from the State Council, a social 
service organization could not be defined as non-governmental organization or non-profit 
organization. First, it was not just initiated but also supervised by government institutions. 
Second, it could set up for-profit organizations based on Corporate Law (The State 
Council of the People's Republic of China, 2004). 
Figure 1.1 shows the sequence of state enterprise reform. This reform proceeded through 
a process of trial and error, in line with the central government’s intention to incorporate 
the private sector according to the objective of constructing a socialist market economy. 
However, many problems were encountered so that one state enterprise reform called for 
further reform. At the same time, given the importance of state enterprises, the impact on 
them of reform also determined the success or failure of China’s economic transition. 
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Figure 1.1: Transformation of China’s State Enterprises 
Source: Author 
 
1.3 Motivation of Study 
The central question for China’s continued development is whether its development 
model could be sustained with state enterprises leading the economy even with reforms. 
Some economists argued that this was impossible: China’s state enterprises were like 
other countries, and needed further reforms through being denationalized under a market 
mechanism (Qi, 2012). They said this was because they were inefficient, badly run, loss 
making and relied on monopoly power to survive. Some even argued the present state 
enterprises situation could not be sustained.  
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Throwing light on the above question is the overall motivation of this study. In doing so, 
we are conscious of the fact that many scholars were looking at China and its state 
enterprises through mainstream (Western) theoretical perspectives and assumed that 
conclusions from these perspectives were the only valid ones to draw. Since China had 
so many state enterprises that likely impact the country’s development, we need to 
determine if this is indeed the case. While it was true some state enterprises were loss-
making, we need to look deeper to its causes. For instance, if they were originally forced 
to undertake social responsibilities that are now no longer required, does discarding these 
responsibility and producing performance improvement for these enterprises also 
translate to gains for the country as a whole, when all that happened was to transfer these 
responsibilities elsewhere, or, as has happened in China, to discarding them (see Chapter 
4)? 
Several specific issues are ripe for further study within the broad framework outlined 
above. One is the transformational impact of the nature and role of China’s state 
enterprises through state enterprise reform, the characteristics (control modes of the state, 
performances and roles of state enterprises in the economy) of today’s state enterprises. 
Another is whether there exists variation in state enterprise behavior and performance 
among different types of state enterprises, however delineated.  A third is the robustness 
of these enterprises through changes in external conditions, such as the Asian and Global 
Financial Crises of 1997-1999 and 2008 respectively which would have tested the 
efficacy of state enterprise reforms. A fourth is the extent to which China’s state 
enterprises is fulfilling other strategic roles demanded of them by the state. 
A final issue this study hopes to address is the lessons of the China’s state enterprise 
experience for other countries despite the fact that Chinese circumstances differ from 
those of most other countries. The first is that state enterprises can exist in many forms, 
depending on the manner in which they are owned or controlled.  Second, how state 
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ownership and control is exercised has implications for the performance of these 
enterprises. Third, it also affects relations between the state and the private sector. Fourth, 
to the extent that state enterprises play multiple roles, preeminence given to particular 
roles would affect how effectively other roles are played. Finally, context matters in any 
assessment of state enterprise efficacy and performance – the specific circumstances 
facing a country not only shape the role of state enterprises but also how well the function.  
1.4 Problem Statements  
In the China context, the above discussion gives rise to a number of research issues, 
framed here as problem statements. These statements make reference to gaps or 
limitations in the existing literature on this subject. 
Problem Statement 1: Ownership and Control 
Although there was no shortage of literature on China’s state enterprises, characterizing 
today’s state enterprises still faces several major challenges due to their complexity. The 
defining distinction between state and private enterprises based on ownership, encounters, 
for a country as decentralized as China, problems of clarifying which part the state is the 
owner. How much state ownership exists is also hard to tell since some state enterprises 
are not directly owned by the state, but may be owned by an enterprise not with complete 
state ownership, or by multiple such enterprises. And in terms of governance, problems 
like which part of governance state power extends to, or how much state involvement is 
in operations, or how much does the state figure in providing a tilted playground for state 
enterprises, or how many state’s strategies to follow also need to be solved. Therefore, 
specific state-control modes of China’s state enterprises need to be examined.  
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Problem Statement 2: Roles 
Most economists suggested that China’s state enterprises should be privatized to prevent 
them from using their monopoly position to dominate markets while turning in below-
average performances. However, China’s state enterprises are still required to pursue and 
fulfill both commercial and non-commercial responsibilities and obligations. Therefore it 
needs to be further discussed that China’s state enterprises have functions in supporting 
the Chinese economy, like spurring technology innovation to strengthen Chinese 
international competiveness, to help the state overcome crises, and to protect public 
interests. The appropriate role of state enterprises and how well they play this role is the 
second problem to be studied. 
Problem Statement 3: Performance 
Most existing literature sought to verify the relatively poor performance of China’s state 
enterprises by using quantitative methods and comparing them with non-state enterprises, 
sometimes assumed to be synonymous with private enterprises. State ownership and state 
involvement were considered as factors leading to inefficiency. However, as indicated 
earlier, when we examine state enterprises’ performance, we should look beyond 
profitability to take into account other indicators, like the competitive environment they 
were facing and technology innovation they developed. A more comprehensive set of 
indicators of performance needed to be discussed.  
1.5 Research Questions and Objectives 
The problems as stated above raise several important questions. Each research question 
begets a corresponding research objective, which may be further subdivided into sub-
objectives. 
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Research Question 1:  
After state enterprise reform, what is the dynamic role of the Chinese state and its state 
enterprises in terms of ownership structure and governance mechanism (state-control 
mode)? How is it different from state enterprises envisaged in mainstream public 
enterprise theories (agency theory, property rights theory, public choice theory, and 
neoliberalism)? 
Research Objective 1: 
The first objective is to characterize the ownership structure and governance mechanism 
of China’s state enterprises before, during and after reforms, and thereby to analyze the 
dynamics of change and then to understand the extent and nature of control through 
ownership and governance. 
A first sub-objective is to analyze the dynamics of change by looking at how the state 
enterprise has evolved in line with state enterprise reform policies. This evolution can be 
shown to affect performance and to lead to further reforms. 
A second sub-objective is to grasp the role of the state in state enterprises by examining 
the state’s control through ownership and governance. As indicated above, there are 
several ownership forms (state-owned, state-holding and state joint-stock). This role is 
examined through reviewing the governance of state enterprises by looking at hiring 
practices, incentives for performance, transparency of reporting, bureaucrats or 
professional hires, reporting channels, state involvement in decision making, and the 
extent of state support and preferential policies. 
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Research Question 2:  
As key instruments of the state, what roles do China’s state enterprises play to drive the 
growth in the economy, and how different are these roles from those envisaged by 
mainstream public enterprise theories (agency theory, property rights theory, public 
choice theory, and neoliberalism) of state enterprises? 
Research Objective 2: 
The second objective is to examine the roles that state enterprises play in representing the 
state at the macro-level. Specifically, what roles do they play, in major events like China’s 
World Trade Organization (WTO) admission, Global Financial Crisis (GFC), and overall 
economic growth? 
The first sub-objective is to access the extent to which they are successful in meeting 
these objectives. 
A second sub-objective is to find out whether they are trade-offs in meeting various state 
objectives. For instance, how does the profitability objective conflict with the objective 
of social protection? 
Research Question 3:  
The third question is to relate the above issues of ownership structure and governance 
mechanism to performance by asking, how do state enterprises perform in terms of 
profitability, competition and innovation and also how well does this performance accord 
with existing mainstream public enterprise theories (agency theory, property rights theory, 
public choice theory, and neoliberalism)? 
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Research Objective 3:   
The third objective is to find out the performance indicators and evaluate them for 
different types of state enterprises. 
To answer this question there are three sub-objectives.  
Firstly, it is to examine if state enterprises make profits or losses through standard 
profitability indicators like net profit margin, return on assets, and return on equity. 
Secondly, it is to examine the extent to which China’s state enterprise face competition 
from other state enterprises, non-state enterprises (private and foreign) in their markets. 
Lastly, it is to find out if China’s state enterprises engage in innovation, and whether such 
innovation is comparable to that undertaken by private enterprises.     
1.6 Structure of Study 
The study is structured as follows. In the next chapter, theoretical and empirical literature 
on the Chinese state and state enterprises would be reviewed. This would be followed by 
a chapter on the research methodology applied and upon which a conceptual framework 
is built data sources would also be identified chapters 4, 5, 6 are three analytical chapters. 
Chapter 4 reviews China’s state enterprises and their relationship with economic growth 
and distribution. Chapter 5 focuses on a strategic industry – China’s banking sector. 
Chapter 6 then analyzes another major type of state enterprise – “commercial” state 
enterprises – through a case study (Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment (ZTE) 
Corporation). The conclusion chapter would synthesize the findings and draw 
implications for the study of state enterprise. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Much has been written about China’s state enterprises through its several phases of reform. 
As the economic landscape for these enterprises shift with each and each phase of reform, 
so the nature of critiques and assessment of their performance have also changed. By and 
large, however, most studies have been framed by Western theories of and applicable to 
public enterprise, so that conclusions were drawn and assessments made assuming these 
theories hold. But although seldom deployed, alternative theories also have relevance for 
China’s state enterprises. 
With respect to empirical studies, these have been undertaken at different stages of state 
enterprise reforms. As a result, judgments about their efficacy and performance have also 
evolved. Given the size of the state enterprise sector, few studies have been able to claim 
more than partial coverage whether in geographical or institutional terms. 
The situation above speaks to the need to undertake a review of literature that deals with 
both the theories applicable to China’s state enterprises as well as empirical studies that 
cover state enterprises over time and space. This chapter aimed to review the existing 
debates on China's state enterprises that emanate from both theoretical studies and 
empirical studies. 
This chapter has four sections: the next section presents all Western theories on public 
enterprises. They are agency theory, property rights theory, public choice theory, and 
neoliberalism. Section 2.3 is going to do further discussion of alternative theories with 
relevance to Chinese state. They are theories of economic embeddedness, market 
socialism and developmental state, the significance of history to the Chinese state. Section 
2.4 will present empirical studies regarding the performance of China’s state enterprises. 
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Conclusion part will be drawn in section 2.5. 
2.2 Theoretical Studies on Public Enterprises  
A number of theories apply to state enterprises all of which argue for their inferior 
performance compared to enterprises in the private sector. These are agency theory, 
property rights theory, public choice theory and neoliberalism.  
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory was put forward by Jensen and Meckling in 1976 (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Agency theory referred that there would be conflicts between the principal and the 
agent if their interest diverged (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). If the agent became the principal 
of enterprise resources, one would take actions for one own interests (Dharwadkar, 
George, & Brandes, 2000). It stressed the relationship between the provider and the user 
of enterprise resources. As the principal, the provider was also the owner of those 
enterprise resources. The manager who was in charge of those enterprise resources were 
the agent. If the manager was the owner of those enterprise resources, one had the residual 
claim over those enterprise resources, and one would work hard for one own interests. 
Thus, there was no agency problem. However, if the manager increased enterprise assets 
through stock issuing or debt financing and then one did not owned all of those resources. 
And then the manager would have the motivation of perquisite consumption and work 
intensity reduction. There were significant differences from that the manager had all 
enterprise resources. The principal delegated authorities to the agent and the interest of 
the principal would be affected by the choice of the agent. There were possibilities the 
agent might behave against the interest of the principal. There were three agency costs: 
monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual losses. Monitoring costs referred to costs 
that external shareholders spent on monitoring the manger’s perquisite consumption and 
work intensity reduction. Bonding costs referred to costs that the manager spent on self-
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discipline for acquiring the principal’s trust. Residual losses referred to other costs 
resulting from interest conflicts between the principal and the agent. Agency theory tried 
to solve objective conflict problem when the principal let the agent to take action for the 
principal’s interest and the agent used the principal’s enterprise resources (Eisenhardt, 
1985, 1989). Agency problems were related to the type of ownership. The principal 
determined the objective of an enterprise. If state ownership was transferred to private 
hands of a state enterprise, the objective of that state enterprise would change from state’s 
wishes to private owners. Private sector was more efficient than state sector since its 
objective was more considering the profit maximization instead of political issue and 
monitoring (Estrin & Pérotin, 1991). 
2.2.2 Property Rights Theory 
Property rights are determining how the property is used and owned (Alchian, 1987). The 
property can be used by individuals, associations or governments (Guerin, 2003). 
Property rights theory implied that the more direct and strengthened were the rights to the 
property, the better assets would be used (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973). To define the 
property rights could enable the principal exercise his/her rights to realize the optimal 
utilization. Rights included ownership right, possession rights, control rights, use rights, 
earnings rights, and disposition rights. There was no transaction cost as the property 
boundary was clear. The efficiency of resource allocation was decided by the 
distinctiveness of the property boundary (Coase, 1937, 1959, 1960; Stigler, 1971). In an 
enterprise, the relationship between the principal and the agent could also be considered 
as a contract transaction. Therefore property rights within the enterprise were related to 
the efficiency of that enterprise. The principal excised his/her property rights and affected 
his/her properties. The principal had residual claims for his/her properties, then he/she 
had more incentive motivations to improve the efficiency of that enterprise. If state 
ownership was transferred to private hands of a state enterprise, private hands acquired 
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state property rights the private would exercise their rights to realize maximized profits 
on their properties (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Demsetz, 1967). If the state was the owner 
of property, the boundary of property rights was not clear compared to private owners. 
The private sectors would exercise their rights to realize maximized profits on their 
properties. 
2.2.3 Public Choice Theory 
Public choice theory argues that Individuals’ interests were given priority over public 
interests (Buchanan, 1954; Buchanan & Tulllock, 1972). The divergence between the 
state and bureaucrats occurred when bureaucrats focused on their own interests instead 
of public interests. Public interests could not be reflected well by the state, and the state’s 
intention also could not be reflected well by bureaucrats. Accordingly, they imposed on 
state enterprises’ goals that could lead them to acquire political interests which had 
conflicts with efficiency. The wrong motivation led to the inefficiency of state enterprises. 
Private individuals would focus on their own interests to make the enterprise better. It 
suggested state enterprises changing from state-owned to private-owned with less 
political intervention and increasing search for efficiency. The bulk of bureaucrats, 
however, were civil servants whose jobs and payments were protected by a civil service. 
This image was often compared with that of an enterprise owner whose profits were 
determined by the success of production and sale, who aimed to maximize profits, and 
who could hire and fire employees at will. Public choice theory referred that when 
politicians and government officials represented the state to manage public resources, the 
divergence occurred when politicians and government officials focused on their own 
interest instead of the public interests in state enterprises (Tullock, 1987). And public 
interests could not be considered well by the state, while private individuals considered 
their own interests to pursue the efficiency. A group’s objective could not represent 
everyone’s interest well. 
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2.2.4 Neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism supports economic liberalizations, free trade and open markets, 
privatization, deregulation, in other words, neoliberalism stressed private interests or 
private sector within modern society (Collins English Dictionary, 2003). That is to say to 
reduce the government control in the economy (Boas & Gans Morse, 2009). It focused 
on the concept of free market. There was no bond imposed by the state and no state control, 
which led to total freedom of movement for capital, goods and services. Minimization of 
the state involvement would create the condition of marketization and perfect competition. 
The state could not involve in economic activities. Neoliberalism was a label for 
economic liberalism that emphasized the efficiency of private enterprises, liberalized 
trade and relatively open markets, and therefore sought to maximize the role of the private 
sector in determining the political and economic priorities (Harvey, 2005; Shearmur, 
1992). The development of pro-corporate political policies restrict the public arena 
(Chomsky, 1999). Neoliberalism emphasizes the efficiency of private enterprises since 
private sectors had more liberalized trades and relatively open markets which lead to 
efficiency. With interventions imposed by the state, the state enterprise could not be run 
efficiently. Hence, according to this theory, state enterprises should be privatized. 
2.3 Theories Relevance to Chinese State 
There are a number of contextual issues that affect the relevance of the above theories. 
Alternative Western theories have some relevance to the Chinese case and that China has 
borrowed from models that are alternatives to Western mainstream theories of public 
enterprise. These issues also relate to China’s history and cultural traditions. 
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2.3.1 Economic Embeddedness 
Human economy was always embedded in society. The economic activity is intervened 
by non-economic institutions (Plattner, 1989). Even in market societies, economic 
activity is not separated from society (Granovetter, 1985). The term “embeddedness” 
expressed the idea that the economy was not autonomous as it must be in economic theory, 
but subordinated to politics, religion, and arid social relations. It centered on the role of 
the state in the economy. Even though the economy was supposed to be self-regulating, 
the state must play the ongoing role of adjusting the supply of money and credit to avoid 
the twin dangers of inflation and deflation. It became utterly impossible to sustain market 
liberalism’s view that the state was “outside” of the economy (Polanyi, 1957). As the state 
was embedded in society, market liberalism might not work as expected. Accepts system 
that was neither market liberalism nor Marxist (Polanyi, 1944). Viewing of embeddedness 
was more in line with Chinese concept of the state, which, as explained in section 3.1, 
represent just the top tier of an orderly hierarchy. 
2.3.2 Market Socialism 
Market socialism refers to the notion that a socialist state would own the means of 
production but the prices of commodities are determined by the free market for 
equilibrating markets (Buchanan, 1985; Gregory & Stuart, 2004). A socialist state would 
play a guiding role in adjusting market-determined prices to facilitate movement to 
market equilibrium. In a socialist market economy, the state owned, managed and 
administered the means of production while the market distributed resources and 
economic output. The state influenced the level of aggregate investment to be allocated 
by an investment board. The prices of commodities were market-determined (Lange, 
1936, 1937; Le Grand & Estrin, 1989). China is referred to officially as a socialist market 
economy which stemmed from the Chinese economic reform and was introduced by Deng 
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Xiaoping. It was also called “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Deng, 1984). It was 
defined as “a multi-ownership-oriented basic market economic system, with the public 
ownership in the dominance” (People's Daily Online, 2007). And as Deng noted in his 
1984 speech cited earlier, “the socialist sector is the mainstay of our economy”. When 
China began its reform, it felt that it could combine socialism with elements of the market 
economy. The socialist mode of production had to adapt capitalist techniques to thrive 
(Bremmer, 2009; The Economist, 2012). Chinese state had a major influence both on the 
amount and the nature of investment in China, particularly in infrastructure and in the 
selection of key sectors for development, as well as in human capital formation and in the 
direction of scientific and technological research (Tisdell, 2009). When state ownership 
was becoming less and less important in China, the means of production were not 
necessarily owned by the state. Except for strategic state enterprises which the prices were 
mainly determined by the state, other state enterprises had state ownership and market-
determined prices. Thus the free market pricing system had not fully been adopted in 
China.  
2.3.3 Developmental State 
A developmental state is a state that follows a state-designed development path. And it 
had been favoring state interventionism over a liberal open market (Leftwich, 1994).  The 
developmental state was conceptually positioned between a liberal open economy and a 
central planned model. So it was neither capitalist nor socialist. In developmental state 
countries, the state followed a state designed development path. And it had been favoring 
state interventionism over a liberal open market. The developmental state was 
conceptually positioned between a liberal open economy and a central planned model. So 
it was neither capitalist nor socialist. The state has major role, guiding the private sector 
through pro-active industrial policy (Wade, 1990; Woo-Cumings, 1999). The China 
model of development also relies heavily on a proactive state role. This role is not unique 
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to China, being an essential characteristic of the developmental state like Japan (Leftwich, 
1995). Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) of Japan caused the Japanese 
“miracle” during 1920s-1980s. The institutional foundations of Japanese industrial 
policies were manipulated by Japan's bureaucratic elites. The Japanese government could 
perform its countless duties due to its objectives (Johnson, 1982). What is different for 
China is that the respective states (Japan, Korea) intervened in the market to promote 
private sector enterprises (The Economist, 1997), the Chinese state supported its own 
enterprises to promote growth – the so-called “state-led model” (Yip, 2012). Yip 
contrasted the Chinese model with the neoliberal model by characterizing the former as 
“the state controls the capital” and the latter as “capital controlling the state”, a clear 
reference to state capture by capitalist vested interests. Underlying this assumption is the 
Chinese understanding, as stated earlier, that the state and civil society are not mutually 
exclusive but the state is part of society. 
2.3.4 History of Chinese State 
Scholars, especially historians, have argued that China, while adapting to new 
circumstances, always looks back to its own history in seeking solutions to problems and 
challenges. Wang (2014) described how the May 4th Movement of 1919 became a 
reference point for subsequent movements and reforms (Wang, 2014). This is because the 
Chinese state has existed for over two millennia, predating the conceptualization and 
emergence of the now dominant nation state. Although bearing a close resemblance to a 
nation state, and despite transitions from imperial rule through republicanism, Leninism 
and to the ‘market socialism’ of today, all within a century, the modern Chinese state is 
the outcome of centuries of evolution. Kuhn (2002) argued that this state has been “shaped 
decisively by the flow of its internal history”, although external models of governance 
have left their mark (Kuhn, 2002). Nevertheless, the Chinese state remains more the 
product of its own history than of foreign influences. 
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What are the salient characteristics of this indigenously evolved state? First, its prime 
objectives are defense of the realm and guardianship of its civilization and its people, 
including economic modernization and society transformation (Jacques, 2011; 
Shambaugh, 2000). These objectives, together with the need to modernize post-Qing 
Dynasty China, give the state a far larger role than that of a nation state. Pye (1992) 
famously writes that China is a civilization pretending to be a state (Pye, 1992). Jacques 
(2012) and Hsiung (2011) refer to China as a civilization state, wherein lies the entire 
civilization (Hsiung, 2012; Jacques, 2011). Zhang (2012) goes further to characterize the 
country as a ‘civilizational’ state, which combines the essential qualities of a civilization 
state with features of the modern nation state (Zhang, 2012). This role is reinforced by 
China’s modern history, in which the chaos that reigned just after the establishment of the 
1911 republic could only be solved by strong leadership backed by the apparatus of state 
(Zhou, 2010) . Second, the relationship between the state and Chinese society is much 
closer than in Western societies. Indeed, the state is at the apex of an orderly hierarchy in 
which layers of society make up the rest of the pyramid. Not only is there no mutual 
exclusivity between state and society, the state, a product of and deriving its strength from 
Confucian thinking for much of China’s history, is very much part of society, deriving its 
authority from its missions above (Li, 1997).    
That the Chinese state, viewed in its historical context, is materially different from what 
the West believes to be the Western norm for a modern state should lead us, first, to 
question the belief that China’s future depends on its convergence to Western norms of 
state and governance. The assimilation of new concepts of state governance is not 
necessarily a wholesale endorsement of these concepts but rather responses to adapt to a 
changing world, and consistent with what China has done throughout history. The 
Chinese state remains, to borrow from Kissinger “singularly” Chinese, defined by its long 
history and cultural identity (Kissinger, 2011). Second, China’s missions for its state 
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imply a role that goes well beyond what is expected of a nation state. Fairbank noted the 
small size of the Chinese state in relation to its considerable mandate (MacFarquhar & 
Fairbank, 1987). Hence, from a historical perspective, neither the size of the state sector 
nor the Chinese model of state-led growth, also referred to as state capitalism, should 
surprise. These salient features must be borne in mind as we examine the magnitude and 
role of state enterprises. 
2.4 Empirical Studies  
A great deal of empirical research had been done on China’s state enterprises. Some 
support the predictions of mainstream Western theories, others refute them, while yet 
others are inconclusive. In some ways, as the state enterprise sector has been undergoing 
reform, comparing studies of different time periods may not be fully valid. It is also true 
that few studies have examined how state enterprises have changed over time. Those 
below are findings that support mainstream public enterprise theories. Findings that do 
not support mainstream public enterprise theories will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
When the state transferred responsibilities in output decision-making to China’s state 
enterprises and the profit retention rate was raised, managers were paid more bonuses, 
hired more workers and invested for the enterprise. As a result, increased autonomies led 
to higher productivity (Groves, Hong, McMillan, & Naughton, 1994). As state enterprise 
managers were selected and supervised by government bureaucrats, those bureaucrats 
might have incentive problems. With the state sector, agency problems resulted in soft 
budget constraint (SBC) problems (Bai & Wang, 1998). With greater influence from the 
central state and community governments, township-village enterprises (TVEs) aimed to 
achieve community governments’ goals of increasing government revenues, rural 
employment and incomes but they did not compete well due to employment and local 
public goods supply quotas that distorted the market signals they received, so compared 
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to private enterprises, they were inefficient (Jin & Qian, 1998).  
Empirical analysis of China’s state enterprises showed the firms' profitability positively 
related to legal person shares but negatively related to state shares. And labor productivity 
also correlated negatively with state shares. These results suggested the inefficiency of 
state ownership (Xu & Wang, 1999). Till 1996, China’s state enterprises were in a serious 
crisis in terms of their poor performance. The root of this crisis was their high agency 
cost. This high agency cost stemmed from collusion among state agencies (local official 
and state enterprise managers) and an obsolete managerial incentive scheme, which was 
a crucial factor that led to the inefficiency of state enterprises. A better managerial 
incentive scheme for state enterprises managers and less political intervention and 
informational asymmetry were encouraged to monitor state enterprises effectively (Mi & 
Wang, 2000).  
By cross-country empirical analyses on 29 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous 
regions during 1978-1989, conclusions were drawn that private and semi-private 
enterprises contributed to China’s economic growth; in contrast, China’s state enterprises 
damaged growth (Chen & Feng, 2000). Reform of state enterprises in China was 
considered central to restructuring the construction industry. Lack of autonomy and 
unclear boundary of property rights contributed the poor performance, but reform 
measures to solve this inefficiency were not sufficiently bold (Sha & Lin, 2001). 
It was also argued that China needed to privatize state enterprises for maintaining and 
accelerating economic development. In order to achieve successful privatization, 
transfers of technologies by the state were encouraged (Ding & Motwani, 2001). That 
China’s state enterprises’ environmental performance (pollution control performance) 
was worse than private enterprises and foreign enterprises was the conclusion of the 
survey of China’s 1000 industrial enterprises of three provinces and based on enterprise-
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level information in 1999 (Wang & Jin, 2002). Through investigating a sample of state 
enterprises during 1980-1994, in terms of state enterprises’ financing sources for fixed 
investment, it was found that bank finance was linked more to profitability than direct 
government transfers, since getting bank finance enabled state enterprise managers to take 
greater risks (Cull & Xu, 2003).  
Through evaluating 634 listed state-owned enterprises’ that were privatized during 1994-
1998, conclusions were drawn that earning ability, real sales and workers’ productivity 
were improved and state ownership negatively affected the performance of those 
enterprises while foreign ownership did not show significant impact on their performance 
(Sun & Tong, 2003). By examining the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation of 
China’s state enterprises during the 1980s, it was found that compensation was less 
sensitive to enterprise performance, but more sensitive to managerial return (Mengistae 
& Xu, 2004). In socialist and transition economies with serious informational asymmetry, 
policy burdens from the state would result in moral hazard for state enterprise managers 
and soft budget constraint problems, which led to state enterprises’ low efficiency. The 
control power of state enterprise managers also resulted in the inefficiency of state 
enterprises (Lin & Li, 2004).  
Along with profound ownership changes in China’s state enterprises since 1979, 
management of state enterprises was also transformed from central planed into new forms, 
with variations across ownership forms and localities. But reform of state enterprises took 
time because of historical legacies, organizational inertia and continued government 
interference (Hassard, Morris, & Sheehan, 2004). Corporate financing choices and 
dividend distribution decisions were impacted by the extent of political interference, 
managerial entrenchment, and institutional control affects. This result from political costs 
approach suggested a better governance structure in China’s state enterprise reform with 
less state involvements (Su, 2005).  
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Based on a sample of 5284 partially privatized state enterprises in China during 1991-
2001 to examine if the firm value was affected by the ownership structure, state shares 
were negatively correlated with Tobin’s Q (referred to as the firm value) as foreign shares 
were positively related to that Q (Wei, Xie, & Zhang, 2005). Among China’s listed 
enterprises, different types of controlling shareholders had different uses of incentive pay. 
If the controlling shareholder was a state agency, performance related pay was not used. 
If the controlling shareholder was a private block holder or state enterprise, the CEO's 
pay was related to the increase in shareholders' wealth or increase in profitability. But the 
effectiveness of the incentive system was low since CEOs’ pay-performance sensitivity 
was low (Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2006).  
The panel data of 165 rural and urban enterprises of Nanjing city and its environs, 
privatization policies were adopted to weakest unban enterprises, and the private 
ownership contributed to the improvements in terms of productivity and profitability 
(Dong, Putterman, & Unel, 2006). With the state continuing to control China’s state 
enterprises even after the privatization and listing in the stock market, it was found that 
economic efficiency and financial performance were not improved much (Chen, Firth, & 
Rui, 2006). The long-term managerial incentive problem and the management selection 
problem arose from the fact that managers of state enterprises were selected by 
bureaucrats rather than entrepreneurs. These built-in problems of state ownership cannot 
be solved by state-dominated corporatization but only by privatization (Zhang, 2006). 
Chinese leadership gave top priority to building a “harmonious society” which implied 
reducing income and regional disparities. But they found that the faster the economic 
growth the greater the income disparities and the lower the possibility of achieving social 
justice by income redistribution. Hence greater economic efficiency could be realized by 
privatization but at the expense of social justice. Since governments controlled the key 
industrial sectors and maintained monopolies on sectors which were profitable, wealth 
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flowed to the state and the people became poorer. Moreover, due to the state monopoly 
in these sectors, private sectors had to struggle even as it was asked to play an increasing 
role in China’s economy (Zheng & Chen, 2007). When trying to find out if corporate 
ownership was related to enterprises’ equity risk (measured as the volatility of enterprises’ 
stock returns) and stock returns in China, results emerged that state ownership led to 
higher stock volatility and lower stock returns. State ownership increased agency conflicts 
because of diverse incentives of bureaucrats and state agencies in the process of 
maximizing the firm value (Zou & Adams, 2008). 
Generally speaking, it was also found that state-owned banks in China were less cost-
efficient and profit-efficient than joint-stock banks (Ariff & Can, 2008). Foreign banks 
were also found to be more efficient than the big-4 state-owned banks in China. Even the 
minority foreign ownership within big-4 state-owned banks in China had a significant 
positive effect on the performance in terms of efficiency (Berger, Hasan, & Zhou, 2009). 
The big-4 state-owned commercial banks had the worst performance in terms of 
profitability, efficiency and asset quality than private and foreign banks in China. 
However, foreign acquisition or public listing could be the positive factor to improve their 
performance (Lin & Zhang, 2009). A joint-stock structure was verified to be more 
profitable for Chinese bank compared to state ownership (Jiang, Yao, & Zhang, 2009).  
Another study found that the privatization of China’s state enterprises resulted in higher 
sales, labor productivity and profitability, the last because of decreases of the managerial 
expenses to sales. The impact of privatization was more sustainable when state ownership 
was reduced from majority to minority in an enterprise (Bai, Lu, & Tao, 2009). By 
examining how much a sample of 461 publicly listed manufacturing enterprises’ 
corporate governance practices affected their productive efficiency during 1999-2002, 
conclusions were drawn that state ownership and state legal person negatively affected 
efficiency because of political interference. The greater the transfer of state ownership 
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and control to private hands, the more efficiencies were achieved in corporate in China 
(Lin, Ma, & Su, 2009). As bank management of China was appointed by the government, 
with little managerial expertise and ineffective incentive schemes, it was hard for them to 
maximize the shareholders’ interests. Diversification in loans, deposits, assets, and 
geography were associated with worse performance and lower efficiency. But foreign 
ownership could play a mitigating role in the diseconomies of diversification (Berger, 
Hasan, & Zhou, 2010). 
When controlling shares were transferred from the state to private owners, the 
performance was improved significantly in a sample of 127 Chinese listed enterprises. 
This result suggested that the Chinese state should continue to reduce its controlling 
ownership to enhance operating efficiency and profitability (Huang & Wang, 2011). The 
central government’s control also had negative significant influence on the performance 
of privatized state enterprises (Yang, 2012). 
Li (2013) argued that the 4 trillion stimulus plan to combat the Global Financial Crisis 
accelerated the credit dilation of the banking sector and increased risks associated with 
NPLs. Under the Basel Accords III, the refinancing of banks was aimed at banks meeting 
the specified capital adequacy ratio. Because of lower interest margins, banks would 
exaggerate the size of their balance sheets to keep profits (Li, 2013). The corruption 
problem of state enterprises were gradually exposed during recent years, and to a certain 
extent, or for a specific area, it showed a high trend, and the problem is increasingly 
serious (Zhu, 2014). The government intervention through political incentives and the 
uncertainty of executive appointment damaged the performance of state enterprises. 
Abandoning the administrative selection system of the state enterprise executives was 
considered key to improving efficiency and speeding up  compensation reform (Wang & 
Wei, 2014). State enterprise monopoly, on the other hand, had negatively impacted 
performance (Du, Tian, Zhang, & Li, 2014). Reducing the policy burdens of state 
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enterprises with was a way to improve the performance. The measurement for the policy 
burdens was enterprise staff redundancy rate (Chen & Tang, 2014). 
Findings, to be elaborated later, that do not support mainstream public enterprise theories 
studies that challenge the conventional arguments do so from several standpoints. One is 
that what to do with state enterprises was not a black-and-white case of privatization but 
depended on state enterprise performance itself. Another is based on the many non-
economic objectives state enterprises had to achieve. 
2.5 Conclusion: A Critique of Existing Literature 
Theories related to public enterprises were reviewed. Western models have been 
extensively applied to China’s state sector. These models, agency theory, property rights 
theory, public choice theory and neoliberalism, argued against state involvements in state 
enterprises. The role of the state in state enterprises was considered as inefficient. 
However, in China’s case, we could not look only in this angle because of contextual 
differences between China and other states. Additionally, other theories relevant to 
Chinese state have been ignored. 
Secondly, since reform has transformed these enterprises over time, any time series 
analysis that includes major reform changes would capture neither the situation before 
nor the situation after these changes. The relevance of such results can be called into 
question.   
Thirdly, in reviewing the transitional process of China’s state enterprises, it should first 
be noted that the state’s control in state enterprises varies. From enterprise to enterprise, 
the nature of China’s state enterprises transforms all the time. What needs to be researched 
is how to capture the latest changes. China’s state enterprises represent a new complex 
ownership and governance form, requiring clarification of the extent of the state’s 
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involvement is. This means that cross-section studies capture not a homogenous group of 
enterprises but a large variety of enterprises in various states of transformation and with 
varying degrees of state ownership. How ownership power is exercised also varies from 
enterprise to enterprise. Like time series analyses, the generalizability of findings from 
these studies would thus be compromised. Further, given the limitations of both time 
series and cross sectional data applied to state enterprises in China, the use of panel data 
only compounds these limitations. 
Fourthly, the Chinese state may have other objectives not highlighted in Western theories. 
The focus on efficiency and profitability obscures an important role of state enterprises 
to take on positive externalities, chief among them being the provision of a social safety 
net for workers. So the role of state enterprise in much of the current discussion is not 
complete. To be fair, the internalization of externalities is very much a part of mainstream 
economic theory of the role of government. It is this preoccupation with efficiency, 
perhaps abetted by neoliberalism, which is to blame. 
The most important conclusion to emerge from this literature review is that given the 
complexity of China’s state enterprises, multi-firm or sectorial analysis, even if yielding 
important findings, must be complemented by in-depth studies of major enterprises, with 
the choice of enterprises made to cover different enterprise types. This brings us back to 
the challenging task of classification of state enterprises. Nevertheless, a good starting 
point is the official classification into three broad types – strategic/central enterprises 
wholly owned by the state, state-holding enterprises in which the government is the 
majority or largest single shareholder, and state joint-stock enterprises which the state 
exercises no control. This is the approach adopted in this study. 
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, four mainstream theories applicable to public enterprises – agency theory, 
property rights theory, public choice theory and neoliberalism were reviewed, which 
could be theoretical pillars for this research to examine China’s state enterprises. Besides 
these four mainstream theories, another four alternative theories could also be considered 
to explain the role of China’s state enterprises as vital institutions of the Chinese state. 
These were economic embeddedness, market socialism, developmental state, and the 
history of the Chinese state. Indicators like control modes of the state, roles and 
performance of state enterprises in the economy, also discussed in Chapter 2, could be 
used to measure the performance of China’s state enterprises. The conceptual framework 
for this research would be built up from these discussions. Based on this conceptual 
framework, three analytical chapters flesh out the main aspects of the nature of Chinese 
state and China’s state enterprises. This chapter sets out the theoretical framework, the 
research methodology and the data used to support arguments in these three analytical 
chapters. 
The next section lays out the theoretical framework for this research. This is the basis for 
the conceptual framework in section 3.3. Section 3.4 presented the design for the whole 
research. Section 3.5 describes the qualitative methods chosen and the rationale for their 
use, together with specific examples to show how their use is appropriate. 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
The starting point for developing the theoretical framework is the set of four theories 
applicable to public enterprise outlined above and the main conclusions they arrived at.  
This framework is shown in Figure 3.1.  As already discussed, agency theory postulated 
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that there would be interest conflicts between the principal and the agent if their interests 
diverged (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). Property rights theory implied that the more direct 
and strengthened were the rights to the property, the better its assets would be used 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1973). Public choice theory then argued that when politicians and 
government officials represented the state to manage public resources, they would give 
priority to their own interests instead of public interests that state enterprises were to cater 
to (Tullock, 1987). Finally, neoliberalism emphasizes the efficiency of private enterprises 
since private sectors face competition and open markets both of which lead to efficiency. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Theoretical Framework: Four Public Enterprise Theories 
 
The above four economic theories suggested privatization of state enterprises as the 
appropriate strategy in the economic development of a nation. Figure 3.1 showed that if 
privatization was adopted by the state enterprise according to above theories, the 
enterprise would be much more efficient. Thus, mainstream theories combine to argue for 
decreased state involvement in order to realize better enterprise performance. 
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Figure 3.2: Theoretical Framework: Four Relevance of Theories to Chinese State 
 
However, the four preceding theories have limited applicability to China, which has lived 
under a social and political system quite unlike the modern (Western) notion of a nation 
state against which these theories had been framed. Other Western theories also have 
partial relevance for China’s state enterprises. As already discussed, one is related to the 
concept of “economic embeddedness” in which it is argued that human economy was 
always embedded in society (Granovetter, 1985). The term “embeddedness” expresses 
the idea that the economy was not autonomous as it was assumed in economic theory, but 
subordinated to politics, religion, and social relations. Another is market socialism.  
Features of the developmental state also apply to China, as does Lange’s market socialism, 
although it comes “with Chinese characteristics”. 
Scholars, especially historians, have argued that China, while adapting to new 
circumstances, always looks back to its own history in seeking solutions to problems and 
challenges. As an example, Wang (2014) described how the May 4th Movement of 1919 
became a reference point for subsequent movements and reforms (Wang, 2014). Thus, as 
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described earlier, recognizing China’s context is vital to any understanding China’s 
institutions and policies. 
Like the four theories before them, the above four theories of the Chinese state stress the 
importance of the role of the state and argues for the preservation of that role. Clearly, the 
Chinese assumption is diametrically opposed to that of mainstream Western theories 
considered applicable to public enterprises. 
3.3 Conceptual Framework 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Conceptual Framework 
These theories are brought together in the conceptual framework for this study.  The latter 
is shown graphically in Figure 3.3. Based on this conceptual framework, this research is 
developed in the following sequence: 
1. A critical review is undertaken of prevailing theories relating to the role of the state and 
its enterprises in the Chinese context (already undertaken);  
2. An alternative set of theories that recognizes a more positive role of the state is 
postulated that, while not totally relevant, can provide a better assessment of the role of 
the Chinese state (already undertaken);  
3. The modified framework is applied to state enterprises to examine the nature of Chinese 
state and state enterprises. Initially, by examining the ownership structure and governance 
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mechanism, this study could find out what the state’s role in state enterprises is and how 
the state exercises this control after state enterprise reform. Three dimensions of the role 
of these enterprises are analyzed next.  
4. For strategic state enterprises, the functioning of state enterprises would be interpreted 
to inspect the state’s dominating role in the state-led growth strategy adopted by China;  
5. In addition to supporting the state, state enterprise reform has also incorporated the 
profit motive. To what extent can these objectives be reconciled is an important area of 
enquiry;  
6. For state enterprises competing in the market, it is interesting to see how the state’s 
control affects their performance;  
3.4 Analytical Framework 
The three dimensions above are the substance of three analytical chapters (Figure 3.4). 
Initially, this research would assess the nature of Chinese state and its enterprises through 
a country-level analysis. Understanding China’s state enterprises should be based on 
analyzing the Chinese state in historical context. And then indicators like ownership, 
governance and performance would be used to characterize China’s state enterprises. 
Performance measurements included profitability, competition and innovation. Then this 
research would correlate state enterprises with both economic growth and social welfare. 
The first analytical chapter would provide a general framework for a more detailed 
examination of major types of state enterprises. 
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Figure 3.4: Analytical Framework 
 
Then this study would fit this framework into two different state-control modes. The first 
one referred to state-holding enterprises occupying strategic sectors. Those state 
enterprises are referred to as strategic state enterprises. In strategic industries like 
financial, mining, steel, telecommunications, transportation, utilities, oil, and military-
related production which were crucial to country’s safety and the lifeline of national 
economy, the state should be in a controlling position. The banking sector is chosen as 
representing these enterprises since it is always crucial to the national economy. Lessons 
of history for Chinese state will be drawn by looking back to the history of Chinese state 
and China’s banking sector to identify the prime directives for the Chinese state. After the 
banking sector was restructured by state enterprise reform, the controlling role of the state 
was undiminished. The prices they charged were determined primarily by the state. But 
state control did not extend to day-to-day operations. What motivated this retention of 
ownership and at what cost to the state? 
The second example was of a state-holding enterprise with reduced state ownership as a 
result of state enterprise reform, but without commensurate diminution of state control. 
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This control ensured that the state strategies were followed. But this control did not 
extended to day-to-day operations since corporate management had been left in 
professional managers’ hands. And the state offered preferential benefits or those state 
enterprises for their technology development and private enterprises also enjoyed the 
same treatment. Under this state-control mode, their performance and functions for the 
state would be examined.   
3.5 Specific Methodology 
This study uses four qualitative methods: the historical narrative and case study as two 
main methods with ethnography and phenomenology as the other two supporting methods. 
It uses secondary data analysis to support the four qualitative methods. 
3.5.1 Why Qualitative Paradigm? 
By reviewing empirical studies that assess China’s state enterprises’ ownership, 
governance, performances and roles since the beginning of state enterprise reform, it was 
found that the main methodologies applied were quantitative. Researchers usually used a 
sample of state enterprises within a specific period or in specific areas to run regressions 
to estimate the relationships among variables. But since China’s state enterprises were 
transformed all the time under state enterprise reform, the condition facing these 
enterprises was not static. As a result, conclusions reached were of little use for 
generalization. Another feature of China’s state enterprise reform over the years is that 
every state enterprise was transformed at its own pace, which means that they could not 
be neatly put into groups. Throughout the reform, the state ensured that its strategies are 
followed, but how much or to what extent the state enterprise has been transformed 
through alternative methods the state enterprise chose, was hard for the state to control 
effectively. In addition, state ownership in a state enterprise has also become very hard to 
measure. Thus, while most state enterprises are joint-stock entities, the ownership forms 
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are diverse and complex and also the state usually owns a state enterprise indirectly and 
through many hierarchies. 
Due to the complexity of China’s state enterprises and the environment under China’s 
economic framework, those empirical studies could not claim comprehensiveness of 
coverage. Given those challenges, the qualitative research approach makes for a better 
understanding of the complex rationale, through identification, description and 
interpretation. It also focused on the identification of inconsistencies.  
Qualitative research is the study of the empirical world from the viewpoint of the person 
under study. It has two underlying principles. The first is that behavior is influenced by 
the physical, socio-cultural, and psychological environment – this is the basis for 
naturalistic inquiry. The second principle is that behavior goes beyond what is observed 
by the investigator. Subjective meanings and perceptions of the subject are critical in 
qualitative research, and it is the researcher's responsibility to access these (Schmid, 1981). 
Kirk and Miller (1988) suggested a working definition of qualitative research that reflects 
these two principles. They defined it as "a particular tradition in social science that 
fundamentally depends on watching people in their own territory and interacting with 
them in their own language, on their own terms" (Kirk & Miller, 1988). Qualitative 
research encompasses many methods and approaches. The next section discuss four of 
these and explain why and how these are applied in this study. 
3.5.2 Historical Narrative 
Historical research has been defined as the systematic and objective location, evaluation 
and synthesis of evidence in order to establish facts and draw conclusions about the traces 
that past events left behind (Gardner, 2006). In historical research, the investigator studies 
documents and other sources that contain facts concerning the research theme with the 
objective of achieving better understanding of present policies, practices, problems and 
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institutions. Historical studies attempt to provide information and understanding of past 
historical, legal and policy events (Howell & Prevenier, 2001). The objective of historical 
research is to find out solutions to current problems which have their roots in the past, to 
use the past to predict the future or to test theories and hypotheses about the past. Its 
characteristics are not just a compilation of facts but involves explanation, interpretation 
of, and nuances, persons, ideas influencing events; data collection and analysis with 
multiple foci – events, changes, concepts, people, institution (Garraghan, 1946; Shafer & 
Bennett, 1969). 
The historical approach has particular relevance for China. The Chinese have always 
relied on learning from the past; to them, the past has never been a foreign country.  Thus 
Chinese leaders and their advisers today are not only looking at the globalizing world 
outside but also inwards to the Chinese past for ideas to help them think about the future 
(Wang, 2014). So referring to Chinese history provides lessons for the Chinese state of 
today. China cannot blindly copy what other countries have done but has to refer to its 
history to make decision.  
This method for achieving better understanding of present policies, practices, problems 
and institutions by past events is adopted in Chapter 4 to talk about the history of Chinese 
state and in Chapter 5 to speak of the history of China’s banking sector. Through 
describing the history of the Chinese state, one section of Chapter 4 stresses that the 
Chinese state is shaped decisively by the flow of its internal history, but not the currently 
prevalent nation state and state concept is very strong. In Chapter 5, the description of the 
history of China’s banking sector is used to explain how the previous governments had 
tried to keep control of this crucial sector and why the state’s role is regarded as important 
since Qing Dynasty. 
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3.5.3 Case Study 
Case study is a research method to do descriptive, exploratory or explanatory analysis of 
a person, group or event. Causation is explored to find underlying principles for an 
explanatory case study. The case can be chosen from historical records or as it becomes 
available, that is, case studies could be retrospective or prospective (Jon & Greene, 2003; 
Yin, 2009). This method focuses on analyzing persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, 
policies, institutions, or other systems. The subject of the inquiry of the case provides the 
objective of the study (Thomas, 2011). The case study method is most appropriate in 
situations where it is impossible to separate the phenomenon from its context, in other 
words, it studies complex phenomena within their contexts. Case study is a valuable 
method for researchers to develop theory, evaluate programs, and develop interventions 
(Baxter & Jack, 2008). The method includes single and multiple case studies, and multiple 
sources of evidence also can includes quantitative ones. Case study research can be based 
on prior development of theoretical propositions (Siegfried, 2005). 
In the context of this research, determining the extent of state ownership is important for 
understanding the role of the state in China’s state enterprises. However, as already 
indicated, the state’s ownership was also hard to grasp since the ownership forms were 
diverse. In terms of the state’s control over a state enterprise, it is even harder to capture. 
The control methods included intervention in day-to-day operations, presence on the 
board of directors, preferential treatments and so on. Due to such diversity, doubts existed 
as to whether comprehensive analysis is possible. Thus, to do deep analysis, it would be 
better to examine the above questions through the lens of specific cases. 
This method for understanding complex issues will be adopted in Chapter 5 to use the 
Bank of China (BOC) as a brief case study and Chapter 6 to use ZTE Corporation in an 
era of reform as a single case to do in-depth investigation. In Chapter 5, a case study of 
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the BOC was undertaken to see how the Chinese government has tried to improve the 
efficiency of the banking sector while at the same time ensuring that it follows and 
supports the government’s strategies/policies. This case is embedded in the historical 
approach described earlier, and illustrates the complementary application of both main 
approaches. 
Also, in Chapter 6, this study would use a case – ZTE Corporation – to verify the success 
of one of the state-control mode. ZTE Corporation has been transformed by China’s state 
enterprise reform. This chapter shows how ZTE Corporation followed the state’s 
strategies to restructure and what alternative reform measures it adopted. Its ownership 
structure was complex while state ownership was decreasing to an unobvious level. 
3.5.4 Ethnography 
The research method ethnography is designed to explore the cultural phenomena 
stemming from the researcher’s observation of the society from the point of view of the 
subject of the study. It writes about the culture of a group (Hobbs, 2006; Sanjek, 1996). 
The results of a case represent the system of meanings in the lives of a cultural group 
(Geertz, 1973, 1994; Philipsen, 1992). As the empirical data is from human societies and 
cultures, ethnography is popular in the social science when people explore particular 
ethnic groups. A comprehensive ethnography study includes the history, the terrain, the 
climate and the habitat, and contributes to the understanding of humans’ social life and 
records all observed behavior (Ember & Ember, 1977; Heider, 1997). Data collection is 
to grasp the social meanings and ordinary activities of people in naturally occurring 
settings (Brewer, 2000). 
This study also uses ethnography as a support research method because of its belief in the 
importance of culture in shaping Chinese institutions, beliefs and behavior. This method 
will be reflected in Chapter 4 by the history of Chinese state, stressing the role played by 
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Confucianism. Confucianism can be dated back over two millennia and it is the abiding 
cultural-political ideology for the entire history of imperial China as the basis of the view 
of the state. Despite the official repudiation of Confucianism by the leadership led by 
Mao Zedong in the earlier years of the People’s Republic, a value system heavily 
influenced by Confucianism remains intact while the philosophy itself has reemerged to 
be endorsed by the leadership, with the establishment of Confucius Institutes worldwide 
the most obvious manifestations of this endorsement (Paradise, 2009). 
3.5.5 Phenomenology  
Phenomenology investigates the phenomenon which people experience or think about 
(Marton, 1986). Phenomenology illuminates and identifies phenomena through how they 
are perceived by the actors in a situation. It gathers deep information and perceptions by 
inductive, qualitative channel like interviews, discussions and participant observation, 
and representing it from the research participants. It is based on personal knowledge and 
subjectivity and stresses the personal perspective and interpretation (Lester, 1999). 
This study will used this method as a supporting method to use specific events. This 
would be reflected in Chapter 5 by stressing the role and performance of China’s banking 
sector in China’s joining WTO and during and after the GFC.  
3.5.6 Data Sources 
These qualitative research methods are supported by secondary data analysis. Data 
sources include primary data and secondary data. Primary data came from in-depth 
interviews through open-ended discussions with government officials, and state 
enterprise’s key persons. This study uses data from interviews with selected state 
enterprises’ key persons which formed the basis of case studies. Secondary data consist 
of online databases such as China Statistical Yearbook and CEIC Database, existing 
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literature, and annual reports of selected state enterprises, historical facts, and event 
analysis. Especially for listed state enterprises, information was abundant in their official 
websites. Such information included shareholder structure, assets, and profits. 
Disaggregate data sources for Chapter 4, 5, 6 are as follows. 
In Chapter 4, an overall analysis would be developed based on evidences from existing 
literature on the Chinese state and China’s state enterprises, as well as online databases. 
Data like selected statistics of Chinese industrial state enterprises during 2000-2009 from 
China Statistical Yearbook and selected macroeconomic indicators of China’s economic 
growth and income distribution during 1980-2009 from World Bank database would be 
looked at. 
In Chapter 5, the data sources are online sources and existing literature, like Statistics of 
China Banking Regulatory Commission and Statistics and Analysis Department, the PBC. 
This chapter analyzes the ownership structure of China’s big-5 banks today by looking 
their latest annual reports to find out how much is each bank’s state ownership. This 
chapter also uses the banks’ annual reports and information from interviews and 
discussions with individuals knowledgeable about those banks. 
In Chapter 6, the main data sources are interviews with key persons in ZTE Corporation 
and government officials. The data on tradable and non-tradable shares in China’s share 
markets during 2004-2012 are from the CSRC. Data on ownership structure, change in 
state ownership of ZTE Corporation during 1998-2012, and financial performance during 
2001-2012 were from annual reports of ZTE Corporation. Data for the global top five 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) applicants and the number of international applications 
during 2008-2012 are from PCT Newsletter by World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO). 
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CHAPTER 4 CHINA’S STATE ENTERPRISES, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND 
DISTRIBUTION 
4.1 Introduction 
China’s arrival at centre stage has made it the focus of attention among Western and 
Western-trained commentators in general and economists in particular. As China’s 
impressive economic advance has been achieved under a political system and via 
strategies that are both antithetical to dominant Western thinking, this attention has at 
times been hostile.7 
The sustainability of China’s existing political order and the economic model it has 
deployed are the two themes that run through the discourse on China. Pei (2006)’s 
observation on the first theme is representative: 
“Beijing’s brand of authoritarian politics is spawning a dangerous mix of crony 
capitalism, rampant corruption, and widening inequality ... if current trends 
continue, China’s political system is more likely to experience decay than 
democracy ... the very policies that the party adopted to generate high economic 
growth are compounding the political and social ills that threaten its long-term 
survival” (Pei, 2006b). 
The premise of statements of this genre therefore is that China does not embrace 
democracy, specifically Western-style democracy, and liberal market economics. The first 
theme then begets the second – which an authoritarian regime is incompatible with a true 
market economy. Thus, Chang (2010) notes: 
“A true market economy, for example, requires the rule of law, which in turn 
requires “institutional curbs” on government. Because these two limitations on 
power are incompatible with the Party’s ambitions to continue to dominate society 
China cannot make much progress toward them, at least as long as the Communist 
Party is around” (Chang, 2010). 
                                                     
7 Two examples from credible sources suffice to prove the claim. John Mickleth wait opined that “the country’s rulers are acutely 
aware that their government does not serve ordinary Chinese well”. This judgement was based on a single person’s view, and the 
article was not even entirely about China (The Economist, 2011). Arthur Kroebar (2012), in explaining China’s continued resilience 
to the global finance crisis, ended his article with the account of China’s “second-rate society” being built upon inequality, and this is 
ironic considering the revelations about what unfettered capitalism had produced in 21st-century United States (Kroeber, 2012). 
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Only liberal democracy, expressed in political and economic terms, has a future; efforts 
to graft Western institutions onto an authoritarian structure will also not succeed.8 
The Chinese model not only defies this prescription but goes beyond mixing political 
authoritarianism with market economics. It espouses state-led growth. State enterprises 
are central to this strategy. However, many commentators argue that China’s state 
enterprise sector is a drag on the economy and needs to be reformed through privatisation 
or liquidation (Kwan, 2010; Lal, 2006), and that these enterprises would not have 
survived had it not been for the government’s role in tilting the playing field in their favour. 
This chapter presents an alternative view of Chinese state enterprises, arguing that these 
enterprises are part and parcel of the role of the state that has been historically at variance 
with that of most other nation states. It delves deeper into the discussion beyond the arena 
of economics that economic studies of the Chinese state and its enterprises largely neglect. 
Direct application of Western theories relating to state enterprises with their built-in 
assumptions is therefore a flawed approach. 
Lacking a national data set and limited sector-wide statistics, this chapter bases its 
analysis on empirical work undertaken by numerous researchers. The discussion is 
therefore anecdotal and subjected to the same limitations this body of work is saddled 
with. Since empirical research deals with specific aspects or particular geographic areas, 
any macroeconomic implications drawn are necessarily tentative. 
In the next section, the Chinese state is placed in its historical context as a basis for a 
more balanced assessment of its state enterprises. The section 4.3 reviews the role of state 
enterprises within the framework of the Chinese state. The 4.4 and 4.5 sections examine, 
at the sectoral and macroeconomic levels, the possible links between the state enterprise 
                                                     
8 In referring to China’s “trapped transition”, Pei (2006) goes further to question the Chinese leadership’s motives for reform, noting 
that “the ruling elites have little interest in real reforms. They may pledge reforms, but most such pledges are lip service or tactical 
adjustments aimed at maintaining the status quo” (Pei, 2006a). 
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sector and China’s economic growth and income/wealth distribution, followed by the 
conclusion in the section 4.6. 
4.2 Understanding State Enterprises – The Chinese State in Historical Context 
In economic terms, the dominant Western view of the role of the state is that of an 
internaliser of externalities and a provider of public goods. In support of this view, a range 
of theories – public choice, agency, organisation and property rights – also seek to explain 
the differences between state and private enterprise performance. Their conclusion, that 
private enterprises perform better than state enterprises, speaks of the importance of 
ownership, and is premised upon the clear distinction between state and private sector 
activity, or, more broadly, between state and civil society. 
Since state enterprises are institutions of the state, their role depends on the larger role of 
the state. There is now increasing recognition that the latter role is at variance with the 
role of the state envisaged by Western economists for at least two reasons, both of which 
have historical and cultural roots (Hsiung, 2012; Jacques, 2009; Zhang, 2012). First, the 
modern Chinese state has been largely shaped by its long history rather than by principles 
that under-pin the prevailing nation states, the history of which is much more recent. 
Despite transitions from millennia of imperial rule through republicanism, Leninism and 
to “market socialism” today, the Chinese state has endured being “shaped decisively by 
the flow of its internal history”(Hsiung, 2012; Kuhn, 2002) rather than by external models 
of governance, which were, however, eventually absorbed by the indigenously developed 
Chinese state. 
Regardless of the influences that impact the Chinese state, continuity and perpetuation 
are ensured by its enduring missions, which, as stated by Jacques (2011) (Jacques, 2011) 
and Shambaugh (2000) (Shambaugh, 2000), are in defence of the realm and guardianship 
of its civilisation and its people, including economic modernisation and social 
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transformation. The second mission in the guardianship of its civilisation gives China’s 
its distinctiveness – in the state lies the entire civilisation, leading Jacques to call it a 
civilisation state which is distinct from a nation-state.9 
The dominant role of the state in China is not hard to understand from a historical 
perspective. For thousands of years, China was under imperial rule, it being accepted by 
Chinese society that the emperor as the Son of Heaven and the father of the people has 
absolute authority to rule under the Mandate of Heaven. This Mandate was derived not 
from laws or rules but from moral authority. This authority was further embedded by the 
state’s and society’s embrace of Confucianism. Confucian philosophy held that there 
existed a natural order in the universe and that this order should be reflected in human 
relations, including that between the emperor and his subjects. 
This moral authority was exercised through officials, referred to as “fu mu guan” (parental 
officials). The state played its role by engaging in public works that enhanced or 
guaranteed the welfare of subjects, the Great Wall of China and the Grand Canal being 
outstanding examples (Parker, 1908). An even better example is the state’s role in taming 
the Yellow River over the last four millennia. This river, seen as the cradle of Chinese 
civilization, has been both a source of sustenance but also of immense destruction. 
Connell (2013) noted: 
“The productivity made possible by the Yellow River has provided the economic 
surpluses that have supported brilliant civilizations in the region since the second 
millennium BCE, but its periodic breakouts and changes in direction as it threads 
across more than five thousand kilometers of western and northern China have 
caused some of the worst disasters in recorded history” (Connell, 2013).  
Modern Chinese history is also conducive to the growth of a strong state. Zhou (2010) 
argues that there was a need for a strong state in post-Qing dynasty China as the country 
                                                     
9 This term is used also by Hsiung (2012) (Hsiung, 2012). Zhang Weiwei (2012) calls China a civilisational state with “its own intrinsic 
logic of evolution and development” (Zhang, 2012). 
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attempted to maintain social stability and modernise rapidly, following the example of 
Japan’s Meiji era (Zhou, 2010). An alternative explanation for China’s current brand of 
market socialism being a variant of modern capitalism focuses on the country’s recent 
history as it makes the transition from a command economy (Gabriele & Schettino, 2012). 
Gabriele, a proponent of this explication, argues that China’s recent history makes for an 
important state role. Although rife with faults, China’s market socialism may evolve into 
a more sophisticated form with no diminution in the size of the state. Thus, history has 
produced a role for the Chinese state that goes well beyond the mandate of the nation 
state, which is legalistic and political. This is well recognised by Western historians and 
political scientists, if not by economists (Kuhn, 2002; Shambaugh, 2000; Wong, 1997). 
Second, the concept of state and civil society as being mutually exclusive – regarded 
largely as the norm of Western societies – has also been challenged by some scholars for 
being inapplicable to China (Huang, 2008; Wakeman, 1993). These scholars view the 
relationship between the state and civil society in China as non-mutually exclusive – that 
is, the state, albeit a large discrete part of it, is very much a part of society and works 
closely rather than in competition with the civil society. Thus, the debate about the 
appropriate size of the government is immaterial for China. 
Historians have recognised that Confucianism, which dates back over two millennia and 
was the abiding cultural-political ideology for the entire history of imperial China, forms 
the basis of the Chinese view of the state. The resilience of Confucianism is demonstrated 
by the fact that it is experiencing a revival under the current regime. According to 
Confucius, the state is rooted in the Chinese civilisation and constitutes the highest 
hierarchy in the social order, below which are the family and the individual.10 Li (1997) 
argues that the values of a hierarchical paternalistic system are not necessarily compatible 
                                                     
10 “Yu zhi qi guo zhe, xian qi qi jia” (欲治其国者，先齐其家) (To rightly govern the state, it is necessary first to regulate one’s own 
family) (Dawson, 2005). 
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with the Western notions of democracy, which stress the exercise of personal rights (Li, 
1997). Instead of equal rights entitlement as protection for the weak, Confucianism relies 
on “ren” (仁), an attribute loosely translated as benevolence, imposing limitations on the 
stronger ones. Thus, this explains why liberal democracy as understood in the West is 
alien to China for much of its history. While this is also true even for many Western 
European countries, the dominance of Confucianism as the accepted code of conduct in 
China’s society throughout its history sets the country apart from other countries. The “ke 
ju” (科举) system of examinations is based on Confucian principles for professional 
advancement in government service, and the state was the primary source of employment 
and career progression, thereby ensuring the state’s pre-eminence in Chinese society.11 
The dominance of Confucianism in Chinese politics and society notwithstanding, it is not 
the only philosophy that was important in China’s history. Legalism (Fa jia (法家)), 
which gained preeminence during the time of Shi Huangdi and also during later parts of 
Chinese history, was, in its emphasis on rules and institutions rather than relationships, 
antithetical to Confucianism (Zhou, 2011). Yet not only did it not challenge imperial rule, 
it advocated absolute power for the ruler and was associated with harsh, authoritarian rule 
by the state (Fu, 1996).  In addition, it is materially different from Western concepts of 
the rule of law in that its argument advocating the observance of law is to ensure fidelity 
to the monarch (He, 2011).  It is thus true that the objective of fidelity to the monarch and 
hence the state remained preeminent in Chinese society. 
Those who know of an existence of a Western style civil society in China acknowledged 
that Chinese civil society is either different from that in the West, or that it is small in 
presence. Thus, Goldman (2000) noted that diverse views and activities that sought to 
                                                     
11 James Hsiung (2012) noted that “the state, as the certifying agent of social mobility, in what became a ‘one-career society’, 
invariably became larger than society itself (Hsiung, 2012).”  
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influence state decision-making in early 20th-century China were shaped chiefly by 
“Chinese collectivist views” than by individual rights. “Political rights,” Goldman (2000) 
added, “were seen, as they are today in China, not as individual or group claims against 
the state so much as a limited arena of legitimate interests within the state (Goldman, 
2000).” In the same year Goldman’s article was published, Zhou (2000) wrote that 
Chinese society was both fragmented and restricted by the Chinese state, consumed by 
the need to maintain social stability while undertaking rapid modernisation (Zhou, 2000). 
This characterisation of the Chinese state has three implications, all of which are 
significant to the discussion of its role and institutions. First, the assimilation of new 
concepts of state governance should not necessarily be seen as a wholesale embrace of 
these concepts but as responses needed to fulfil its missions in a world in which these 
concepts have gained ascendancy. This means that the belief that China’s future depends 
on its convergence to Western norms of state and governance is misplaced. As Huang 
(2008) noted, “China’s present cannot be, and China’s future should not be, equated 
simply with the modern Western path of capitalism, liberal democracy, and the nation-
state (Huang, 2008).” Second, China’s missions for its state go well beyond the mandate 
of the Western nation state, and hence define a far larger role. From a historical 
perspective, the Chinese model of state-led growth, also referred to as state capitalism, is 
therefore not surprising. Finally, the nature and attitude of Chinese society are such that 
the distinction between the Chinese state and its civil society is nowhere as sharp as 
Western theories of public enterprise assume it to be. 
4.3 Characterising China’s State Enterprises: Ownership, Control and Performance 
As key institutions of the Chinese state, state enterprises are central to the discussion of 
their role in it. Although there has been a decline in the state enterprises’ contribution in 
terms of China’s number of enterprises, industrial output and exports, they remain as 
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major players in the economy. Table 4.1 reports statistics of industrial state enterprises 
that are wholly owned and majority-owned by the government. These figures understate 
the government’s corporate ownership in this sector because enterprises in which the 
government is a minority shareholder are excluded. Worth noting is the fact that while the 
number of state enterprises in 2009 was reduced to just under one-eighth of that in 2000, 
their share in output and employment has only been halved and fallen to two-fifths 
respectively, suggesting that these enterprises have become larger over time. Data from 
the second national economic census, conducted in 2008, confirmed this development. 
State enterprises in the industrial and service sectors held RMB 63 trillion out of RMB 
208 trillion, or 30 per cent of total assets, which translate to about 13.4 times the size of 
non-state enterprises in terms of average assets.12 The decline in the proportion of wholly 
owned state enterprises is less than that of majority-owned enterprises. 
Table 4.1: Selected Statistics of Chinese Industrial State Enterprises (2000-2009)13 
Year No. of State Enterprises 
as % of All Enterprises 
State Enterprise Output 
as % of Total Output 
State Enterprise 
Employment as % of 
Total Employment 
2000 32.8 47.3 53.9 
2001 27.3 44.4 49.2 
2002 22.6 40.8 43.9 
2003 17.5 37.5 37.6 
2004     12.9 (2.0)14      35.2 (15.3)      29.8 (13.7) 
2005 10.1 33.3 27.2 
2006      8.3 (5.3)      31.2 (14.9)      24.5 (15.1) 
2007      6.1 (3.4)      29.5 (13.7)      22.1 (12.9) 
2008      5.0 (2.6)      28.4 (13.1)      20.3 (11.4) 
2009      4.7 (2.5)      26.7 (12.5)      20.4 (11.1) 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
 
                                                     
12 The census enumerated 154,000 state enterprises that are wholly or majority owned by the government, representing only 3.1 per 
cent of the total number of enterprises in the industrial and service sector (Gao, 2010). The appearance of China’s state enterprises in 
the Fortune 500 list of companies is another indicator of the enterprise size. In 2011, China had 61 companies in this list, compared 
to 19 in 2005. The Sinopec Group is ranked fifth (23rd in 2005), China National Petroleum sixth (39th) and State Grid seventh (32nd) 
(Fortune Online, 2011). 
13 Includes state enterprises which are wholly or majority-owned by the government only.  Enterprises in which the government has 
minority ownership are excluded. 
14 Includes state enterprises wholly owned by government only. 
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The rich historical discourse on China’s state and state-civil society relations seems to 
have completely evaded the economic debate on Chinese state enterprises. Thus, viewed 
through the Western economic lens, Chinese state enterprises have been characterised as 
“technologically inefficient”, “moribund” or “very poor relative to the non-state sector”, 
which are stereotyped traits of weaknesses of Western state enter-prises (Broadman, 1999; 
Mai & Perkins, 1997). The state enterprises are therefore blamed for increasing economic 
vulnerability, damaging the private sector and retarding the country’s long-term economic 
growth. As for the commentary on the state, the debate over state enterprises is framed in 
terms of private versus government ownership, with privatisation the ultimate goal in 
reform.15 The question about whether these judgements on the Chinese state enterprises 
hold true for the Chinese state hinges on addressing two related questions. First, which 
are the Chinese state enterprises and in what ways are they similar to the generic state 
enterprises in Western public economics? Second, how has the state enterprise sector 
performed in fulfilling its mandated functions since the economic transition in 1978? This 
section will focus on the discussion of the first question. The subsequent sections will 
deal with the second question. There is no shortage of literature on China’s state 
enterprises, but characterising today’s enterprises is challenging because to distinguish 
between public and private enterprises using a set of generic attributes – the most evident 
of which are ownership, control and performance – becomes problematic in the case of 
China. Ownership is the first defining attribute that differentiates state enterprises from 
private enterprises. Control is the second attribute related to institutional capability and 
governance. The third attribute, performance, arises from several theories about state 
enterprises that distinguish them from private enterprises. 
 
                                                     
15 This state-private dichotomy is encapsulated in catchwords such as “China state enterprises advance, private sector retreats” 
(Chovanec, 2010). 
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4.3.1 Ownership 
This attribute that defines state enterprises however presents problems. First, in common 
with other countries, though China defines state enterprise by ownership (full and 
majority), decentralisation and interlocking holdings often make it difficult to tell which 
part of the state – the central, provincial or local – is the owner. Further, due to numerous 
reform experiments, state ownership of enterprises ranges from 100 per cent (for strategic 
enterprises) to minority shareholding, is differentiated according to administrations 
(central, provincial and local governments) and also includes quasi-state entities whose 
ownership is ambiguous (Hu, 2005; Scissors, 2011).16 There are overlaps too in central 
enterprises (Yangqi), which currently number at 129 enterprise conglomerates and are 
controlled by the central government, including both strategic enterprises and those in 
which the government holds more than 50 per cent of the stocks. At the same time, non-
state enterprises are not entirely private sector enterprises because township and village 
enterprises that are collectives are also included. 
4.3.2 Control and Governance  
Ownership ambiguities have prompted attempts to distinguish enterprises by their 
exercise of control (Chen, et al., 2006). In this regard, the appointment of CEOs of state 
enterprises by the government reflects the latter’s control of these enterprises (Fan, Wong, 
& Zhang, 2007). This, as has been argued, is inimical to performance of state enterprises. 
However, much has changed in the state enterprise sector. Since the formation of the 
SASAC in 2003, CEO appointments for the central enterprises were conducted by 
SASAC mainly from within the ranks of these enterprises (State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission, 2008). For state enterprises in general, a 
                                                     
16 Marshall Meyer argued this was the case with Haier (Knowledge@Wharton, 2001). 
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growing body of literature also points to such appointments being made on commercial 
rather than political grounds (Knowledge@SMU, 2012; Li, 2005). 
Nevertheless, appointment of the top management level matters much less than 
governance. To the extent that exceptions to the state enterprise stereotype abound among 
China’s enterprises, the nature of governance cannot be easily categorised. Guthrie and 
Wang (2007), in reviewing various enterprise structures, concluded that many state 
enterprises are managed and run like private firms (Guthrie & Wang, 2007). In terms of 
reward for performance, state enterprises that are listed on international stock exchanges 
compete for talent and link executive compensation to corporate performance like any 
other private enterprise. Some state enterprises have attracted foreign investors and hence 
have multinational representation on their boards. The level of compensation is now 
sufficiently high to attract top managers and executives from the private sector.17 Listing 
on the international stock exchanges like Hong Kong and New York, which bring in 
private and foreign investors, clearly also subjects these enterprises to market discipline, 
as well as improved corporate governance and some degree of shareholder influence. 
China also embarks on an international talent hunt for high-calibre executives, including 
foreigners and Chinese émigrés, for its leading state enterprises to ensure they achieve 
international competitiveness. Thus, state enterprises pit against the domestic private 
sector and even multinational enterprises in the talent hunt. By offering attractive 
employment terms, state enterprises have an edge in recruiting talent. Evidence has also 
shown that the global managerial labour market is a strong determinant of compensation 
of state enterprise CEOs (Li, Moshirian, Nguyen, & Tan, 2007). 
                                                     
17 A recent research report by Jiang (2011) found that employee salaries paid by state enterprises are 13 per cent higher than that in 
the non-state sector, while the management level in central state enterprises earns over 60 per cent higher than the private sector on 
average (Jiang, 2011). 
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Further, Kato and Long (2004), who studied executive compensation in firms listed in 
China’s stock markets, concluded that Chinese enterprises tend to associate executive 
compensation (in cash) and firm performance much more strongly than enterprises in the 
United States and Japan, although state enterprises manifest a much weaker link (Kato & 
Long, 2004). Corroborating these findings, Conyon and He (2011) concludes that the 
factors determining executive compensation in China were no different from those in the 
US, and that China’s corporate governance reforms were reasonably effective in aligning 
managerial with shareholder interests (Conyon & He, 2011).18 Thus, it should not be 
surprising if state enterprises such as Baoshan Iron and Steel, Legend Computers (now 
Lenovo), China International Marine Containers Corporation, the Pearl River Piano 
Group and Guangzhou Metro Corporation were said to be among the best managed firms 
in China since as early as 2001 (except Guangzhou Metro Corporation) 
(Knowledge@Wharton, 2001; Tse, 2006). In reconciling the weak link between cash 
compensation and corporate performance despite strong management performance of 
state enterprises, Cao et al. (2010) argued that political incentives can offset any shortfall 
in economic incentives which disadvantage managers of state enterprise (Cao, Lemmon, 
Pan, & Tian, 2010). 
4.3.3 Performance 
The third attribute is enterprise performance, which state enterprises are expected to fare 
below par. 19  Public enterprise theory measures performance by taking into account 
enterprises’ economic inefficiency and/or poor profitability. State enterprise inefficiency 
arises from the monopoly power of enterprise in the market and the obligation to satisfy 
multiple and conflicting objectives. The latter factor, together with bureaucratic 
                                                     
18 Their findings echo those of Fung, Firth and Rui (2003) that show corporate governance has a significant impact on CEO 
compensation among partially privatised state enterprises in China (Fung, Firth, & Rui, 2003). 
19 “Enterprise performance” in this context refers to performance at the (microeconomic) enterprise level. 
60 
 
management, accounts for poor profitability. The inability to innovate, a critical attribute 
in the discourse on economic convergence and technology catch-up, is also a contributory 
factor to poor performance. 
Studies undertaken for the period up to the 1990s have confirmed the theoretical 
hypotheses about loss-making state enterprises, citing factors such as employment costs, 
market competition, social welfare costs, power relations with different levels of 
government, government policies during economic transition as well as historical factors 
(Holz, 2002; Hu, 2005). Principal-agent problems, exacerbated by the reforms in the 
1990s, also emerged as a result of asset-stripping especially at the subnational level 
(Smyth, 2000). However, with reforms undertaken since the early 1990s, the situation 
reversed in the mid-1990s (Tian & Estrin, 2008). A research project completed recently 
by the Unirule Institute of Economics on China’s state enterprises reported that the net 
profit of state-owned and state-holding enterprises in 2008 was more than three times 
higher than that in 2001 as a result of subsidies, lower tax burdens and financing cost, 
compared to non-state enterprises (Jiang, 2011). 
Are state enterprises technological laggards? The China Chemical National Corporation 
(ChemChina), created from a merger between China Blue Star Chemical Cleaning and 
other state enterprises affiliated with the Ministry of Chemical Industry, has upgraded its 
technology through international acquisitions (Koch & Ramsbottom, 2008). In the clean 
energy sector, state enterprises such as State Grid Corporation, which dominates China’s 
electricity supply, are said to be a leader not only in China but also the rest of the world 
in clean energy research and development (R&D) and the technology’s eventual 
commercialisation.20 Local jurisdictions like Shanghai have also supported the national 
strategy through creating environments for innovation. These initiatives have reflected 
                                                     
20 The developments and growing technological capabilities described here are reported in a number of studies (Ren, Zeng, & 
Krabbendam, 2010; Tong & Zhu, 2009; Wu, 2007). 
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that large enterprises, many of which are state-owned, take up a dominant pie in R&D 
funding and expenditure, and that China’s R&D expenditure as a share of GDP is now 
comparable to those in developed countries. There is also evidence that enterprises rather 
than the government are increasingly driving innovation, a positive outcome of the 
Chinese government’s strategy launched in 2006 to promote indigenous enterprise-based 
innovation (Ren, et al., 2010; Zhang, Zeng, Mako, & Seward, 2009). Further, Zheng, Liu 
and Bigsten (2000) find that large state enterprises are more likely than non-state 
enterprises to generate technical progress while Yang also reports that state enterprises 
did respond to technological catch-up (Gong, 2004; Zheng, Liu, & Bigsten, 2000). Thus, 
some Chinese state enterprises are currently at the forefront of innovation in an 
environment that still faces many challenges. 
Despite their good performance, state enterprises are still subject to criticism that their 
success is attributable to their reliance on state power, or the preferential treatment being 
granted as a monopoly or near-monopoly and for being in heavily regulated sectors with 
little competition from the private sector. In fact, state enterprises found in intensively 
competitive industries are also facing competition from both the domestic and foreign 
private sectors as well as other estate enterprises.21 The stiff competition was attributed 
to the large number of state enterprises (except the central enterprises which number 
slightly over a hundred) owned by different levels of government operating in China’s 
fragmented market. These enterprises face tough competition as they move beyond their 
local market (Knowledge@Wharton, 2006), resulting in some highly competitive state 
enterprises. The automobile and steel industries are such examples. Under competition, 
Chinese automobile makers are beginning to achieve original capabilities and R&D (Li, 
2009). The government has also promoted competition by introducing a bidding process 
                                                     
21 However, Geng, Yang and Janus (2009) argue that asset accumulation was the highest among what the state considered strategic 
industries (Geng, Yang, & Janus, 2009). 
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for enterprises attempting to make acquisitions abroad. Dyer and McGregor (2008) cited 
the case of Chinalco’s share acquisition of Rio Tinto being approved by the government 
after it won the bid against other state enterprises (Dyer & McGregor, 2008). They also 
noted that China Airlines’ success in beating Singapore Airlines over the intended 
purchase of China Eastern Airlines is not simply an exercise of raw state power. As a 
matter of fact, China Airlines had to pay a higher price than Singapore Airlines to take 
over China Eastern Airlines. Given these developments, Woetzel (2008) notes that while 
the playing field remains in favour of the state enterprises, especially in terms of access 
to finance, the competitive conditions facing state and private enterprises were 
converging (Woetzel, 2008). Internationally, state enterprises face the even greater 
handicap of being viewed with suspicion by foreign governments.22 
The role of reform and privatisation are central to the existence of Chinese state 
enterprises. Privatisation has taken different routes in implementation and resulted in 
different corporate entities. For instance, the state enterprise reform introduced a decade 
ago had promoted greater autonomy in not only enterprises but also various levels of 
government. The various routes to privatisation include privatisation of control with no 
ownership change, leasing, mergers, sale to employees to form joint stock companies, as 
well as ownership participation from individuals, groups of individuals, including foreign 
investors. Profitable enterprises have been listed on international stock exchanges while 
enterprise groups were formed with a view to develop national champions. The myriad 
experiments – many were unsuccessful but others do rise to become behemoths that are 
looked upon with suspicion by the West today – simply illustrate the dynamism of a sector 
that has been labelled as “dying” and “a dinosaur”.23 
                                                     
22 Even the sale of telecommunications equipment by Huawei, an employee-owned enterprise, to America’s AT&T in 2009 was 
scuttled by the American fear of the Chinese use of such equipment to spy on the US (Pomfret, 2010). 
23 By the mid-1990s, Mai and Perkins (1997) made this conclusion that “most SOEs are now able to operate, to a greater or lesser 
extent, in a market environment. Economic reform has enabled them to make their own production plans, set prices, purchase inputs 
and sell outputs within a market structure (Mai & Perkins, 1997)”. 
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The existence of these specific cases leaves open the criticism that besides state 
favouritism,24 cases of successful state enterprises represent exceptions to a subsector 
wallowing in failing and failed enterprises. However, as noted earlier, successful 
enterprises account for a tiny fraction of the total enterprises. These enterprises are, 
nevertheless, often among the largest in the country, if not in the world, and they still 
account for a sizeable share of industrial output.25 
More importantly, the crux of the above discussion is not about the argument that the state 
enterprise sector as a whole is efficient, competitive and innovative, though this is to a 
certain extent true for some enterprises but that the general characterisation of the sector 
as moribund, loss-making, or inefficient is no longer appropriate. Nor is it easy or 
meaningful to draw a contrast between private and the state sectors, given how some state 
enterprises are managed. Indeed, as Scissors (2011) notes, the contrast perpetuates a 
mistaken notion that what China officially refers to as “non-state” is synonymous with 
private (Scissors, 2011). 
Even more importantly, the above discussion illustrates the limited applicability of the 
state-private dichotomy that has served as the implicit assumption in many studies. 
Further, what the world fathoms is a form of enterprise, neither fully public nor private, 
that defies stereotyping, which however fits well with the historical and sociocultural 
development of China. Given the special environment in which they exist, these 
enterprises bear little resemblance to the Japanese keiretsu and Korean chaebol, which 
are private entities albeit with extensive government intervention.26 They are public-
private hybrids. While their closeness to government and political leadership has given 
                                                     
24 As the boundary between public sector and private sector becomes indistinct for many enterprises, the key to government support 
appears to hinge upon whether the leadership of the enterprise has close ties with the government, regardless of whether it is classified 
as public, private, or in-between. 
25 In as early as 1997, Li and Putterman (2008) estimated that small state enterprises accounted for no more than 16 per cent of total 
state enterprise output (Li & Putterman, 2008). This share in output would have fallen further with the government strategy of 
“retaining the large and releasing the small”, since the bulk of state enterprise closures are likely to be small enterprises owned by 
local and provincial jurisdictions. 
26 The large Chinese state conglomerates have been compared with their Japanese and Korean counterparts (The Economist, 1997). 
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them the advantage to tap state resources, they do enjoy sufficient autonomy to be 
managed like private enterprises at the same time. 
4.4 The State Enterprise Sector and Economic Growth 
Given the size of the state enterprise sector, commentary on its sectoral and/or macro- 
economic role has also been framed in terms of its contribution to economic growth. 
Empirical studies on economic growth of the state enterprise sector until around 2000 
have largely been unfavourable. A host of empirical studies have found that total factor 
productivity – a source of economic growth – of these enterprises was reported to be zero 
or negative, and many reasons were attributed to their poor performance (Sachs & Woo, 
2003). By comparing state enterprises’ productivity with that of non-state and/or private 
enterprises, Sachs and Woo (2003) report higher and more rapidly rising profitability 
among non-state enterprises but declining profitability for enterprises with increasing 
share of state ownership (Sachs & Woo, 2003). 
At the macroeconomic level, there were commentaries critical of state enterprises for 
inhibiting China’s economic growth as the country’s economic growth moderated 
considerably and state enterprise losses mounted at the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis 
(AFC) in 1997 (Dorn, 2000; Rawski, 2000). While these commentaries were mostly not 
supported by research, a few studies have attempted to make that link empirically. Chen 
and Feng (2000) analyse the cross-provincial data for the 1978-89 period and found 
evidence of growth-enhancing effect of “private and semi-private enterprises” and 
growth-diminishing impact of public enterprises (Chen & Feng, 2000). Similarly, Phillips 
and Shen (2005) discover that the size of the state enterprise sector (measured in terms of 
its share in total industrial output) is negatively related to provincial growth rates (Phillips 
& Shen, 2005). 
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In empirical studies conducted since the turn of the 21st century, an increasing number of 
positive analyses has replaced and eclipsed the mostly negative findings as state 
enterprise reform – which was initially aimed at stemming losses but gradually reoriented 
to nurture globally competitive enterprises – has produced an economic turnaround for 
the state sector. Recent literature surveys have indicated that there are signs of 
productivity growth in the state enterprise sector in the period leading up to 1993 and 
after, and that the existing gap between the state enterprise sector and the non-state and 
foreign enterprise sectors is narrowing (Jefferson, Rawski, & Zhang, 2008). The results 
were corroborated by the estimates made by Park (2010), who also documented the 
impressive rise in total factor productivity (Table 4.2) (Park, 2010).  
An important reform that will likely have a major impact on growth is the consolidation 
of state enterprises into conglomerates under the supervision of the central government 
(SASAC). The objective of forming central enterprises is to help them achieve global 
competitiveness in both scale and technology. Adopting Korea’s “picking winners” 
system, China chooses industries with cutting-edge and green technology, select 
manufacturing, and production of industrial materials of strategic importance like steel, 
cement, aluminium and rare earth elements as “pillar industries”. Restructuring and 
mergers were supported by incentives such as tax credits and financing from state-owned 
banks and asset management companies (State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission, 2010). These enterprises number fewer than 130 and efforts 
are being made to consolidate further.27 These enterprises, together with selected state 
enterprise giants, will be key players in the government’s strategy of “state-led” growth. 
None of the studies discussed earlier dealt with data of an appropriate level of generality 
to offer a reasonable macroeconomic view. It does not seem possible to explicitly 
                                                     
27 The number of central enterprises had to be reduced to fewer than 100 by 2010, but progress was slower than expected (Yang, 
2011). 
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associate macroeconomic growth and productivity data with the role of the state 
enterprise sector. For instance, as Table 4.2 has shown, China’s economic growth rate for 
various years bears little relation to changes in the state enterprise sector. It is therefore 
hard to refute Li and Putterman (2008)’s argument that “it is implausible that China’s 
economic growth could have progressed so rapidly if the country has been dragging along 
its state sector like an albatross round its neck for all of these years (Li & Putterman, 
2008)”. 
Table 4.2: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators of China’s Economic 
Growth and Income Distribution (1980-2009) 
Year       GDP   
          Growth 
           Rate   
           (%)1 
 Period     TFP  
         Growth 
           Rate  
           (%)2 
 Year       Gini         Income  
                       Share Held 
          Coefficient1      by  
                      Poorest 10 %1 
1980         7.8 
1984        15.2 
1988        11.3 
 
1980-90      2.93 
1981        0.291 
1984        0.277 
1987        0.299             3.3 
1990         3.8 
1992        14.2 
1994        13.1 
1996        10.0 
1998         7.8 
 
1990-00      3.72 
1990        0.324             3.5 
1993        0.355             3.2 
1996        0.357             3.1 
1999        0.392             2.1 
2000         8.4 
2002         9.1 
2004        10.1 
2006        12.7 
2008         9.6 
2010        10.4 
 
2000-07      6.04 
2002        0.426             2.3 
2005        0.425             1.8 
Source: 1 World Bank database at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
 2 From Park Jungsoo, “Projection of Long-term Total Factor Productivity for 12 
Asian Countries”, ADB Working Paper No. 227, October 2010, Table 3. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that mainstream Western economics, which recognises the 
productive and redistributive role of state enterprises, cannot be criticised for the research 
focus and emphasis on efficiency. Responsibility lies in the dominance of neoliberal 
ideology towards the end of the 20th century, with the Washington Consensus holding 
sway with multilateral lending institutions. Consequently, the larger important role of 
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state enterprises in general and China’s in particular has been neglected (Chai, 2003). This 
missing role is examined in the next section. 
4.5 State Enterprises and Social Protection: Missing in (Research) Action? 
There is a plethora of research directed at measuring state enterprise performance in terms 
of efficiency, but there is little research linking state enterprises to their social security 
role. To be sure, there are however a few exceptions. Bai, Li and Wang (2003) stressed 
the importance of state enterprises playing both productive and distributive roles during 
the transition period as independent institutions get ready to become fully operational in 
the provision of a social safety net (Bai, Li, & Wang, 2003). Huang, Li and Lotspeich 
(2010) recognise that by preventing large-scale unemployment, state enterprises 
facilitated the growth and development of non-state enterprises through a positive 
externality – social stability – but at the cost of reduced productive efficiency (Huang, Li, 
& Lotspeich, 2010). Their estimates have shown that incorporating this externality has 
aligned state enterprises’ contribution to economic growth with that of non-state 
enterprises. While relieving enterprises of their distributive role has strengthened their 
profitability, this has however left a void in the social safety net that has not been filled 
even today. 
How did state enterprise reforms change the enterprises’ original mandate? Before the 
start of China’s economic transition in 1978, state enterprises accounted for three-quarters 
of China’s industrial output, employed two-thirds of all industrial employees, and were 
responsible for employee welfare, including pension and housing. They also contributed 
to 90 per cent of the state’s fiscal revenues (Dong & Putterman, 2003). Hence, the 
distributional role of state enterprises as provider of social protection and as income 
source to fund social provisions needs no further emphasis. During the first 15 years of 
transition, state enterprise reforms had improved financial discipline through 
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restructuring incentives and increasing competition, but that had not given enterprise 
managers the autonomy to dismiss workers. By the mid-1990s, as the state enterprises’ 
share in total output plunged, the share in total employment has decreased much more 
gradually. This implied that despite the serious losses suffered by state enterprises due to 
asset stripping by managers, inefficiencies arising from a long history of soft budget 
constraints and large labour redundancies (Hashiguchi, 2008; Mako & Zhang, 2003),28 
the social safety net had remained largely intact. However, the severe losses had attracted 
attention from the international community, which suggested privatisation as a solution. 
Little attention was given to alleviating the social burden of state enterprises though 
privatisation, as a remedy, was in place.29 
The Chinese government reacted to the growing losses of state enterprises by making a 
shift in the reform strategy, retaining only the largest state enterprises while “releasing” 
the small ones (zhua qa, fang xiao) through sale, privatisation or closure (Zhou, 2000).30 
However, so long as the retained enterprises are not relieved of their social burdens, they 
would be forced and continue to rely increasingly on bank loans, which have become 
harder for state enterprises to obtain since then as a result of the reform. Hence, state 
enterprises’ debt burden soared, while struggling even to fund their operations. 
Despite the reluctance to shed labour, an estimated 3.6 million workers were laid off 
between 1995 and 1997, although some were rehired (Zhou, 2000). That it did not prove 
to be socially destabilising could be due to the fourfold increase in employment in the 
non-state sector during the period. 
                                                     
28 From May 1998, those who were retrenched were able to receive assistance through a re-employment service. The International 
Labour Organization (ILO) reported that by the end of 1998, about 85 per cent of those made redundant had registered (International 
Labour Organization, 2002). Dong and Putterman (2003) estimated that the ratio of state enterprise losses to before-tax profits rose 
from 5 per cent in 1980 to 22 per cent in 1995, reflecting a widening gap (Dong & Putterman, 2003). 
29 The World Bank did undertake a programme that aimed to reduce the social consequences of its enterprise reform programme. 
However, the fund allocated was modest, and the activities, which were later assessed to be partially successful, were limited to 
management and retraining of laid-off workers (Carlier, 2001).  
30 The strategy involved privatisation, liquidation and/or closure of numerous state enterprises at county and local levels, laying off 
about four million state enterprise employees, and restructuring of large enterprises through corporatisation, mergers and listing on 
international stock exchanges. 
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Corporatisation and shareholding reform, including the inclusion of foreign ownership 
and listing on international stock exchanges, did eventually erode the provision of social 
safety net, however (Moore & Wen, 2006).31 This is the result of successful listing and 
foreign investor participation that required a clean set of accounts without any data on 
social costs, that solely displays the information about income of the listed enterprise 
(Walter, 2010).32 
A by-product of the reforms was the creation of social security experiments to take over 
the role formerly played by state enterprises. These experiments ranged from the rehiring 
of laid-off workers and provision of compensation packages for laid-off workers to the 
establishment of the National Social Security Fund in 2001. They had helped relieve some 
of the hardships caused by the layoffs and restructuring under state enterprise reforms, 
but did not seem sufficiently comprehensive to form a national social security system. 
Discussions of forming the national social security system continued in the lead-up to 
China’s 12th Five-Year Programme (Lim & Spence, 2010).33 State enterprise reforms that 
are based partially on Western-style corporate restructuring had therefore obliterated the 
traditional distributive role of Chinese state enterprises, leaving a vacuum in the wake 
that had to be filled by piecemeal experimentations of social security. 
Interestingly, in today’s extensive discussion on social security, there are very few 
references made to the state enterprises’ distributive role, which until slightly over a 
decade ago was a prominently significant function (Barnett & Chalk, 2010; Li & Piachaud, 
2004; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010). While it is the 
case that the social security protection afforded by state enterprises at that time is no 
                                                     
31 Moore and Wen (2006) were of the view that the direction taken of state enterprise reform was driven chiefly by the state’s concept 
of privatisation and economic benefits derived rather than the need for a more balanced economic and social strategy (Moore & Wen, 
2006).  
32 Walter (2010) called these reforms “a social disaster” (Walter, 2010). 
33 In the collection of papers that served as inputs to the FYP, two out of nine chapters and five out of 20 background papers were 
devoted to social security issues and an additional paper co-authored by Edwin Lim and Michael Spence on housing. 
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longer adequate today given the large number of rural-urban migrant workers to be 
covered, there is little from existing Western research that recognises state enterprises’ 
distributive role. 
Even after being relieved of their social responsibilities, state enterprises did make an 
impact on income distribution. In housing reform, the state has made a retreat in the 
provision of public housing, while promoting the development of the private housing 
market and construction industry. State enterprise employees were encouraged to and did 
purchase their housing units at subsidised prices. Financing for house purchase was made 
available through the Housing Provident Fund to which employees have to contribute, as 
well as through commercial mortgage financing. The latter had driven up the demand for 
housing, with housing prices rising sharply.34 Regardless of their core business, state 
enterprises, whose original mission included building and providing housing for 
employees, began to undertake construction of residential (and commercial) units for 
profit on land that they owned or acquired from profit retention. The state enterprises’ 
foray into real property had driven up land, and hence housing, prices, thus putting 
housing out of the reach of lower-income and rural-urban migrant households (Barboza, 
2010; Li, 2011; Lim & Spence, 2010). Efforts by the central government to rein in these 
enterprises has had limited success. Thus, not only do state enterprises no longer provide 
social safety nets, they have contributed to increased inequality in access to housing. 
Despite their focus on the market, due credit and justice should be given to state 
enterprises for continuing to support the government in such activities as disaster relief 
and diplomatic confidence-building. For instance, in the post-disaster reconstruction in 
Yushu, Sichuan province, four central enterprises – Sinohydro Group Ltd, China Railway 
Construction Corporation, China State Construction Engineering Corporation, and China 
                                                     
34 As reflected from the data in the China Statistical Yearbook, the average residential housing prices increased two-and-a-half times 
from RMB 1790 per square metre in 1997 to RMB 4459 per square metre in 2009. 
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Railway Group Ltd – played a significant role (China State Enterprise News, 2011). 
Central enterprises are also involved in China’s engagement with Africa, e.g., a unit of 
the China State Construction Company was responsible for the construction of the African 
Union Conference Centre (Ministry of Commerc of the People's Republic of China, 2012). 
Also, as China’s largest state enterprises move towards international standards of 
governance, there is an increased focus on corporate social responsibility. This represents 
the state enterprises’ formal return to the pursuit of social objectives that were once a part 
of their mission (China Knowledge@Wharton, 2010).35 
As substantial resources are required to fund a comprehensive social safety net, state 
enterprise profits, estimated to be as much as 20 per cent of the national budget in 2010, 
are naturally regarded as the source of funding (Mattlin, 2009). Although the state as a 
shareholder is entitled to dividends, the largest state enterprise holding companies, 
empowered by the 1994 tax reform law, have been retaining the bulk of the profits.36 At 
the same time, the successes of national champions and enterprises in strategic sectors 
have built powerful corporate interests that are able to resist pressures to distribute part 
of their earnings as dividends to the government, monies that could have been used to 
fund social security. The challenges faced by SASAC (established in 2003 to exercise the 
government’s ownership rights), in fulfilling its mandate, serve as a cautionary tale (Lam, 
2011; Mattlin, 2009; Naughton, 2008). 
On a final note, the absence of micro-level research, coupled with the lack of macro-level 
data, implies that assessing the distributional impact of state enterprise reform at the 
macroeconomic level is impossible. Indeed, official data on income distribution at the 
national level were no longer published after 2005 (Table 4.2). Existing data show rising 
                                                     
35 Corporate social responsibility was first introduced into China by multinationals to meet the demand of Western consumers, but its 
adoption was accelerated by labour protests within China. 
36 Listed subsidiaries of these holding companies are required to and do pay dividends to the holding companies, but these profits are 
retained at the holding company level. 
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income inequality, whether measured by the Gini coefficient or by the share of income 
accruing to the bottom decile of income earners. The extent to which state enterprise 
reform contributed to this deterioration cannot be determined; factors like growing 
urbanisation and unequal regional growth have been important factors. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The Chinese state today is the product of its political and cultural history, both the past 
and the recent, and is deeply embedded in the Chinese society. Complementing this rich 
history are numerous reform experiments undertaken by different levels of government 
during China’s transition from a command economy to one based on market socialism. 
The result has been the emergence of state enterprises that do not fit a simple dichotomy 
of state and private. 
Yet the dichotomy between state and private enterprises forms an essential part of the 
Western theories about public enterprises. In these theories, state enterprises are 
stereotyped to perform poorly in comparison with private enterprises. The standard 
solution being proposed is to privatise the state enterprises, which would also shrink the 
state sector. Save for the notable exceptions, existing research on China’s state enterprises 
has relied heavily on these Western theories and paradigms. 
Given the particularities of the Chinese state, benchmarking its enterprises using Western 
theories has several adverse consequences. First, the misinterpretation of state enterprises 
has resulted in the failure to recognise the emergence of a new type of enterprise – the 
state-private hybrid – that will play a growing global role. Second, while the pursuit of 
efficiency in enterprise operations is advocated in neo-liberalism rather than the Western 
theories per se, this is effected at the expense of the state enterprises’ initial role in the 
provision of a social safety net. In its drive to create globally competitive corporations, 
China’s own reforms have led to the demise of this pre-existing social safety net. With 
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widening disparities, the implementation of a plethora of social security reform initiatives 
to date is strong evidence that the destruction of a system is far easier than rebuilding one. 
This chapter, like other existing research, has not been able to establish the link between 
the performance of the state enterprise sector and macroeconomics. In addition, there is 
scant evidence of how losses incurred by state enterprises and the relief from social 
burdens could impact economic growth; neither is it simple to dissociate state enterprises’ 
distributional impact from the impact of urbanisation and regional differences in growth. 
This will definitely warrant future research should more data become available. 
Last but not least, whether the Chinese experience has relevance for other countries in 
transition, like Vietnam, or countries whose governments play a major role through 
government-linked corporations, like Malaysia, requires further research. Clearly, 
China’s historical trajectory is unique and cannot be emulated; however, if the evolution 
of the Chinese state enterprise sector is but a phase of the country’s experiment with 
market socialism, China’s many experiments have much to offer by way of lessons of 
successes and failures. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE STATE’S ROLE IN A STRATEGIC INDUSTRY – CHINA’S 
BANKING SECTOR 
5.1 Introduction 
China’s banking sector dominates its financial system. Efforts to improve the banks’ 
efficiency have been made. China needs to prevent the banking sector from going into 
crisis in order to sustain stable economic growth (Allen, Qian, Zhang, & Zhao, 2012). 
Because the banking sector is crucial, the Chinese state’s role is crucial as well. This is 
true because Europe and North America have private sector driven financial systems, 
China’s financial system is dominated by the government. In China, commercial banking 
and investment banking are highly controlled (Genevieve & Wei, 2005). 
The World Bank is considering proposing the privatization of one of China’s state-
holding commercial banks. Through this proposal, the entrance of foreign investment 
banks into China’s market and with less control of the state and greater consideration for 
shareholder interest constitute its initial objectives (Davis & Orlik, 2013). The existing 
studies have suggested greater private ownership and less state involvement because 
banks have had relatively bad performance in terms of high NPLs, low efficiency, and 
other factors. In other words, they considered state ownership and governance as 
responsible for low profits and returns to shareholders. 
Responding to weaknesses, China’s banks undertook reforms as part of state enterprise 
reform since China began its marketization process in 1978. The state enterprise reform 
transformed China’s state enterprises in terms of their governance mechanisms and 
ownership structures. So the first objective of this chapter is to review the changes of 
China’s banking sector that were affected by state enterprises reform and what their 
ownership structure and governance mechanism look like today, more precisely, how the 
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state-control mode evolved and what is the state-control mode today (how much state’s 
control in both ownership and governance is today)? 
However, to understand the changes in China's banking system, this chapter must refer to 
history. The importance of history has already been discussed in Chapter 4. It is argued 
here that the government’s policies with respect to the financial sector have as much to 
do with the history of Chinese banking as with economic ideology. Hence, the objective 
of this chapter is to provide the historical context as an explanation of the state's role in 
the banking sector. This role is manifested in the fact that the banking sector has been 
designated a strategic sector. This objective needs to be matched with another objective. 
This is with respect to the functioning of the banking sector in the context of the Chinese 
state’s efforts to improve efficiency. This functioning is manifested in indicators of 
financial robustness, the ability to remain profitable, and at the same time, as a major 
instrument of China’s growth strategies, to support the state at critical times. 
The next section analyzes the historical role of China’s banking sector since the Qing 
Dynasty. Section 5.3 reviews how China’s banking sector followed the state’s policies 
towards reform. Also, it summarizes how China’s banking sector looks today. And this 
section links state control to ownership structure and governance in state-holding 
commercial banks. Then, section 5.4 displays the overall performance of the main state-
holding commercial banks during two specific circumstances. Section 5.5 offers a 
conclusion. 
5.2 China's Banking Sector – A Historical Perspective 
In the context of world history, the failure of the Paris Commune was partly attributed to 
its failure to take over the Banque de France, namely, to control the economic lifeline, 
i.e. the central bank as the center of the financial system in France. Marx and Engels 
(1959) pointed out in the Communist Manifesto (1848) that if the proletariat wants to 
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become the ruling class, then the state has to control all finance through a central bank 
with state capital (Marx & Engels, 1959). Lenin (1927) pointed out that the banking sector 
is in the central position of an economic system (Lenin, 1917). After the establishment of 
the Soviet Union, the banking system under the state’s control played a major role in its 
economic recovery. In 15 years, the Gross Industrial Production of the Soviet Union 
ranked second in the world (Wang, 2010). In reference to Chinese history, we also can 
see that the banking system is a crucial sector for the national economy. 
5.2.1 “Qianzhuang” (钱庄) & “Piaohao” (票号) (the Qing Dynasty) Versus HSBC 
(British Power) 
During the late Qing Dynasty, the Opium War destroyed China’s currency stability. At 
that time, multiple currencies were used by different jurisdictions. The absence of a 
central bank did not permit the issue of a single currency in China. There was little 
credibility for the Qing Government’s issued bank notes. In addition, several finance 
institutions were in existence. These were the “Qianzhuang” and “Piaohao” which 
focused on the currency exchange business and bank draft business, respectively. These 
institutions were the precursors of modern China’s financial institutions. The Qing 
Government still had to repay loans from “Qianzhuang” and “Piaohao”. “Qianzhuang” 
and “Piaohao” had to finance foreign trade.  
The modern banking sector in China did not emerge until quite late into the Qing Dynasty 
because the Qing Government ignored the importance of creating a modern banking 
system. The history of modern banking in China started with the establishment of the 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) in 1865, which was founded for 
British power to control China’s financial sector at that time. The capital foundation of 
HSBC stemmed from the opium trade and served to facilitate British Far East trade (Guo 
& Lu, 2013). Afterwards, HSBC swept away all financial institutions in Hong Kong and 
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Shanghai to become the new leader of Far East foreign banks, and controlled China’s 
international exchange business. Relying on British power, HSBC refused the Qing 
government’s request to reveal information about the bank’s clients. Cheap deposits came 
to HSBC since it was the most safe wealth vault. It also acquired banknote issuing 
authority from the British Hong Kong government. Finally, it controlled the capital 
sources (monetary situation) of China’s “Qianzhuang”, “Piaohao”, and the “Chaipiao” 
(拆票) business (Song, 2011). “Chaipiao” business referred to short-term loans among 
those banks. Backed by British naval might, HSBC quickly established itself as the 
dominant institution in the Chinese banking system. HSBC’s other businesses were 
political loans for the Chinese government, loans for railways, and advanced payments 
for the opium trade. It gradually took over the central bank position, which further 
controlled the Qing Dynasty’s monetary situation to eventually dominate China’s 
financial network (capital and credit flows) (Song, 2011). HSBC’s bank draft and packing 
credit were major channels for China's trade finance and international exchange (Wu, 
2006). HSBC controlled China’s money supply and acted as a central bank due to the 
business limitations of “Qianzhuang” and “Piaohao”. Foreign banks penetrated into 
Chinese financial networks and their agents monopolized financial markets.  
5.2.2 The Establishment of the BOC 
In 1905, “Hubu”37 (户部) Bank was established by the Qing Government. It undertook a 
dual role of central bank and commercial bank. It also issued bank notes, acted as the 
national treasury, such as functioning as a central bank, in addition to basic commercial 
banking such as deposits and loans. In 1908, the Qing Government renamed the bank to 
“Daqing” (大清) Bank and entrusted it with the functions of a central bank. “Daqing” 
Bank was a joint-stock bank at that time in which the government owned half (5 Million 
                                                     
37 “Hubu” was the Ministry of Finance of the Qing government. 
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“Liang” (两)) (the silver currency) and private entities could purchase the rest (5 Million 
“Liang”). The Qing Government officials assumed management responsibility.  
The 1911 Revolution witnessed the collapse of both the Qing Dynasty and “Daqing” 
Bank. The revolutionary government (Beiyang Government) thought that all shares 
belonged to the Qing Government and enacted a crackdown policy. This caused private 
shareholders to gather and held a meeting to form strategies to protect their shares 
(Caijing Online, 2012). 
In 1911, Chen Jintao, who was the Finance Chief for the Beiyang Government was going 
to establish a central bank for the Beiyang Government by restructuring the “Daqing” 
Bank to the BOC, which was to be a government private joint stock bank and to undertake 
the central bank’s role (Wen Hui Bao, 2008). The new government firstly cleaned up 
businesses belonging to “Daqing” Bank and eliminated the shares (5 Million “Liang”) 
belonging to the Qing Government. Private shareholders’ shares were converted from 
“Daqing” Bank to the BOC with equal value. Then, the BOC attracted investments for 5 
Million shares (Caijing Online, 2012). In 1923, Zhang Jiaao who was the Vice President 
of the BOC raised private sector share capital to replace government share capital by 
paying 5 Million “Liang”. In this way, the BOC was no longer controlled by the Beiyang 
Government as the private sector held 99% of the shares (Qu & Luo, 2011). 
5.2.3 The Change of Government after the Qing Dynasty 
After the 1911 Revolution, there were several separatist warlord regimes on China's 
turbulent political scene. These warlords established several governments. In the north 
was the Beiyang Government, in the center was the Wuhan Government, and in the south 
was the Guangzhou Government. Chiang Kai-shek was the head of the Guangzhou 
Government.  
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Between 1923 and 1926, the Soviet Union provided financial support of 30 Million “Gold 
Rubles” to the Guangzhou Government to support the Northern Expedition by Chiang 
Kai-shek. Moreover, the Soviet Union provided 10 Million “Gold Rubles” for it to 
establish a central bank. In 1927, the Northern Expeditionary Army finally reached 
Shanghai, the financial sector that was controlled by Jiangsu and Zhejiang Financial 
Magnates (foreign banks, government banks, “Qianzhuang”, and “Piaohao”), backed by 
British and American bankers. Agents for the foreign banks organized the Shanghai 
Chamber of Commerce, which included all important banks including “Qianzhuang”, 
“Piaohao”, and other commercial and industrial organizations to finance 60 Million Yuan 
for Chiang Kai-shek under the condition of cleaning up the members of Communist Party 
within the Wuhan Government (Song, 2011).38  
In March 1927, the Wuhan Government sent Song Ziwen, the Minister of the Ministry of 
Finance, to Shanghai to unify fiscal responsibility and financing for the Wuhan and 
Guangzhou Governments. Nevertheless, Chiang Kai-shek requested the Shanghai 
Chamber of Commerce, which maintained good relations with Chiang Kai-shek, to ignore 
Song Ziwen. He also implemented an economic blockade on the Wuhan Government. He 
also reduced the financing channels for Jiangsu and Zhejiang Financial Magnates.  
Feng Yuxiang, who was a powerful warlord independent of both the Kuomintang – and 
the Communist party, was courted by Jiang as a way to neutralize the Wuhan Government. 
Chiang Kai-shek was in a stronger position than the Wuhan government as he was able 
to offer Feng better financial benefits. In December 1928, the Nanjing Nationalist 
Government was established by Chiang Kai-shek to replace the Beiyang Government. 
                                                     
38 Since the Communist Party cooperated with Kuomintang (国民党) to resist the warlord, in Wuhan Government, there were a group 
of members of the Communist Party joining as the officials. 
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We can see Chiang Kai-shek needed the money to the struggle against other warlords and 
the Communist Party, and then control a nationalist government. 
5.2.4 The Establishment of the Central Bank of the Communist Party 
The growing Communist Party calling itself the Soviet Republic of China (SRC), which 
could threaten Chiang Kai-shek, was located in central China. In 1932, SRC established 
its own central bank. Chiang Kai-shek responded by implementing a strict economic 
blockade on this area. As a result, commodities were in short of supply, the prices of 
commodities increased, and the SRC government’s issued bank notes depreciated. 
Additionally, Chiang Kai-shek counterfeited currency to flow into those areas and 
exchanged gold and silver reserves from the central bank of SRC on a large scale (Culture 
China Online, 2010; Shandong University Party Committee Organization Department, 
2010). The SRC government had to have enough gold and silver reserves to back the bank 
notes it issued. The government had to guarantee repayment in order to ensure its 
continued access to credit. It realized that as long as the currency issuing authority had 
the trust of the people, it did not need to have the full backing of silver and gold reserves. 
Therefore, the ability of the SRC government to resist the Kuomintang’s siege and 
economic blockade largely depended on the credibility of this government’s central bank. 
5.2.5 The Evolution of Chiang Kai-shek’s Financial Autocracy 
The establishment of the Nanjing Nationalist Government in 1928 to oust the Beiyang 
Government to enable Jiang’s group to become the central government needed to have an 
independent Central Bank. Song Ziwen, who had become the Minister of Finance under 
this government, wanted to restructure the BOC as a central bank. However, at the time, 
the Nanjing Nationalist Government was not powerful enough to control the BOC, and 
this proposal was rejected by the Vice President of the BOC (Bank of China, 2014c). The 
largest shareholder of the BOC was the Xi Family, who was also agent for HSBC. HSBC 
81 
 
was backed by the British Empire. However, the Nanjing Nationalist Government was 
able to force the BOC and the Bank of Communications (BoCom)39 to restructure and 
raise government shares to become the majority shareholder. 
Song Ziwen indicated that there were three objectives to establishing a central bank: unify 
the monetary system, consolidate the national treasury, and adjust the financial system 
(Qu & Luo, 2011). The BOC was transformed into an international exchange bank. It was 
changed from a government bank into a commercial bank. The BoCom was transformed 
into an industrial development bank. Nevertheless, the BOC and the BoCom still 
undertook banknote issuance responsibility as a central bank. At that time, the BOC 
remained the number one financial institution in the sector. The BOC had a big advantage 
in total assets, total loans, total deposits, and total circulation over both the central bank 
and the BoCom until the end of 1934.  
The Nanjing Nationalist Government implemented a financial monopoly policy and 
increased government shares of the BOC in order to control it (Wen Hui Bao, 2008). 
Since March 1935, it issued government bonds to raise capital for the central bank, the 
BOC, and the BoCom; it transferred out the Chairman of the Board and the Managing 
Director, and appointed Song Ziwen as Chairman of the Board. It tried to control the BOC 
totally through majority shareholding and restructuring at the management level. The 
capital of the BOC was 25 Million Yuan with 20% (5 Million) government shares. The 
Nanjing Nationalist Government raised government shares by 25 Million Yuan to 
ultimately own 30 Million Yuan out of 50 Million Yuan or 60%. 
Shareholder objections were muted by the government's political pressure. Still they were 
able to force the government to accept two proposals to reduce the latter’s power. One 
                                                     
39 BoCom was established in the capital of 2.5 Million “Liang” by Qing Government in 1908 with 2/5 “Youchuanbu” (邮传部) 
(Ministry of Postal Service and Transmission of Qing Government) shares and 3/5 private shares. 
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was to reduce government shares to 50% from 60%, and the other was to reduce 
government representatives to 9 (out of 21) among the Board of Directors, and managing 
directors were appointed by the Chairman instead of by election by the Board of Directors, 
and a “Chairman responsibility system” replaced the managing director responsibility 
system (Bank of China, 2014a). 
At that time, the new Chinese financial system was known as the “Four Banks & Two 
Bureaus”40 and was under the control of government officials. In 1935, currency reform 
unified different currencies and made the “Fabi” (法币) legal tender. The four banks 
controlled the financial system. In 1942, the Nationalist Government assigned different 
functions to each of the four banks. The BOC’s commercial banking functions were 
limited to domestic savings and loans, supporting foreign trade and related investments 
and loans, and managing the government’s foreign funds. Thus, the BOC became a 
specialized international trade bank. Most of its original businesses were gone and it no 
longer functioned as a central bank (Bank of China, 2014b). 
5.2.6 The Collapse of Chiang Kai-shek’s Financial Autocracy 
After the currency reform, Japan launched its attack on China in 1937. As a result of the 
war and inflation, people sold “Fabi” for foreign currency. As a result, “Fabi” devalued 
and the value of loans to the Chinese government decreased. As a result, the Nationalist 
Government had to seek additional loans from Britain and America to support and 
stabilize the value of “Fabi”. In 1939, the Sino-British Currency Stabilization fund was 
established with a value of 10 Million Pounds (the BOC – 3.25 Million; the BoCom – 
1.75 Million; HSBC – 3 Million; and Standard Chartered Bank – 2 Million). In 1941, the 
Sino-British Currency Stabilization fund was incorporated into the Sino-American-
British Currency Stabilization Fund (SABCSF) in the value of USD 110 Million. 
                                                     
40 Four banks: the Central Bank, BOC, BoCom and Peasants Bank of China. 
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(America – 50 Million; British – 40 Million; and China – 20 Million). The Board of 
SABCSF managed this fund, whose duty was to stabilized the “Fabi”, intervene in the 
foreign exchange market, and manipulate exchange rates. At that time, the “Fabi” was 
based on foreign currency reserves, the Board being the currency issuing authority. In 
addition, it had the authority to foreign currency policy. Thus, the Board of SABCSF took 
on the role of the central bank. 
In 1942, America loaned USD 500 Million to support China’s war with Japan. The 
Central Bank established the Foreign Currency Management Committee to manage those 
loans. The central bank replaced the Board of SABCSF to execute currency power 
because USD 500 Million was far greater than USD 110 Million. 
However, a series of policies by the Nationalist Government, such as Quantitative Easing 
in 1945, Foreign Currency Liberalization in 1946, and “Gold Yuan Note” (金圆券) 
reform in 1948 led to inflation, currency system collapse, and the loss of loan resources, 
all of which brought financial paralysis and the collapse of the Kuomintang regime. The 
PBC41 started to issue “Renminbi” (人民币), which was not based on foreign currencies, 
until December 1948. The currency in mainland China was unified in 1950. Additionally, 
foreign banks pulled their businesses from mainland China. 
Table 5.1: The Evolution of Government and Central Banks in the Modern 
History of China 
Period Government Central Bank 
1865-1905 Qing Dynasty HSBC acted as the central bank 
1905-1912 Qing Dynasty “Daqing” Bank 
1912-1928 Beiyang Government BOC and BoCom 
1925.7-1926.12 Guangzhou Government BOC and BoCom 
1927.2-1927.8 Wuhan Government BOC and BoCom 
1927-1939 Nanjing Nationalist Government Four Banks 
1939-1942 Nationalist Government The Board of SABCSF 
1942-1948 Nationalist Government The Central Bank 
Source: Author   
                                                     
41 The PBC was established in 1st December 1948, which is the central bank of PBC. 
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As the above historical account shows, the government’s attempts to create a central bank 
has had limited success and the government was unable to exercise effective control of 
monetary policy such as the operation of a silver standard during the Great Depression. 
This was primarily because of the inability of the ruling Chinese government at that time 
to control its financial institutions due either to political weaknesses and infighting, or to 
the domestic strife after the establishment of the Chinese Republic. These weaknesses led 
to the need to bring in Western powers (especially the British but also increasingly the 
Americans) to ensure the functioning of China’s fragile financial system.  Both sets of 
factors have been detrimental to the creation of a strong financial structure regulated by 
a central bank. 
Table 5.1 summarizes the evolution of the government and central banks in modern China. 
Controlling the banks allowed regimes to be in control. All regimes need money to run 
the state and to allocate resources. Therefore, the most effective way to control an 
economy is to control the currency and the banking system, which creates the currency. 
We can see why state control is seen by the current leadership as vital for the banking 
sector and a strong banking system is needed to carry out government policies from the 
lessons of history learned by the Chinese state. We also can see the paternal role of the 
state and socialist ideology after 1949. It is not surprising that control of the banking 
sector is a prime directive for the Chinese government. Its effort to strengthen this sector 
through reform must be seen in this light. 
5.3 Ensuring State Control and Reflecting the State’s Role 
During the period between 1949 and 1980, China remained closed, and there was no 
interference from outside. But inside China, the banking sector has been gone through 
many changes. Since 1949, the BOC has specialized in the foreign currency business, but 
it entrusted this task to the PBC to control foreign currencies. The BOC also engaged in 
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other foreign currency related business (Bank of China, 2013). In 1951, the Agricultural 
Bank of China (ABC) was founded and merged into and separated from the PBC three 
times. It specialized in providing and managing agricultural funds for the state 
(Agricultural Bank of China, 2014). The initial establishment of the People’s 
Construction Bank of China (PCBC) in 1954, which was affiliated to Ministry of Finance, 
was to act as an “appropriation” institution that controlled and allocated budgeted 
infrastructure project funds (China Construction Bank, 2014). Before opening-up in 1978, 
the big three banks: the Bank of China (BOC), the ABC, and the PCBC were not 
independent entities but subordinate to the state. They were specialized banks instead of 
commercial banks. The Chinese state in 1978 started its state enterprise reform. The 
development of China’s state banks was in line with state enterprise reform. 
5.3.1 China’s Banking Sector Reform 
According to existing studies about China’s state enterprise reform (Zhou & Xia, 2008) 
and China’s banking sector reform (Liu, 2009), China’s banking sector corporatization 
process could be described as occurring in phases. 
(a) Dissociation of the big-4 state-owned banks from the state and the emerging 
joint-stock system and the corporate governance structure (1979-1997) 
The state initiated financial reform by the dissociation of the big-4 banks from the state. 
In 1979, ABC was reabsorbed by the government for the fourth time and officially opened 
to the public to receive savings deposit. The BOC became a branch of the PBC to operate 
the foreign currency business and the PCBC was separated from the Ministry of Finance 
by the State Council. In 1984, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) was 
established to undertake the PBC’s industrial and commercial credit and savings 
businesses (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, 2013). In this stage, the 
specialized banks were transformed into commercial banks. 
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To an extent, the banking reforms tracked broader state enterprise reforms. From 1987 to 
1988, a group of emerging joint-stock commercial banks was established to increase the 
competitiveness of China’s banking system. The BoCom was the first joint-stock 
commercial bank in China. BoCom was also autonomous in its operations and a 
manager/contract responsibility system was adopted. As the pilot bank to implement 
joint-stock reforms, BoCom underwent ownership reform and governance reform by 
increasing managerial autonomy. Since 1992, another batch of banks such as the China 
Everbright Bank (CEB) emerged. 
In 1994, there were key changes for three policy banks: the China Development Bank 
(CDB), the Agricultural Development Bank of China, and the Export-Import Bank of 
China were established for loan policy-based functions, agricultural policy-based 
functions, and export-import policy-based functions, respectively. The policy-based 
functions of the big-4 banks were formally removed and transferred to these policy banks. 
In 1995, the Commercial Banking Laws of People’s Republic of China were promulgated, 
emphasizing a modern corporate governance structure in which commercial banks were 
to act in accordance with the Company Laws of the People’s Republic of China (China 
Banking Regulatory Commission, 2008). These laws became the legal basis for the 
banking system and commercialization and corporatization were formally stressed. In 
1996, PCBC was renamed the China Construction Bank (CCB). In 1997, CEB 
accomplished its joint-stock reforms and became the first state-holding commercial bank 
with foreign shares by the Asian Development Bank (Berger, et al., 2009). CEB initiated 
foreign ownership participation in China’s banking sector. 
(b) Further joint-stock reform by listing (1998-the present) 
This stage was characterized by the state’s preparations for public listings. Firstly, the 
big-4 state-owned commercial banks disposed of their NPLs and then were restructured 
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into joint-stock enterprises with an aim to accelerate their corporatization and 
marketization processes (Kwan, 2009). In 1998, the Ministry of Finance issued RMB 270 
Trillion of special state treasury bonds to complement the big-4 state-owned commercial 
banks’ capital base. With the capital adequacy ratio of 8%, they fulfilled the requirements 
of the Basel Accords. The following year, the state established four Assets Management 
Companies (AMCs) to take over RMB 1500 Trillion of NPLs from the big-4. The state’s 
strategies for the banking sector were to go international and import international 
competition because the Basel Accords rules represented international standards. In 2001, 
China’s banking system qualified China to join the WTO as a member; and China’s 
financial market was opened to foreign investors. Furthermore, the state encouraged 
foreign investors to become shareholders in joint-stock commercial banks as strategic 
investors42. Thus, both foreign ownership and foreign corporate governance mechanisms 
were introduced into China’s banking sector (Matthews & Zhang, 2010). 
Specific instructions from the state in 2002 indicated that the big-4 state-owned 
commercial banks were the only institutions able to deal in currencies. In 2003, the big-
4 state-owned commercial banks and three policy banks started the process of preparing 
for public listing. The listing of this special sector had to overcome three thresholds, 
Company Laws and Commercial Banking Laws of the People’s Republic of China, and 
the Basel Accords, with up to 8% capital adequacy ratio and no more than 10% NPL ratio 
required (Zhen, 2004). In 2003, the CBRC was established. China’s banking sector has 
been supervised by the PBC, the CBRC, the CIRC, the CSRC, and the SAFE since 2003 
(Zhong Guo Jin Rong Jie Wang, 2014).  
                                                     
42 Strategic Investor refers to the legal person shareholder who subscribes newly issued shares from the issuer and has the long-term 
cooperation and investment relationships with the issuer. This legal person can be the domestic or foreign enterprises as long as it has 
capital, technology, management, market and talent advantage which can upgrade the industrial structure, expand the market share for 
the issuer, strengthen the core competition and innovative capacity for the issuer to acquire profit reward. 
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In December 2003, to enrich the required capital base of the BOC and the CCB for joint-
stock reform, the State Council made the decision to use state foreign currency reserves 
of USD 45 Trillion. The Central Huijin Investment Limited (Central Huijin), a wholly 
state-owned enterprise, was established to supervising those funds. In June 2004, Central 
Huijin also injected RMB 3 Trillion to BoCom. Thus, Central Huijin owned 6.68% of 
BoCom. Central Huijin became the sole shareholder of BOC and the largest holding 
shareholder43 of the CCB. In April 2005, with permission from the state, joint-stock 
reforms of the ICBC started. The ICBC was injected with USD 15 Trillion by Central 
Huijin and the Ministry of Finance and Central Huijin was given 50% in the equity of 
each. 
In October 2005, the CCB listed through an IPO on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
(HKSE). Simultaneously, the ICBC issued A-shares through the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) and H-shares through HKSE. In June and July 2006, BOC was listed on 
HKSE and SSE, respectively. In September 2007, the CCB listed on SSE. In October 
2008, ABC’s joint-stock reform scheme was passed by the State Council. In July 2010, 
ABC went on a public listing at both the SSE and HKSE. The banking sector welcomed 
internationalization of bank ownership through the banks’ efforts toward globalization. 
Following these reforms, most commercial banks were listed and began their split-share 
reforms (see Chapter 1) with the permission of the CBRC but the state had to maintain 
control. This meant that even when state shares became tradable on the stock markets, the 
state and state legal person shareholders could not sell their shares without the CBRC’s 
approval. While other state enterprises were privatized and allowed to sell their tradable 
                                                     
43 The holding shareholder refers to having greater than 50% ownership, and if less than 50% but more than other shareholders’ 
ownership proportion in the same enterprise or if there are fewer shares than other shareholders had, but exercising control through 
other shareholders indirectly. 
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state shares, the banking sector remained under state ownership and followed state 
strategy. 
Table 5.2: The Link between State Enterprise and Banking Sector Reforms 
Year State Enterprise Reform Banking Sector Reform 
Governance Reform 
1979 More autonomy in 
operations and employees 
for own benefits  
None 
1984 The dissociation of state 
enterprises from the 
government and the 
separation of ownership 
rights and control rights 
were encouraged 
1. BoCom was given autonomy in operations and 
manager/contract responsibility systems were adopted. 
2. The policy-based functions of the big-4 banks were 
formally stripped as the three policy banks was 
established.  
3. No reaction for the separation of ownership rights and 
control rights policy. The state had the controlling power 
in terms of ownership and control. 
1994 Corporate governance 
structure 
1. The Commercial Banking Laws of the People’s 
Republic of China emphasized corporate governance 
structures for commercial banks. 
2. Commercial banks had to act in accordance with the 
Company Laws of the People’s Republic of China. 
2005 Share incentive plans Few 
Ownership Reform 
1986 Joint-ownership system 1. Two batches of joint-ownership commercial banks 
emerged (For example: BoCom was the first joint-
ownership commercial bank; CEB accomplished its joint-
ownership reform in 1997, and became the first state-
holding commercial bank with foreign shares. 
2. In December 2003, joint-ownership reform of BOC and 
CCB started. 
3. In April 2005, with the permission from the state, joint-
ownership reform of ICBC started. 
4. In October 2008, ABC’s joint-ownership reform 
scheme was passed by the State Council. 
1993 Listing 1. The Ministry of Finance issued special state treasury 
bonds to complement the big-4 state-owned commercial 
banks’ capital base. 
2. The state established four AMCs to strip NPLs from 
the big-4. 
3. The State Council enriches the required capital base for 
BOC and CCB. 
4. Central Huijin also injected RMB 3 Trillion into 
BoCom. 
5. ICBC was injected USD 15 Trillion by Central Huijin. 
2005 Split-share reform Under the permission of CBRC, most state-holding listed 
banks started the spilt-share reform.  
Source: Author 
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Table 5.2 shows that the reform of the banking sector occurred in tandem with state 
enterprise reform except that the state’s controlling position (through ownership and 
management) was maintained. This meant that the reform process in terms of diminishing 
state control lagged behind that of non-financial state enterprises. Control has been given 
priority over ownership for state enterprises, but not for the banking sector. After split-
share reform, even though there is a potential trend to reduce majority shareholders’ 
shares, the state made special policies to retain its controlling position in the banking 
sector in terms of ownership and control. Thus, it is not hard to understand the 
marketization and corporatization of China’s banking sector has been at a slower pace 
than for other state sectors. 
Table 5.3: Main Financial Indicators of the Big-5 Commercial Banks (2006-2012) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
1. Credit Risk Indicator – NPLs to Total Gross Loans (%) 
ICBC 3.79 2.74 2.29 1.54 1.08 0.94 0.85 
BOC 4.04 3.12 2.65 1.52 1.10 1.00 0.95 
BoCom 2.01 2.05 1.92 1.36 1.12 0.86 0.92 
CCB 3.29 2.60 2.21 1.50 1.14 1.09 0.99 
ABC 23.43 23.50 4.32 2.91 2.03 1.55 1.66 
Overall 7.1 6.2 2.4 1.6 1.1 1.0 1.0 
2. Liquidity Indicator – Loan-Deposit Ratio (%) 
ICBC 51.4 56.3 56.4 59.5 62.00 63.50 64.10 
BOC 57.60 64.78 63.71 70.30 70.20 68.77 91.19 
BoCom 64.14 64.87 64.91 71.97 72.10 71.94 72.71 
CCB 60.87 61.27 59.50 60.24 62.47 65.05 66.23 
ABC 66.37 65.87 50.84 55.19 55.77 58.50 44.97 
3. Performance Indicators 
3.1. Net Profit (Trillion Yuan) 
ICBC 48.72 81.26 110.77 128.60 165.16 208.27 238.53 
BOC 41.89 56.23 63.54 80.82 104.42 124.18 139.43 
BoCom 12.27 20.51 28.42 30.08 39.04 50.74 58.37 
CCB 46.32 69.05 92.60 106.75 134.84 169.25 193.17 
ABC 5.81 43.79 51.45 65.00 94.87 121.92 145.09 
3.2. Return on Assets (%) 
ICBC 0.71 1.01 1.21 1.20 1.32 1.44 1.45 
BOC 0.96 1.09 1.00 1.09 1.14 1.17 1.19 
BoCom 0.80 1.07 1.19 1.01 1.08 1.19 1.18 
CCB 0.92 1.15 1.31 1.24 1.32 1.47 1.47 
ABC 0.88 0.84 0.82 1.24 0.77 1.04 1.05 
3.3. Return on Equity (%) 
ICBC 15.18 16.15 19.39 20.14 22.79 23.44 23.02 
BOC 13.86 14.22 13.72 16.42 18.86 18.27 18.10 
BoCom 14.42 17.17 20.86 19.26 20.08 20.49 18.43 
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Table 5.3, continued: Main Financial Indicators of the Big-5 Commercial Banks 
(2006-2012) 
CCB 15.00 19.50 20.68 20.87 22.61 22.51 21.98 
ABC N/A -6.01 17.72 18.96 17.50 20.46 18.76 
3.4. Earnings per Share (Yuan) 
ICBC 0.15 0.24 0.33 0.39 0.48 0.60 0.68 
BOC 0.17 0.22 0.25 0.32 0.39 0.44 0.50 
BoCom 0.26 0.43 0.58 0.61 0.73 0.82 0.88 
CCB 0.21 0.30 0.40 0.46 0.56 0.68 0.77 
ABC N/A N/A N/A 0.25 0.33 0.38 0.45 
3.5. Cost-Income Ratio (%) 
ICBC 35.68 34.84 29.54 32.87 30.61 29.38 28.56 
BOC 38.96 35.59 33.55 37.15 33.62 32.58 31.81 
BoCom 46.04 40.26 39.38 38.87 31.89 30.13 29.71 
CCB 38.00 35.92 30.73 32.93 31.50 29.87 29.57 
ABC 50.43 43.36 44.71 43.11 38.60 35.89 37.10 
4. Capital Adequacy Indicator – Bank Capital to Assets Ratio (%) 
ICBC 14.05 13.09 13.06 12.36 12.27 13.17 13.66 
BOC 13.59 13.34 13.43 11.14 12.58 12.97 13.63 
BoCom 10.83 14.44 13.47 12.00 12.36 12.44 14.07 
CCB 9.92 12.58 12.16 11.70 12.68 13.68 14.32 
ABC N/A N/A 9.41 10.07 11.59 11.94 12.61 
Overall 5.1 5.7 6.0 5.6 6.1 6.4 6.3 
Source: Annual reports of big-5 commercial bank (2006–2012) and World Bank (2012) 
 
Additionally, during reform, the state played an important role. In addition to efforts to 
boost their performance through preferences like low borrowing costs and shielding from 
competition, the Chinese state also paid attention to increasing efficiency within the 
confines of state policy. In addition, the state targeted the banking sector for public listing, 
joining WTO, and further opening to the international market to attract foreign equity and 
competition, i.e., going global (see later). The state also offered substantial assistance 
such as helping their recapitalization and the transfer of NPLs and the injection of reserve 
funds to fulfil Basel Accord requirements. Listings on stock exchanges mandated these 
banks to conform to international corporate governance benchmarks. Moreover, the GFC 
had propelled them higher in global rankings by asset size. 
Table 5.3 shows the main indicators of the big-5 commercial banks that embarked on a 
substantial reform effort. Because of banking sector reforms, the NPLs to total gross loans 
ratio fell and indicators such as net profit, return on assets, return on equity, and earnings 
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per share were gradually increasing. The cost-income ratio decreased overall and 
indicated the costs from deposits were reduced. The bank capital to assets ratio (%) was 
substantially greater than the average level of total banks that saw good capital adequacy. 
Loan-deposit ratios were increased overall and indicated that a leveraging strategy was 
adopted. 
5.3.2 The Current Structure of China's Banking Sector and the Role of the State in 
the Main State-holding Commercial Banks 
The above changes have produced a financial sector that continues to be dominated by 
government ownership and control. Today, the financial institutions of the banking sector 
includes policy banks, commercial banks, rural cooperative banks, urban credit 
cooperatives, rural credit cooperatives, finance companies affiliated to enterprise groups, 
trust and investment companies, financial leasing companies, auto financing companies, 
money brokers, and so on. Policy banks like the CDB, the Agricultural Development 
Bank of China, and the Export-Import Bank of China are joint-stock banks with 100% 
state ownership. Commercial banks consist of large commercial banks, joint-stock 
commercial banks, municipal commercial banks, rural commercial banks, and foreign 
investment banks. Major commercial banks include the big-4 commercial banks and 
BoCom, which are now known as the big-5 commercial banks. Joint-stock commercial 
banks consist of the China Citic Bank, the CEB, the Huaxia Bank, the China Guangfa 
Bank, the Ping An Bank, the China Merchants Bank, the Shanghai Pudong Development 
Bank, the Industrial Bank, the China Minsheng Banking, the Evergrowing Bank, the 
China Zheshang Bank, and the China Bohai Bank, for 12 in total (China Banking 
Regulatory Commission, 2013). 
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Table 5.4: Fourth-Quarter-End Balances for Major Commercial Banks and Joint-
Stock Commercial Banks (2003-2012) 
Year Major 
Commercial 
Banks 
Total 
Assets: % 
of in All 
Financial 
Institutions 
of Banking 
Sector 
Total 
Liabilities: 
% in All 
Financial 
Institutions 
of Banking 
Sector 
Joint-
Stock 
Comme
rcial 
Banks44 
Total 
Assets: % 
of in All 
Financial 
Institutions 
of Banking 
Sector 
Total 
Liabilities: 
% in All 
Financial 
Institutions 
of Banking 
Sector 
2003 The Big-445 54.9 54.8 13 13.8 13.9 
2004 The Big-4 53.6 53.5 13 14.9 15.0 
2005 The Big-4 52.5 52.4 13 15.5 15.7 
2006 The Big4 51.3 51.0 13 16.2 16.5 
2007 The Big-4 53.2 53.3 13 13.8 13.9 
2008 The Big-546 51.0 51.0 12 14.1 14.3 
2009 The Big-5 50.9 51.0 12 15.0 15.1 
2010 The Big-5 48.7 48.7 12 15.8 15.9 
2011 The Big-5 47.3 47.4 12 16.2 16.3 
2012 The Big-5 44.93 44.89 12 17.61 17.78 
Source: Statistics of China Banking Regulatory Commission 
 
Table 5.4 shows the proportions of China’s major commercial banks in the total assets of 
all financial institutions of the banking sector, which had progressive reductions but 
remaining number remained considerable until 2012. Even though the total numbers of 
joint-stock commercial banks are much more than the major commercial banks, their total 
assets are not as significant as the major commercial banks’. 
 
Figure 5.1: Percentage Share of Assets of the Banking Sector in All Financial 
Institutions47 
Source: Statistics of China Banking Regulatory Commission 
                                                     
44 13 joint-stock commercial banks included BoCom while 12 joint-stock commercial banks did not. 
45 The big-4: ICBC, BOC, CCB, and ABC. 
46 The big-5: ICBC, BOC, CCB, ABC, and BoCom. 
47 Other financial institutions consist of policy banks, rural commercial banks, foreign investment banks, rural cooperative banks, 
urban credit cooperatives, rural credit cooperatives, finance companies affiliated to enterprise groups, trust and investment companies, 
financial leasing companies, auto financing companies, money brokers, and so on. 
Big-5 
commdercial 
banks, 44.93%
Joint-stock 
commercial 
banks, 17.61%
Municipal 
commercial 
banks, 9.24%
Other financial 
institutions , 
28.22%
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Figure 5.1 shows the ownership structure of the big-5 commercial banks and joint-stock 
commercial banks (17 in total), accounted for more than 60% of the assets of the banking 
sector. Thus, The Chinese state has tried to keep these institutions large and powerful. 
Foreign investment banks shares were not significant. 
5.3.2.1 Ownership Analysis 
Table 5.5 shows that among China’s main banks, the state has a large proportion of 
ownership. By examining the ownership structure of the top-10 shareholders of those 
banks, the ownership concentration by the state and legal person shareholders is relatively 
high. Moreover, as one of the shareholders in most of those banks, the state or a state 
legal person is the controlling shareholder. This means the state exercises control over all 
major banks. Table 5.5 shows that foreign ownership is present among those banks, but 
compared to state ownership is not significant. 
 Table 5.5: Ownership Analysis of the Main Banks in China 
Bank Name Holding Shareholder State Share 
And State 
Legal 
Person 
Share 
Portion48 
(%) 
Foreign 
Investment 
Share 
Portion49 
(%) 
Tradable 
Shares50 
(%) 
BOC Central Huijin 67.94 29.44 100 
ABC Central Huijin 82.70 9.36 17.3 
CCB Central Huijin 59.71 36.51 100 
ICBC Central Huijin 70.8 24.6 100 
BoCom Ministry of Finance 36.27 18.7 91.19 
China Citic Bank CITIC – Wholly Owned by 
Ministry of Finance (Actual 
controller51) 
63.29 30.93 95.43 
CEB Central Huijin 65.65 4.35 46.83 
Huaxia Bank Shougang Group 44.36 19.99 72.86 
 
                                                     
48  State shares are shared owned by the state. A state legal person refers to state-owned, state-holding, and state joint-stock 
organizations. Then, state legal person shares could not be identified as 100% state shares. And the real number may be larger than 
showed here, since some shares may be hidden. And “N/A” represents “Not Applicable”. 
49 The real number may be larger than showed here, since some shares may be hidden. And “N/A” represents “Not Applicable”. 
50 “N/A” represents “Not Applicable”. 
51 According to the Company Law of China, actual controllers referred to those who could acquire controlling power over a company 
without being the shareholder of this company through investing in the shareholder company, signing contracts, or through other 
channels. 
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Table 5.5, continued: Ownership Analysis of the Main Banks in China 
China Guangfa 
Bank 
Citigroup, China Life 
Insurance, Yingda 
International Holdings Group 
& 
CITIC Trust 
72.15 23.67 N/A 
Ping An Bank Ping An Insurance N/A None 60.61 
China Merchants 
Bank 
China Merchants Group 30.57 17.87 100 
Shanghai Pudong 
Development 
Bank 
Shanghai International Group 62.99 N/A 80 
Industrial Bank Fujian Government 35.74 13.13 84.92 
China Minsheng 
Banking 
N/A N/A 20.22 100 
Evergrowing 
Bank 
Yantai Blue Sky Investment 
Holding 
20.55 14.26 N/A 
China Zheshang 
Bank 
Zhejiang Government 14.29 N/A N/A 
China Bohai Bank Teda Investment Holding 62.01 19.99 N/A 
Source: Authors’ own calculation from latest annual reports of above listed banks, which 
are supervised by the CSRC through its Annual Report Standard. 
 
Split-share reforms of those banks was adopted. Most uncirculated shares could not be 
traded for a fixed period. After this period, state and state legal person shares became 
freely circulated on the stock market. Nevertheless, the state also consolidates its 
controlling position by purchasing the tradable shares from the stock market. For example, 
the holding shareholder of the ABC, Central Huijin bought A-shares through SSE to 
increase its ownership proportion in 2012. The listing and split-share reform was 
completed and well received by those banks as most are listed domestically or in Hong 
Kong, and the numbers of tradable shares for listed banks are considerable. 
5.3.2.2 Governance Criteria 
Most of the Board of Directors and top management of China’s five large state-holding 
commercial banks are hires of the financial and other fields from the government 
departments or other state enterprises. Key positions (Board of Directors, Board of 
Supervisors, and top management) in the big-5 commercial banks were filled by internal 
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transfers among these banks as well as PBC, the three policy banks, CBRC, government 
departments (the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, National People's 
Congress, the State Council, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, etc.), 
and state enterprises, which were all government institutions. They were considered 
experienced in China’s reforms and opening up as well as the transformation of financial 
institutions. In addition to strengthening internal collaborations and enacting strategies to 
boost performance, the control of management also ensures that government policies are 
followed by those banks. 
The state’s controlling power remains with the public officials. Among governments and 
government bodies, there are five general administrative levels for public officials: 
national level, provincial level, bureau level, county level, and district level. 52 
Administrative systems for state enterprises were eroded and eventually abandoned 
during state enterprise reform, but were retained in major commercial, joint-stock, and 
municipal commercial banks through a hidden administrative level system. 
China’s system had a Party Committee established within an enterprise. For a private 
enterprise it is an option but for a state enterprise, it is compulsory. The role of the Party 
Committee is determined by the proportion of state shares. It functions to ensure that the 
Communist Party of China’s policies and strategies are executed. It participates in 
decision-making, supervision, day-to-day operations, employment of key persons, 
coordination of internal relations, and other corporate governance details. The state’s 
controlling power in the banking sector is through the Party Committee.  
The ultimate power to decide policy, not day-to-day operations, is vested in the CBRC. 
The CBRC under the State Council regulates banks and ensures they follow the state’s 
                                                     
52 Peoples Republic of China's Law on Public Officials had been approved by the 15th Session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth 
National People's Congress (The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, 2005a). 
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policies and strategies (diplomatic policy, national defense policy, monetary policy, etc.) 
(China Banking Regulatory Commission, 2014). 
For instance, directives given to the banks after the GFC included instructions to ensure 
real consumption contributed more to economic growth than gross fixed capital formation, 
and to ensure services are oriented toward the domestic middle classes than toward 
export-oriented manufacturing. Under the first directive, ICBC made more loans to 
individual consumption, small and medium-size enterprises, and middle-class consumers. 
ICBC bought government bonds, central bank bonds and policy bank bonds, but it was 
not compulsory; ICBC’s purchases of government or other bonds were based on their 
returns on investment. 
Partial after-tax profits of selected state enterprises had to be submitted to the state. The 
after-tax profit retention was for the state enterprise’s own development, which took the 
place of the financial allocation from the state since state enterprises reform began. Again, 
this policy was not adopted by the banking sector financial institutions (Ministry of 
Finance of the People's Republic of China, 2013). 
The state regulated pricing of commercial bank services, including charges for prices of 
basic service like bank bills of exchange, promissory notes, checks, credit transfers, and 
procuration services such as basic settlement prices. Pricing is the responsibility of the 
price administrative departments under the State Council, the banking regulatory 
authorities under the State Council, and the People's Bank of China (The Central People's 
Government of the People's Republic of China, 2012). 
Major commercial banks’ remuneration of and benefits for key personnel were decided 
by the respective supervision institutions according to their administrative level. However, 
their management is supposed to be in accordance with international standards, detailed 
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in the Basel Accords III, and should include international audits and international 
financial statements. 
At present, banks assume sole responsibility for their profits or losses. They do not submit 
their profits to the state. Four AMCs took over RMB 866340 Million of the NPLs big-4 
commercial banks up to the end of March 2006 (China Banking Regulatory Commission, 
2006a). The state ultimately bought the rest of the NPLs. After that, the four AMCs 
transited from policy institutions to commercialized companies. In addition, the 
proportion of NPLs in the big-4 remained low. Therefore, the four AMCs did not have to 
play a role in taking over their NPLs. 
Overall, the Chinese banks have major state ownership, follow state policies and 
regulations, and enjoy state favor over non-state commercial banks. The Chinese state 
through the CRBC still maintains absolute control over the banking sector with the control 
channels being mainly through ownership and the Party Committees (China Banking 
Regulatory Commission, 2006b).  
The need for state control, stemming from the unfortunate history of Chinese banking, 
has been stressed repeatedly by the leadership and top management of the banks. Zhou 
Xiaochuan, the president of the PBC, was reported to have said that the need to restructure 
the Central Huijin was to keep the absolute control of China’s major banks (Zhang, 2007). 
Jiang Chaoliang, a director on the Board of BoCom, said that in order to ensure the 
absolute control position of the state in China’s banking sector, China’s banking sector 
should not relax the policy that foreign shares could not exceed a percentage53 (Jiang, 
2008).  Cai Esheng, the Vice President of the CBRC, said the banking sector reform 
should be under the condition of the Chinese state’s absolute control (Zhang, 2006). 
                                                     
53 It shall not exceed 20% of the shares of Chinese financial institution when a single foreign financial institution invests in a Chinese 
financial institution, and it cannot exceed 25% for the joint shares of multiple foreign financial institutions (China Banking Regulatory 
Commission, 2003). 
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5.4 Answering the Government’s Call 
The commercial banks also have to assist other state enterprises. As initially specialized 
banks, China’s banks were little more than fund disbursement institutions to fund state-
owned enterprises’ economic activities. In the 1980s, the state started to transfer funds to 
newly founded state enterprises in the form of loans instead of appropriations (“loan 
replacing appropriation”). Thus, the state-owned banks played a substantial role in 
providing these loans.  
There were 6,599 large and medium state enterprises with losses in 1997, which prompted 
the 15th China Communist Party National Congress to put forward its “getting out of 
difficulties within three years” to bring them out of the red. The lending policy was 
framed such that bank lending would favor loss-making state enterprises. Moreover, 
technology innovation was rewarded with more loans and appropriations of special funds 
for selected state enterprises were encouraged. Preferential channels such as access to 
borrowed funds at favorable interest rates, debt forgiveness, or loans to boost 
creditworthiness were provided by the state. The Chinese state directed lending to favored 
state sectors through policy implemented by commercial banks (World Trade 
Organization, 2010). 
State-holding commercial banks have to also answer the state’s call under extraordinary 
circumstances as well as support state strategies overseas in addition to providing banking 
services to the Chinese people and financial support for the economy. Two such 
circumstances, China’s entry into the WTO and the GFC, as well as an instance of 
supporting the state’s “going global” strategy will be discussed next. 
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5.4.1 China’s Entry into the WTO  
As China globalizes, banks have an important role in facilitating trade with China’s 
trading partners. To remove trade barriers, China wanted to be able to be fully competitive 
internationally. That was why it joined WTO in 2001. China’s banks would engage with 
banks in WTO member countries under the WTO Financial Services Agreement, which 
is within the framework of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). GATS 
covered four modes of international service trade when applied to China’s dealings with 
other members: cross-border supply referred to services delivered within the territory of 
China from the territory of another member; consumption abroad referred to service 
delivered outside the territory of China in the territory of another member to a service 
consumer of China; commercial presence referred to service delivered within the territory 
of China through the commercial presence of the foreign supplier; and the movement of 
natural persons referred to service delivered within the territory of China, with foreign 
supplier presenting as a natural person. China’s banking sector also opened itself to 
foreign stock ownership. This forced banks to face fierce competition as foreign 
investment banks’ join the Chinese banking market. China Unionpay was one product of 
China’s entry into the WTO. China Unionpay is a Chinese bankcard association that 
provides an inter-bank, cross-region, and cross-border transaction settlement system 
among connected banks. 
In compliance with the agreement under which China joined the WTO, the Chinese 
banking sector was opened to an international market in December 2006. Chinese banks 
also attracted foreign investment through international listings. Moreover, foreign 
financial institutions entered domestic markets as a stand-alone foreign bank or through 
acquiring shares of Chinese banks. 
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Foreign banks, however, did not operate on a level playing field when admitted and faced 
greater supervision from China’s state supervision departments. In the early stages of 
foreign banking entering Chinese financial markets, the Chinese state worried that 
domestic financial institution would be disadvantaged if opened too quickly to foreign 
competition, so supervision departments issued accreditation to foreign bank businesses 
with a cautious attitude. In fact, however, foreign banks were not a threat to domestic 
banks at all. They were not allocated any of the RMB 4 Trillion stimulation during the 
Global Crisis and their local customer base and networks were small. However, the 
foreign banks’ profitability came mainly from their investment in domestic banks. For 
instance, as at the end of 2012, HSBC Holdings owned 10.87% shares of the Industrial 
Bank 54  through Hang Seng Bank, which is the second largest shareholder. HSBC 
Holdings was also the third largest shareholder of BoCom, with 18.7% of ownership. It 
was the second largest shareholder of Shanghai Bank. 
5.4.2 Penetrating Global Financial Markets 
At the same time, the big-5 banks were important instruments of state policy to make 
acquisitions on global financial markets. Since the end of 2007, CCB acquired Bank of 
America (Asia) and BOC purchased Singapore Aircraft Leasing Enterprise. ICBC 
cooperated with the Kuwait Investment Authority to search for investment opportunities 
around the world. Since 1993, when the Singapore branch of ICBC was established, the 
globalization strategy was activated through purchased international banks to establish 
local branches. Since 2007, ICBC acquired Halim Bank in Indonesia and Seng Heng Bank 
(the biggest local bank of Macau), and purchased some stock equity from the largest local 
bank of South Africa (the Standard Bank of South Africa). In February 2013, China 
announced expansion of RMB exchange protocols with Singapore and the PBC appointed 
                                                     
54 Industrial Bank is one of joint-stock commercial banks. 
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ICBC’s Singapore branches to execute RMB clearing operations and to play an agency 
role between Singapore banks and the PBC (Yang, 2013). This protocol would build an 
easier trade bridge between Singapore and China and benefit the RMB’s international 
progress. Of course, ICBC stands to profit from each transaction. 
5.4.3 Global Financial Crisis 
In 2008, the GFC rocked the whole world. As a consequence of this crisis, the foreign 
demand for China’s goods plummeted; and to maintain economic growth, China was 
seeking to stimulate domestic demand. In November 2008, President Wen Jiabao required 
the banking sector to provide support for economic growth by participating in the RMB 
4 Trillion stimulus plan. Enlarging credit was a major part of this plan. According to the 
Statistics and Analysis Department of PBC, credit was expanded by RMB 9.59 Trillion 
and the big-5 commercial banks accounted for approximately half of this expansion. 
Table 5.6 shows that loans by the big-5 commercial banks doubled from 2008 to 2012. 
This was mainly attributed to the state’s policies to maintain economic growth. 
Table 5.6: Total Value of Loans Extended by Big-5 Commercial Banks (2006-2012) 
Iterm 
(Trillion 
Yuan)/Year 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
ICBC 3534 3958 4436 5583 6623 7594 8583 
BOC 2338 2754 3190 4797 5538 6203 6710 
BoCom 910 1083 1299 1801 2190 2505 2880 
CCB 2874 3183 3683 4692 5526 6325 7310 
ABC 3124 3480 3100 4138 4788 5399 6153 
Sum up 12780 14458 15708 21011 24665 28026 31636 
Total Loans 
of Financial 
Institutions 
22529 26169 30339 39968 47920 54795 62991 
Growth Rate N/A 16% 16% 32% 20% 14% 15% 
% of Big-5 
in Total 
57% 55% 52% 53% 51% 51% 50% 
Source: Annual reports from the big-5 commercial banks (2006-2012) and summary of 
sources and uses of credit funds of financial institutions from (2006-2012), from the 
Statistics and Analysis Department, the People’s Bank of China. 
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The financial sector, strengthened through reforms and not having purchased much of 
America’s toxic assets, remained resilient to the GFC shocks. China was also not overly 
dependent on foreign capital for its development. Indeed, the troubles facing Western 
banks have catapulted Chinese banks to the forefront in global rankings.55 Another impact 
has been that banks, which have traditionally focused on large enterprises began to turn 
their attention to small and medium enterprises, especially after the government tightened 
credit in the aftermath of the stimulus package (Zhang & Cheong, 2011). In its assessment 
report, the IMF concluded that China’s financial sector “entered the GFC from a position 
of relative strength” (International Monetary Fund, 2011). However, it also outlined 
several risks, including the growth of “off-balance sheet exposures and of lending outside 
of the formal banking sector” that can reduce banks’ loan portfolio quality (International 
Monetary Fund, 2011). 
The adverse impact of the GFC on export-oriented enterprises and construction firms was 
a major source of vulnerability for China. Another was the large credit expansion that 
accompanied China’s RMB 4 Trillion stimulus package, which threatened to reverse the 
hard-won successes in containing a potential real estate bubble and cooling an overheated 
economy just prior to the onset of the GFC. In the housing sector, already low borrowing 
costs encouraged over-investment in housing,56 while local municipal governments have 
directed state enterprises to invest in housing or channel funds to real estate developers 
(Xu, Yeh, & Wu, 2009). Even those worried about the banks’ heightened vulnerability, 
however, were undoubtedly mindful of the considerable resources the Chinese 
government could deploy to support these institutions (International Monetary Fund, 
2011). 
                                                     
55 As of July 2011, Chinese banks – the ICBC and the CCB – occupied the top two spots in terms of market capitalization (Bloomberg).  
56 However, Huang (in Carnegie 2011) provided an interesting justification for this financial repression. He argued that to the extent 
that the wealthy lose more from this repression through an inflation tax, the government used this as a progressive form of taxation at 
a time when few Chinese citizens fell within the tax net. 
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One consequence of the GFC is that it may well have a greater lasting impact that is likely 
to slow down financial reforms of the kind advocated by the IMF. Whether this 
consequence is positive or otherwise remains to be seen. While the IMF and others lament 
this development (Lipsky, 2011), it should hardly be surprising if the GFC led the Chinese 
leadership to exercise greater caution moving this reform forward.57 “Backwardness” in 
financial innovation and cross-border financial intermediation as well as underdeveloped 
capital markets was what allowed Asia to limit contagions from the GFC were views that 
Asian leaders shared (Khor & Tan, 2011). An important difference between the AFC and 
the GFC is that while during the AFC sizable NPLs signaled immediate danger to Chinese 
banks and, thus, spurred financial reforms, the weaknesses of banks during the GFC are 
nowhere as immediate. China’s leadership clearly sees countering a continuing impact of 
the GFC having a higher priority than banking reforms. And, as the AFC clearly 
demonstrated, countering crisis impact is most effective under centralized decision-
making followed by “unified action” (Yao & Wu, 2011). 
Will financial reform continue, albeit with some delay or with greater caution? The 
answer will likely be yes. First, the lesson of the GFC is not so much that financial 
liberalization should be halted but that effective prudential regulation should have been 
enforced. The casualty is not financial liberalization but the neoliberal approach to 
liberalization. Second, the long-term costs to the Chinese economy of the weaknesses 
discussed above, in the form of distorting investment choices at the microeconomic level 
and of hampering the effective implementation of monetary policy at the macroeconomic 
level are persuasive arguments for continued liberalization (McCormick, 2008). These 
costs, not the accusation of Chinese culpability in the GFC in the form of adopting 
mercantilist policies (Wolf, 2008), will provide the impetus for continued reform. 58 
                                                     
57 The need for caution in financial liberalization is shared by other Asian countries. 
58 Huang, Wang, Wang and Li (2010) found evidence that financial liberalization was helpful to China’s economic growth while 
financial repression inhibited it (Huang, Wang, Wang, & Lin, 2010). 
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Indeed, China’s 12th Five Year Plan speaks of reform to move towards market interest 
rates.59 As history shows and given its abundant stock of foreign reserves, China will not 
be pressured by external voices but will manage this process at a pace it deems appropriate. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The reform of China’s banking sector took place in conjunction with state enterprise 
reform but followed a somewhat different path. Instead of privatization, China’s banking 
sector underwent corporatization and governance reform but the state did not reduce its 
ownership. To implement the governance reform, the big-4 banks acquired increasing 
autonomy and established a sound modern corporate governance structure. Through 
introducing the joint-stock system, the ownership structure was somewhat diversified 
with equity from private capital. They became joint-stock enterprises through listing, 
foreign investment joint, or the exchange of equity. However, the state still possesses a 
dominate position in much of the banking sector and regards banking as a strategic 
industry. Thanks to reform, however, this ownership is combined with an independent 
modern corporate governance structure. This structure means that while the state retained 
the controlling power it does not intervene in the banks’ day-to-day operations. Thus, the 
reform of China’s banking sector was in line with state enterprises reform-corporatization 
but without losing state control (both ownership and governance). 
Why has the state maintained its dominance through ownership of the major banks? First, 
as has been shown in detail in this chapter, this dominance has historical origins, 
stemming from lessons learned from the Qing Dynasty and the post-revolutionary period 
before the outbreak of the Second World War, when successive governments tried but 
failed to control the financial sector and currency system to manage the economy. The 
                                                     
59 Okazaki, Hattori, & Takahashi (2011)drew lessons from the Japanese experience in financial liberalization to urge financial reform 
to facilitate internationalization of China’s banks, in line with that for the RMB (Okazaki, Hattori, & Takahashi, 2011). 
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result has been frequent changes and policy reversals in the quest to form a central bank, 
control of currency, and financially manage the economy, with policies held hostage to 
political rivalry and leadership struggles.  The role of foreign interests, be they states or 
private enterprises, in furthering their own interests in China’s financial system, and 
Chinese reliance on them to bolster the latter must have been another lesson not lost on 
later generations of the Chinese leadership. 
Second, the central role of the state as a political philosophy, which is also rooted in 
China’s culture and history as discussed in Chapter 4, calls for banks to be major 
instruments of Chinese policy under its state-led model. This means banks are called upon 
in extraordinary situations when the stability of the economy is threatened and when the 
state seeks to advance its interests beyond its borders. This role can clearly be seen when 
the GFC hit China in 2008-2009 and when the Chinese government sought membership 
in the WTO and to increase its international footprint. 
At the same time, the government is aware of the inefficiencies associated with not 
privatizing these banking institutions. It has attempted modernizing their governance, 
strengthening efficiency, and distancing them from the central government in their day-
to-day operations, which has resulted in their operating like and fulfilling the role of 
commercial banks in the country’s financial system. It has however also accorded them 
preferential treatment. 
With state protection, they are performing well, perhaps to the detriment of truly private 
banks. China is pursuing and its leadership is clearly aware of the transitional costs of the 
state role in banking for the development of a private banking sector, which is consonant 
with the state-led growth model. However, they must feel this cost is outweighed by what 
they believe to be the benefit from being able to use banks to support and implement state 
functions in ways that Western commercial banks have not or could not. China’s 
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enormous pool of external reserves undoubtedly gives the government comfort in 
managing whatever costs such a system may engender. Therefore, it is likely that the 
Chinese state will live with the costs until such time when the government feels 
sufficiently confident that the economic system is no longer vulnerable, especially from 
outside forces, to instability; be they financial, economic, or otherwise. 
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CHAPTER 6 CHINA’S “COMMERCIAL” STATE ENTERPRISES – A CASE 
STUDY OF ZTE CORPORATION 
6.1 Introduction 
The state has played a dominant role since the establishment of the People’s Republic of 
China in 1949, with this role fulfilled by state enterprises since 1978. Reform of state 
enterprises was a central area of reform in the country’s transformation towards a socialist 
market economy. One product of this reform is that it is very hard to characterize a state 
enterprise in China today. Some enterprises are 100% owned by the state, while others 
are partially owned with varying degrees of state control. Some are held by a state 
enterprise which is a subsidiary of another state enterprise. In addition, there are 
enterprises over which the state has control despite having less than a controlling 
ownership share. Because of the complicated ownership of those enterprises, as well as 
an unclear link between ownership and control, characterizing state enterprises is not a 
simple matter.  
This situation raises questions that have implications for both the applicability of theory 
as well as the meaning of state enterprise as currently understood. The western concept 
of public enterprise is defined by ownership, whether in whole or in part, by the state. 
Through ownership, control is exercised. To the extent it is the latter which really matters 
for the state, two related questions are, first, how control is exercised, and second, how 
does this control affect enterprise performance. Existing theories answer the latter 
question by pointing to the inferior performance of state enterprises compared to their 
private counterparts.  
Gaining insights into the above issues are the research objectives. Specifically, the 
objectives are to: (1) clarify the meaning of state and state enterprise in the Chinese 
context, (2) assess the applicability of extant Western theories of public enterprise in light 
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of (1) above, (3) link the complexity of Chinese state enterprises ownership and control 
and performance to the reforms that brought the situation about, and (4) view all the above 
through analysing the case of ZTE Corporation, a large enterprise officially classified as 
a “state-holding enterprise”. Since objective 1, 2, 3 has been stated in previous chapters, 
this chapter will focus on objective 4. 
Using a case study approach, we profile in section 6.2, 6.3 ZTE Corporation, relating its 
development to the reforms mentioned earlier. The discussion is centred on the evolution 
of the magnitude and nature of state ownership and control. How these links with the state 
impact enterprise performance is the subject of section 6.4, 6.5, 6.6. The concluding 
section draws together the main findings and highlights several implications, including 
for the application of existing theories. 
6.2 Rationales for Choosing ZTE Corporation 
The case study method cannot allow conclusions to be generalized. However, one way to 
ensure the significance of case study-based research is to select a case that is important 
to, in our case, a particular industry or the economy, this importance deriving from its 
scale of operations, or its contribution to national strategy. These criteria led us to select 
ZTE Corporation, a major manufacturer of electronic communications equipment. To 
understand ZTE Corporation requires an appreciation of its holding company, ZTE 
Holdings. Since ZTE Holdings is not listed, the information in this chapter is gleaned 
from interviews/conversations with its management. 
This study is also embedded and longitudinal. Embedded in this case are key players in 
the enterprise – top managers and officials with knowledge of state enterprises – with 
whom interviews were conducted. The period covered is from the enterprise’s inception 
to the present. Secondary data was from existing online databases and also annual reports 
of ZTE Corporation and selected other state enterprises were used to provide supporting 
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data including the shareholder structure, assets, profits, and so on. 
In terms of size, ZTE Corporation is the largest firm in the integrated communications 
manufacturing industry, with 2012 revenues of 84,219,400,000 Yuan. From the 
government’s perspective, it, together with firms like Huawei Technology Co. Ltd., 
spearheads the country’s drive to upgrade national technological capability under the 
Medium and Long-term Plan for Science and Technology Development 2006-2020. 
ZTE Corporation provides global communications network solutions. Its businesses focus 
on design, development, distribution, installation of various advanced 
telecommunications systems and equipment including wireless, access & bearer, VAS, 
operators’ networks, terminals etc.. It was listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
domestically and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange internationally. The Corporation not 
only cooperates with China’s leading telecommunications services operators like China 
Mobile to provide telecommunications products but also delivers its innovative products 
and business solutions across 140 countries through building operators’ networks (ZTE 
Corporation, 2013a). 
6.3 A State Enterprise in Transition – ZTE Corporation     
ZTE Corporation is officially classified as a state-holding company by two of the criteria 
stated above – the state, though a minority shareholder, is the largest shareholder among 
all shareholders, and it also exercises control through its holding company – ZTE 
Holdings. Its corporate history, divisible into phases, is an eloquent documentary of the 
progress of state enterprise reform. The period from its formation in 1985 as the Shenzhen 
Zhongxing Semiconductor Co. Ltd. to about 1992 marked its first phase.   
As the workshop director and the chief technology officer of the state military industry 
enterprise Aerospace System 691 Factory, Hong Weigui was selected as the enterprise’s 
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representative to go to the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone to look for cooperation 
partners to form a new technology enterprise. In May 1985, with the approval of the 
Shenzhen government, Shenzhen Zhongxing Semiconductor Co. Ltd was founded with 
Hong Kong’s Yunxing Electronics Trading Company as the foreign partner, and two state 
enterprises China Great Wall Industry Corporation Shenzhen Branch (now merged into 
Shenzhen Aerospace Guangyu Industry (Group) Corporation) and Aerospace System 691 
Factory as equity owners. With registered capital of 2,800,000 Yuan and 66% of 
ownership from Aerospace System 691 Factory, the new company appointed Hong 
Weigui president. The contract responsibility system was adopted when the Board chose 
one of the three main shareholders to take the operating responsibility through a contract 
against which its share capital and dividends were pledged. In December 1992, a group 
of technicians and managers from Shenzhen Zhongxing Semiconductor Co. Ltd 
incorporated a private enterprise Shenzhen Zhongxing Weixiantong Equipment Co. Ltd. 
with registered capital of 3,000,000 Yuan. This company would have a significant role to 
play in ZTE Corporation’s development. It should also be noted that while Shenzhen 
Zhongxing Weixiantong Equipment Co. Ltd. was legally a private enterprise, its owners 
were employees of a state enterprise. As will be demonstrated later, this ownership pattern 
has major implications for ownership and control. 
The second phase began with the enterprise’s transformation into the Shenzhen ZTE 
Holdings and lasted just 3 years until 1996. In March 1993, Zhongxing Weixiantong 
Equipment Co. Ltd. merged with two state enterprises – Shenzhen Aerospace Guangyu 
Industry (Group) Corporation and Aerospace System 691 Factory to form a joint venture 
company “Shenzhen ZTE Holdings” with the state owning 51% of shares. It was run by 
Zhongxing Weixiantong Equipment Co. Ltd. and owned by both state and private parties. 
Thus Shenzhen ZTE Holdings is an example of the “state holding and private operating” 
system referred to earlier in which the state as owner delegated management to a private 
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shareholder but the private shareholder had to pledge its share rights. State ownership 
with private management occurred with state enterprise reform to loosen ownership but 
retain control. In 1995, Shenzhen ZTE Holdings began its internationalization strategy. 
Phase 3 (1997-2003) saw the enterprise listing on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In 
November 18 1997, Shenzhen ZTE Holdings incorporated Shenzhen ZTE that issued 
65,000,000 shares with the price of 6.81 Yuan per share as its initial public offering at 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. It was the first listed Chinese enterprise manufacturing large 
scale telecommunications equipment. Shenzhen ZTE is thus also an example of a state 
enterprise listing to tap outside capital and at the same time subjecting itself to the 
discipline of the market. 
It was in this period that Shenzhen ZTE’s technological potential was recognized by the 
government. In 1998, the State Economic and Trade Commission identified Shenzhen 
ZTE as one of the national technology centres, rendering it eligible to enjoy preferential 
treatment in the form of duty-free import of new technologies, instruments, and materials 
for R&D (Lian, 2012). Tax exemptions and relief were also accorded to expenditures for 
pilot projects and fixed assets investment for science and technology facilities. But the 
last two were terminated since 2000.60 As evidence of its growing capability, Shenzhen 
ZTE cooperated with the Guangzhou Railway Corporation to construct the first home-
engineered railway telecommunications system, thus breaking the monopoly held by 
foreign enterprises in this area. 
The last stage focusing on shareholding reform was from June 2003, when Shenzhen ZTE 
Co. Ltd. was renamed ZTE Corporation to enter the international market, which is also a 
part of the government strategy of state enterprise reform to build internationally 
competitive firms. In December 9 2004, ZTE Corporation was the first A-share listed 
                                                     
60 The last two preferences were terminated in 2000. 
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enterprise (A-shares refer to Yuan-denominated shares which can only be traded in the 
SSE) which listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange and issued H-shares (Hong Kong dollar 
3.1 Billion denominated shares listed in Hong Kong). 
In accordance with the shareholding reform mentioned earlier, “Directions for ZTE 
Corporation’s split share reform” was announced by the Board on November 23, 2005 
and adopted by ZTE Corporation on December 25, 2005. Because 7 state-holding 
enterprises were state legal person shareholders, SASAC’s review and approval of this 
proposal was required (Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 2005). 
The non-tradable shares could not be traded or transferred in the first 12 months of their 
issue, no more than 5% of the general share capital from ZTE Holdings could be 
circulated after 12 months, 10% after 24 months and 37.41% after 36 months. Further 
ownership protection was accorded holders of non-tradable shares through the setting of 
a higher price than tradable shares when the former became tradable. 
In 2006, in order to support its expansion in the international market, ZTE Corporation 
transferred competent management staff overseas to support its international expansion 
(ZTE Corporation, 2014). 
Finally, according to the annual report of ZTE Corporation, with the approval of the 
CSRC, the first phase of equity incentive plans for employees was implemented on March 
13 2007, and 85,050,238 shares were allotted to 4,022 qualified employees. This step 
could be seen as using incentives to boost employees’ performance. 
6.4 Ownership, Control and Governance 
Changes in the ownership structure have major implications for the degree of state 
ownership, while the institution of split shares has a major bearing on control. How this 
control is exercised has to do with governance of the enterprise. And all these factors 
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affect ZTE Corporation’s performance. 
6.4.1 Ownership Changes 
Table 6.1 tracks ZTE Corporation’s state ownership changes based on milestones in its 
corporate history.  At the end of 1998, state ownership in the form of legal person shares 
numbered 223,600,000, amounting to 68.80% of the general capital. There was no foreign 
owned share. The state legal person shares were owned by 7 state enterprises, and ZTE 
Holdings was the holding company with 62.80% of the general capital. Since ZTE 
Corporation listed in Hong Kong in 2004, Hong Kong Securities Clearing Company 
Nominees Limited (HKSCCNL), the foreign shareholder, was the second largest 
shareholder. Individual owners included top management and other qualified employees 
who were beneficiaries of the equity incentive scheme. ZTE Holdings held the most 
shares among state legal person shares; the remaining state legal person shares accounted 
for only a small proportion (6%) of the total.   
With each corporate milestone, state ownership, reflected by the percentage of shares held 
by state legal persons, diminished. By 2004, state ownership had fallen to below 50%, 
making it no longer a majority shareholder, and, by conventional definition, no longer a 
state enterprise. Under the Chinese classification, however, ZTE Corporation remains a 
state-holding enterprise. By 2011, state ownership has fallen to a third, of which 30% is 
held by ZTE Holdings. Much of the state ownership decline is attributable to the fall in 
the share ownership of ZTE Holdings. 
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Table 6.1: Change in State Ownership of ZTE Corporation (1998-2012) 
Year % Shares 
Held by 
State 
Legal 
Persons 
Reason(s) for Change in % of State 
Ownership 
% Shares 
Held by 
ZTE 
Holdings 
% Shares 
Held by 
HKSCCNL 
1998 68.80 Share structure at formation of 
Shenzhen ZTE Corporation. 
62.80  
1999 64.90 Share placing was adopted to all 
shareholders with total 
19,500,000shares. But state legal 
person shareholders gave up the 
placement. As a result, the general 
capital was increased without the 
state legal person shares’ increases. 
59.24  
2001 57.90 Since 13 March 2001, 50,000,000 
shares were issued to the public. 
52.85  
2004 
 
 
 
48.18 ZTE Corporation issued 
160,151,040 H-shares which were 
circulated in at Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange on December 9. It 
regulated that the state corporation 
shareholders had to reduce to hold 
some shares as the amount as 0.9% 
of those H-shares. 
44.10 14.8 
2005 40.86 Since ZTE Corporation adopted the 
split share structure reform, holders 
of non-tradable shares paid 2.5 
shares for every 10 shares to 
holders of tradable shares as a sort 
of compensation. 
37.41 16.62 
2008 39.07 Through share placement, 
58,294,800 H-shares were issued. 
35.52 16.66 
 2009 37.25 85,050,238 shares were granted to 
4,022 qualified employees. 
33.87 15.89 
2010 35.73 58,294,800 H-shares were issued 
and a warrant call “ZTE ZXC1” 
exercised the option at the price 
42.394 Yuan per share and 
21,523,441 A-shares was 
subscribed successfully. 
32.45 18.27 
2011 34.04 In June 13, ZTE Holdings reduced 
the holding shares 48,495,000 of 
ZTE Corporation through Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange. 
30.76 18.27 
Source: Annual reports of ZTE Corporation (1999-2012).  
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Throughout this transformation, ZTE Holdings remains the key entity for ZTE 
Corporation. It is therefore important to understand the ownership structure of ZTE 
Holdings itself. As shown in Figure 6.1, “Yangqi” China Aerospace Science and 
Technology Corporation was the second largest shareholder that owned 34% proportion 
of ZTE Holdings in 2012. Another “Yangqi” China Aerospace Science & Industry 
Corporation owned 17% of ZTE Holdings. In total, these two state-owned enterprises 
owned 51% of ZTE Holdings. Since state enterprises had over 50% ownership, the 
conventional definition of a state enterprise applies to ZTE Holdings. More importantly, 
that state enterprises have 51% ownership translates into effective control of ZTE 
Holdings by the state. The largest single shareholder (49% of shares) was Zhongxing 
Weixiantong Equipment Co. Ltd. which was a pure private enterprise owned by 
individuals. 
 
Figure 6.1: Ownership Structure of ZTE Holdings, as of 2012 
Source: China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation. (2014). Corporation 
structure. Restrived from http://www.casic.com.cn/n101/n127/index.html, and annual 
reports of ZTE Corporation (1999-2012). 
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With ZTE Holdings owning just 30.76% of ZTE Corporation in 2012 (Table 6.1), the 51% 
state ownership of ZTE Holdings translates into just 15.69% of state ownership of ZTE 
Corporation. However, because ZTE Holdings is the holding company of ZTE 
Corporation, as stated in both companies’ annual reports, and the largest of the 
shareholders (HKSCCNL owns 17% and all other shareholders less than 1% each), it 
retains full control of the latter. Thus, while state ownership had fallen to the point that it 
was only a minority shareholder, the state retained control through its majority ownership 
of the holding company. 
There is more to this ownership than these numbers suggest. Although the state through 
ZTE Holdings has an equity stake of only 15.69% in ZTE Corporation, the other 
shareholders of ZTE Holdings are former employees of the original state enterprise. 
Together with the state, these shareholders can be considered “insiders” in the 
Corporation. There would also be other “insider” minority shareholders would are 
beneficiaries of the Corporation’s incentive program. To the extent that these “insiders” 
grew up with the Corporation, their “ownership” counts for much more than ownership 
as legally defined. They, together with HKSCCNL the nominee company voting with 
ZTE Holdings which appointed them, would ensure that there would be de facto state 
ownership and little contest in board decisions. 
The nature of private sector ownership in ZTE Corporation – the private sector 
participation coming from employees of state enterprises – is not uncommon in China. 
While new private enterprises have undoubtedly emerged as a result of the gradual 
liberalization of the economy, many of today’s private enterprises began life as 
collectives61 and TVEs (Gregory, Tenev, & Wagle, 2000). Others were small SOEs that 
were privatized, especially under the “grasp the large and let go the small” state enterprise 
                                                     
61 Some collectives had been leased out to private entrepreneurs to run, with the option of taking the enterprise private eventually 
(Ralston, Terpstra-Tong, Terpstra, Wang, & Egri, 2006). 
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reform policy beginning in 1995.  Thus, the public-private enterprise distinction, already 
less well-defined given the embedded nature of the state in civil society described earlier, 
is made even more opaque by China’s state enterprise reform experience. 
6.4.2 Corporate Governance 
How is this control exercised? It can be exercised through governance of the enterprise 
on the one hand and its relations with the state on the other. The state’s control over ZTE 
Holdings is reflected in the composition of its Board of Directors. The Board of Directors 
having 9 directors from the three shareholders: Zhongxing Weixiantong Equipment Co. 
Ltd. (4), Xi’an Research Institute of Microelectronics Technology (3) and Shenzhen 
Aerospace Guangyu Industry (Group) Corporation (2) State-appointed directors 
outnumber others 5 to 4.62 
ZTE Holdings is represented on ZTE Corporation’s Board by 5 directors, a third of the 
total number of directors, while the remaining directors have been selected for their 
expertise rather than to represent any single or group of shareholders. 
 Board directors and senior managers had worked in management in various capacities 
within the related entities of ZTE Corporation and its parent companies.63 There are no 
bureaucrats among them. As already indicated, this close connection to the holding 
company also bolsters ZTE Holdings’ de facto control of ZTE Corporation. That all 
members of the Board are “insiders”, those who grew up in or had been part of the 
component entities of ZTE Corporation and were knowledgeable about both the 
operations and the technology of the business, is likely to be more material to the success 
of the Corporation, given the technology intensity of the business, than the much touted 
                                                     
62 Question answered by Top Management H of ZTE Holdings on 15th August 2012, but due to confidentiality, this information was 
not disclosed. 
63 For example, Hou Weigui is the President of ZTE Corporation and Zhongxing Weixiantong Equipment Co. Ltd.; Xie Weiliang, is 
the vice-resident of ZTE Corporation, the president of ZTE Holdings, the general manager of Shenzhen Aerospace Guangyu Industry 
(Group) Corporation and the president & general manager of Aerospace Science & Industry Shenzhen (Group) Co. Ltd. 
119 
 
autonomy from state control (Li, Xia, Long, & Tan, 2012). 
The Board of Directors of ZTE Corporation held office for three-year terms. In the 5 
terms since its incorporation, Board members made all the major strategic decisions about 
the Corporation. They also oversaw top management’s appointments and dismissals. The 
top management took charge of day-to-day operations like recruiting management 
personnel, supervising enterprise operations, and setting market strategies.64 
ZTE Corporation was totally independent of the holding shareholder ZTE Holding in 
respect of employees, assets, finance and accounting, businesses and internal organization 
managements. Thus, for major decisions, ZTE Corporation did not rely on the state but 
took decisions deemed to be in the best interest of the corporation. For instance, the 
technology policies were set by the Chief Technology Officer and his team, who had the 
final say. And the state through ZTE Holdings did not exercise control over ZTE 
Corporation through finance. Employees of ZTE Corporation were paid by the 
Corporation and not by ZTE Holdings.65 
Whether a de facto role is played by government officials in ZTE Corporation is unclear 
however. Although state enterprise reform had officially ended the role of government 
officials in these enterprises’ administrative hierarchies, interviews with officials revealed 
that it was not uncommon for state enterprises to be supervised by central and local 
government officials under overt administrative systems.66 ZTE Corporation is not under 
this category of major state enterprises, and there is the possibility that such an overt 
system did not exist. 
                                                     
64 Questions answered by Human Resource Manager S of ZTE Corporation on 2nd September 2012, but due to confidentiality, this 
information was not disclosed. 
65 Questions answered by Top Management S of ZTE Corporation on 18th October 2012, but due to confidentiality, this information 
was not disclosed. 
66 Peoples Republic of China's Law on Public Officials had been approved by the 15th Session of the Standing Committee of the 10th 
National People's Congress (The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, 2005a). There are 5 general 
administrative levels for public officials – national, provincial, bureau, county, and rural. 
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In common with other state enterprises, ZTE Corporation has a (mandatory) Party 
Committee. Traditionally, this Committee functioned to ensure the policies of Communist 
Party were followed and implemented, participating in decision making, supervision, 
employment of key persons, and even day-to-day operations. However, interviews with 
bureaucrats suggest that the Committee in ZTE Corporation functioned far less 
intrusively than those in major state enterprises. There could be some truth to ZTE 
Corporation President Hou Weigui’s testimony in a Congressional hearing in Washington 
DC on September 14, 2012 that the Party Committee had no say in major decision-making 
and the day-to-day operations of the Corporation. He added that he was not a Communist 
Party member or a member of ZTE Corporation’s Party Committee.67 
Finally, two indicators point to ZTE Corporation’s autonomy from state control.  First, 
while it is customary for part of the after-tax profits of state enterprises to be surrendered 
to the state (Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China, 2013), ZTE 
Corporation made no such repatriation. Second, prices of major state enterprises products 
that are closely associated with people's life had to comply with state pricing guidelines 
(The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, 2005b). But again 
for ZTE Corporation, it is free to set prices based on market determined.68 
Since ZTE Corporation’s listing in Hong Kong, financial reports were prepared according 
to Hong Kong accounting standards which conformed to international accounting 
standards (International Financial Reporting Standards) and Chinese accounting 
standards (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) and were audited by professional 
accounting firms. Generally speaking, employees were hired and fired by the human 
resource department according their capacities and performance. Additionally, employees 
                                                     
67 The hearing was held because ZTE was suspected by members of the US Congress that it would do the bidding of the Chinese 
government and would pose a threat to American national security if allowed to do business (supply equipment to American companies) 
there (ICEO Online, 2013). 
68 Question answered by Top Management S of ZTE Corporation on 18th October 2012, but due to confidentiality, this information 
was not disclosed. 
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were paid and rewarded according to industry benchmarks, with bonuses set based on 
profitability.69 
6.5 Relations with the State 
ZTE Corporation’s relationship with the state took several forms. First, the state ensured 
that its policy were followed when President Jiang Zemin visited ZTE Corporation in 
2000 and issued important instructions in regard to major issues like technology trade 
combination policy and stock options issue.  
Second, the government leadership also motivated ZTE Corporation to embrace 
innovation and go global. In 2010, President Hu Jintao visited the ZTE Corporation booth 
at the Expo on “Emerging Industries of Strategic Importance" in Shenzhen, giving his 
endorsement to TD-LTE deployment.  In 2011, a member of the Standing Committee of 
the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, Li Changchun, 
visited China Content Broadcasting Network and motivated ZTE Corporation to persist 
in innovation to revitalize China.   
Third, in 2003, Chinese President Hu Jintao came to the ZTE Corporation headquarters 
to encourage ZTE Corporation to accelerate the "going global" pace. Also when ZTE 
Corporation signed strategic cooperation plans with other countries’ companies such as 
India’s Sistema and Hi3G Sweden, the signing ceremony was attended by the presidents 
of both countries. 
Not unexpectedly ZTE Corporation has a good relationship with the central and local 
(Beijing and Shenzhen) governments.70 This relationship is built on compliance with the 
country’s technology strategy. This compliance saw ZTE Corporation investing heavily 
                                                     
69 Questions answered by Human Resource Manager S of ZTE Corporation on 2nd September 2012, but due to confidentiality, this 
information was not disclosed. 
70 Question answered by Top Management S of ZTE Corporation on 18th October 2012, but due to confidentiality, this information 
was not disclosed. 
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in R&D and hiring many R&D staff (Table 6.2), including for “TD-CDMA”, “TD-LTE” 
and “Gota” – related technologies and products. Also, consistent with the policy of 
collaboration with research institutes and universities – “Ke jiao xing guo” (Development 
through Promoting Science Technology and Education), ZTE Corporation founded a 
corporate training centre ZTE University to deliver corporate training in 2013. Also, in 
order to acquire technological support for its products, ZTE Corporation established 
Industry-University-Research Institute Collaboration Forum to seek for long-term 
development. This forum makes full use of the advantages in R&D of the other members 
(universities). Publications by ZTE Corporation, such as the journal “ZTE 
Communications”, “ZTE Technologies” and “Mobile World”, update to track its 
technological development. 
ZTE Corporation’s support of the state has been rewarded. ZTE Corporation was able to 
bid successfully for businesses with major state enterprise clients such as China Unicom, 
China Telecom, China Mobile, and Guangzhou Railway. When the central government 
promoted Chinese telecommunication industries and products overseas, ZTE Corporation 
would have the opportunity to follow through with bids for projects. An example is during 
celebrations for the 60th anniversary of the establishment of Australia – China relations 
in 2012, when the door was open to ZTE Corporation as part of China’s proposed 
cooperation with Australia. ZTE Corporation also plays a role when the Chinese 
government provides assistance to third world countries. Sometimes, the state offered 
telecommunication projects which enjoyed preferential treatments, ZTE Corporation was 
asked to submit the tender. And when China offered preferential loans to Papua New 
Guinea for infrastructure development including the installation of a telecommunication 
system, ZTE Corporation is one of the companies selected.  
Another dimension of this recognition is the state’s favoured treatment of the enterprise 
in recognition of its achievements in technology. In the early years of ZTE Corporation’s 
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establishment, its products were recognized by the Ministries of Posts and 
Telecommunications and of Information Industry and the State Science and Technology 
Commission. And this Corporation itself also received the central and local governments’ 
recognition. In 1996, ZTE Corporation was recognized by the State Science and 
Technology Commission as one of key high-tech enterprises under National Torch 
Program and by the State Council as one of the 300 key state enterprises. This recognition 
arises from the state’s drive for indigenous innovation under the Medium and Long-term 
Plan 2006-2020 referred to above. As early as 1998, the State Economic and Trade 
Commission identified ZTE Corporation as one of the national technology centres which 
rendered it eligible to enjoy preferential treatment in the form of duty-free imports of 
materials, income tax exemption on the sale of technology products, and incentives for 
investment. In 1999, ZTE Corporation was also involved in the State Council’s National 
High Technology Research and Development Program. State recognition of ZTE 
Corporation’s contribution also came in the form of the presence of state dignitaries in 
major ZTE Corporation events. For instance, ZTE Corporation’s Pakistan branch was 
opened in 1999 with Premier Li Peng present, while in 2000, President Jiang Zemin and 
Vice Premier Wu Bangguo’s visited ZTE Corporation. 
It is relatively easy for ZTE Corporation to secure special state funds like science and 
technology innovation supporting funds and awards. For exports, the state provided 
export tax rebates for ZTE Corporation. Other export incentives were also offered to ZTE 
Corporation. For instance, the CDB contracted with ZTE Corporation to buy some of the 
latter’s accounts receivable if it was able to meet its export quota. ZTE Corporation also 
could also get loans at lower than market rates from CDB.71 And for specific projects in 
developing countries, ZTE Corporation could secure preferential loans. In 2012, CDB 
                                                     
71  Questions answered by Managing Director Z of ZTE Corporation on 22nd November 2012, but due to confidentiality, this 
information was not disclosed. 
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announced it would increase its strategic cooperation with ZTE Corporation in the next 
five years in the amount of USD 20 Billion (ZTE Corporation, 2014). According to its 
financial statement, ZTE Corporation had government subsidies and tax preference in 
previous years till 2013. 
Beyond financial incentives, the state was prepared to allow a change in “Hu Kou”72 to 
attract talented workers to ZTE Corporation and retain productive employees. Cheap land 
was offered by local governments to ZTE Corporation to construct research centres, 
factories, and affordable housing. For normal commercial loans, ZTE Corporation had 
better access to credit than private enterprises. 
The above suggests that state control of the enterprise is exercised through ensuring 
compliance of and support for state strategies rather than through the placement of 
bureaucrats on the board or intervention in the management of the Corporation.  Indeed, 
the last function is “outsourced” to professional managers who make all the key decisions 
for the Corporation. Financial support comes not from direct payment of employee wages 
but from preferential financial arrangements available to the Corporation. These 
arrangements represent just one dimension, albeit the most important, of the state’s 
support of the Corporation.   
6.6 Corporate Performance 
How has this enterprise model of minority state ownership, state control over policy but 
enterprise autonomy in day-to-day operations performed over the years? Table 6.2 shows 
performance indicators based on sales and profits for the period 2001 to 2012. These show 
growing sales yielding a healthy rate of return of 3.94 percent or more during the decade. 
                                                     
72 The “Hu Kou” system refers to the country’s household registration system, which specifies for each household a particular 
residential location. Residents have full rights and enjoy education and social welfare benefits offered by the state as long as they 
remain in their specified location, but lose these rights and benefits if they move away without official permission.     
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In 2011, total sales reached 86254.50 million Yuan, a 23.39% increase over the previous 
year, the highest within this industry. International sales made up 54.21% of total sales, 
having grown 24%, elevating it to become the world's fourth largest mobile phone 
manufacturer. 
What might account for the Corporation’s success? One explanation may lie in the model 
of light state control only in the form of ensuring national strategy compliance combined 
with autonomous management. However, the many areas of state support would also have 
given ZTE Corporation an edge over private sector competitors.  
Table 6.2: Financial Performance of ZTE Corporation (2001-2012) 
Year Total Sales 
(Million 
Yuan) 
Expenditure on 
R&D as % of 
Sales 
Net Profits 
(Million 
Yuan) 
Rate of 
Return 
(%) 
R&D 
Staff/Total 
Staff 
2001 9,440.90 11.10 414.00 4.39 45.5% 
2002 10,795.90 10.45 703.60 6.52 42.0% 
2003 17,036.10 9.01 1,028.30 6.04 37.6% 
2004 21,220.10 10.67 1,272.50 6.00 32.5% 
2005 21,740.70 9.01 1,287.70 5.92 31.2% 
2006 23,214.60 12.20 767.00 3.30 34.6% 
2007 34,777.20 9.23 1,252.20 3.60 35.1% 
2008 44,293.40 9.02 1,660.20 3.75 33.8% 
2009 60,272.60 9.59 2,458.10 4.08 33.5% 
2010 69,906.70 10.14 3,250.20 4.65 32.8% 
2011 86,254.50 9.85 2,060.20 2.39 33.6% 
2012 84,219.40 10.48 (2,840.90) (3.37) 38.0% 
Source: Annual reports of ZTE Corporation (1999-2012). 
 
A better measure of ZTE Corporation’s performance is its achievements in technology. 
As a technology company, ZTE Corporation’s success must necessarily be built around 
technology. The innovation theme of ZTE Corporation was from “Made in China” to 
“Created in China”. Pursuing this objective, the company had indeed progressed from 
basic material processing to the forefront of the Chinese technology sector. It made efforts 
in indigenous innovation while also introducing foreign advanced technologies to reach 
international standards. For these efforts it was rewarded and recognized by both Chinese 
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government and other countries’ governments. As early as 1986, an R&D team created 
the first generation of 68-lines stored program control exchange ZX-60. Sequential 
improvements led to the licensing and adoption of ZTE Corporation’s equipment for use 
in China. In August 1995, it became the first within the industry to receive ISO9001 
Quality Certificate, and in 2000, it also received the 2000 edition 9001 standard 
authentication. With a total 3,906 PCT applications in 2012, ZTE Corporation was ranked 
No. 1 globally by WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization, 2012), surpassing 
Huawei, the perennial No. 1 for China (Table 6.3). In terms of authorizations and 
applications of the domestic patent for invention, ZTE Corporation was No. 1 in China 
(ZTE Corporation, 2013b). 
Table 6.3: The Global Top Five PCT Applicants and the Number of International 
Applications (2008-2012) 
Rank 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 
1 
Huawei 
Technologies 
Co., Ltd (CN) 
1,737 
Panasonic 
Corporation 
(JP) 
1,891 
Panasonic 
Corporatio
n (JP)  
2,154 
ZTE 
Corporation 
(CN) 
2,826 
ZTE 
Corporation 
(CN) 
3,906 
 
2 
Panasonic 
Corporation 
(JP) 
1,729 
Huawei 
Technologi
es Co., Ltd 
(CN) 1,847 
ZTE 
Corporatio
n (CN) 
1,863 
Panasonic 
Corporation 
(JP) 2,463 
Panasonic 
Corporation 
(JP)  2,951 
 
3 
Koninklijke 
Philips 
Electronics 
N.V. (NL)  
1,551 
Robert 
Bosch 
GmbH 
(DE)  1,586 
Qualcomm 
Incorporate
d (US) 
1,677 
Huawei 
Technologies 
(CN) 
1,831 
Sharp 
Kabushiki 
Kaisha (JP)  
2,001 
 
4 
Toyota 
Jidosha 
Kabushiki 
Kaisha (JP) 
1,364 
Koninklijke 
Philips 
Electronics 
N.V. (NL)  
1,295 
Huawei 
Technologi
es Co., Ltd 
(CN) 1,528 
Sharp 
Kabushiki 
Kaisha (JP)  
1,755 
Huawei 
Technologies 
Co. Ltd (CN) 
1,801 
 
5 
Robert Bosch 
GmbH (DE)  
1,273 
Qualcomm 
Incorporate
d (US) 
1,280 
Koninklijke 
Philips 
Electronics 
N.V. (NL) 
1,435 
Robert 
Bosch 
Corporation 
(DE) 
1,518 
Robert Bosch 
Corporation 
(DE)  1,775 
Source: PCT Newsletter by WIPO (2008-2012) from 
http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/newslett/year.jsp. 
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These technology indicators point to an enterprise that is competitive in its core area of 
competence. This competence is less a reflection of state support, although it helped to 
attract talent, than of management capability. In this sense, it provide a degree of 
vindication for the state enterprise model exemplified by ZTE Corporation, a model that 
is at variance with the stereotype implicit in existing conceptualization of state enterprises 
and more akin to the so-called government-linked companies that exist in many countries.   
Since ZTE Corporation initialled its internationalization strategy, its share of revenue 
from outside China has soared. 2007 saw international revenues accounted 60% of the 
total revenue – the first time it exceeded domestic revenues (ZTE Corporation, 2014). It 
also cooperated with international high technology companies like IBM. In all, its 
equipment are used by more than 500 telecommunications companies in more than 140 
countries and regions. For some of these countries like Malaysia, it had a significant 
market share. 
6.7 Conclusion 
Although the role of the Chinese state and its enterprises has been viewed through the 
lens of Western theories as generally negative, a systematic reading of China’s history 
suggests that this view should be contested. Add to this history China’s unique state 
enterprise reform experiments and an assessment of Chinese state enterprises that is far 
from clear cut emerges. Thus, while numerous studies have espoused a negative view of 
Chinese state enterprises, research endorsing the opposite view, both theoretical and 
empirical, is growing. 
This chapter has not attempted this assessment but instead focuses on one enterprise, ZTE 
Corporation, tracing its origins and linking its growth and transformation to China’s 
stepwise state enterprise reform. Because of these changes, it has come to embody the 
state’s strategy of reducing ownership but maintaining control. Yet the term “control” may 
128 
 
be a misnomer – ZTE Corporation retains almost complete management autonomy 
although complying with national strategies of technology development. Even board 
members, who are instruments of state control, are chosen from within the corporation 
and its affiliates.  
At the same time, state support in the form of tax preferences has undoubtedly helped 
ZTE Corporation’s performance. Such support weakens arguments that attribute state 
enterprise competitiveness principally to autonomy and/or the absence of state control.  
However, since, as shown by the many loss-making state enterprises with state support, 
preferential treatment by the state does not necessarily translate into better performance, 
arguments that autonomy begets better performance remain intact (Li, et al., 2012). Still, 
ZTE Corporation does not easily fit the mode posited of state controlled, dispersedly 
controlled and privately controlled in that it embodies elements of both state and private 
control. What appears to be critical to ZTE Corporation’s success, apart from managerial 
autonomy, is the presence of “insiders” both in the state and private entities owning ZTE 
Corporation who are well versed with the company’s operations at the helm. Since these 
insiders were there from the beginning, it is also not very meaningful to refer to ZTE 
Corporation’s management as being “outsourced”. 
As a “state-holding company”, ZTE Corporation embodies much less “state” than what 
is normally understood in a state enterprise. Its management is also not in the hands of 
bureaucrats. Although no generalization is warranted, ZTE Corporation’s performance 
attests to the relative success of the state strategy to stress control over ownership. And 
this control is limited to providing a strategic direction. In moving from state-owned to 
state-controlled, more appropriately state-led, China’s state enterprises can be said to be 
at the forefront of the model of state capitalism. 
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The ZTE Corporation experience speaks also to how not only agency costs have been 
reduced but also public choice issues have been resolved. It also shows that the 
importance of property rights can be exaggerated. What has emerged from the interviews 
is that ZTE Corporation’s personnel, from the management down, take pride in what they 
have created, despite owning very little of the enterprise. This sense of collective pride, 
attributable to Confucian concepts of collective identity and increasingly recognized as 
an East Asian trait, this trait – of collective pride and shame – has most recently been 
discussed in the context of a South Korean jetliner crash in San Francisco (Klug & Lee, 
2013), can contribute materially to performance.  
Finally the relevance of neo-liberal theories has been muted by the complexity of 
ownership in the specific case of state enterprises like ZTE Corporation and in general by 
the embeddedness of government in Chinese society. China’s state enterprise reform 
experience has blurred further the lines between state and private enterprises which are 
central to Western public enterprise theories. Many of China’s private enterprises today 
began life as state enterprises or as collectives. Some, like the private enterprise which is 
an equity partner of ZTE Corporation, have been formed by state enterprise employees.    
With these enterprises, a calculus of ownership and control that is different from that 
predicated on existing theories has emerged. We believe it is this calculus, as much as the 
management autonomy to which much research is directed, that helps to explain good 
state enterprise performance. 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
7.1 Summary and Findings 
The prevailing discourse on the Chinese state and its state enterprises is dominated by the 
application of Western political and economic concepts. These concepts ignore China’s 
cultural and political history where the state has played a major role and is “embedded”, 
to use Polanyi’s term, in Chinese society. However, China has both absorbed and adapted 
foreign ideas to fit its circumstances.  Thus, its role in numerous innovative reform 
experiments during China’s economic transition from a command to a socialist market 
economy is indicative of the application of Western ideas. Relying mainly on these ideas, 
most assessments of Chinese state enterprises are unbalanced. The preoccupation with a 
state-private dichotomy has led to the failure to recognize the emergence of a distinct 
corporate entity. In fact, Chinese state enterprises are distinguished from those defined by 
stereotypical Western public economics theories by the manner in which they are owned 
and controlled. There is a need to reframe the analysis of China’s state enterprises to 
recognize how its particular cultural and political history has shaped these institutions. 
Central to this analysis are the reforms that have been put in place by the government to 
consolidate and strengthen this sector, and not, as many believe, to diminish their role. 
Within the above framework, this study seeks to answer three specific research questions. 
First, after state enterprise reform, what is the dynamic role of the Chinese state in relation 
to its state enterprises in terms of ownership structure and control mechanisms, and how 
different is it from what Western public enterprise theory argues? Second, what is the role 
of state enterprises for the Chinese state in the economy? Third, do different ownership-
control combinations affect performance outcomes?  
Four qualitative research methods supported with descriptive secondary data analysis are 
the main methods to explore these three research questions. They are historical narrative, 
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case study, ethnography, and phenomenology. Of these, historical narrative and case study 
are the primary methodologies utilized while the other two are supporting methodologies. 
These methods are more appropriate than the quantitative methods used in most studies 
because of the need to gain deep insights into the construction of the state enterprise sector 
and its relationship with government.  
The answers to these three questions are summarized below. From the findings, 
implications for theory, policy, and research are drawn. 
7.1.1 Ownership and Control (Objective 1) 
The state enterprise sector has been officially classified as consisting of three types of 
enterprises. The first type consists of enterprises wholly owned by the state, i.e., state-
owned enterprises, state-owned corporations, and state legal person joint ownership 
enterprises. The second type, referred to as state-holding enterprises, are those in which 
the state has majority ownership (capital or shares greater more than 50%), or have the 
highest ownership among other shareholders with the same enterprise even if it is a 
minority shareholder (less than 50%), or where the state exercises control through other 
state-controlled shareholders. The third type, referred to as state joint-ownership 
enterprises, consists of those in which the state has minority ownership and exercises no 
control.  
The issue of state ownership has been complicated by state enterprise reform that 
produced various corporate structures and types. State ownership ranges from 100% 
through majority ownership to minority ownership, the last of which does not appear in 
government statistics. Apart from national-level enterprises, the sub-national enterprises 
belonging to provincial and local governments also exist in large numbers and function 
alongside, often compete with, national enterprises.  There are also enterprises for which 
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ownership is ambiguous, including quasi-state entities, non-state enterprises, urban 
collectives, and local government-owned township and village enterprises.  
The government’s role may well be larger than what the official statistics suggest because 
parts of government (minority) ownership are undocumented and/or under multiple layers 
of indirect ownership that may indicate the government has an important say if not 
exercising strong control. However, there is no way of knowing what role the government 
plays in these enterprises that do not come under the banner of state enterprises. 
State control is exercised through the administrative body, SASAC, which functions at 
various levels of government. Control channels are through governance, such as top 
management appointments. Furthermore, some state enterprises are managed and run as 
private firms in terms of rewards for performance, such as executive compensation linked 
to corporate performance, talent attracted through listings internationally, foreign 
investors represented by multinational representation on the Board, and private sector top 
managers and executives hired with high compensation in the open labor market. Efforts 
had been made to use attractive employment terms to target better corporate governance 
to achieve competitively domestically and internationally. 
For strategic state enterprises in what the state considers sectors vital to the economy or 
national security, the state retains a controlling position in terms of ownership and control 
even after innovative reform. In addition, the state exercises control through governance 
by Party Committees as a part of management. Such control is needed to ensure the 
government’s strategies are followed. Thus, state strategies can be executed through state 
enterprises. In return for compliance with state strategies which this control mandates, 
state enterprises are favored by explicit state support including preferential credit access. 
For “commercial” state enterprises, such control has been made on commercial rather 
than political grounds. Reform experiments have produced progressive reductions in state 
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ownership without commensurate diminution of state control. There is de facto separation 
between ownership and control, with the former declining and the latter in the hands of 
professionalism management. Thus, this control is only lightly exercised through 
ensuring compliance with state strategies rather than through day-to-day management. 
ZTE Corporation has good relations with the state and in the presence of state support 
receives preferential treatment from it with state funding. 
7.1.2 Meeting State Objectives (Objective 2) 
Since state enterprises are key players in China’s economy, they should have a material 
impact on growth and distribution. Since this century started, negative findings between 
state enterprises and economic growth were replaced by increasing positive analysis. 
However, little empirical research existed that could make the direct link associating loss-
making state enterprises with damaging state enterprise performance and China’s 
economic growth. The emergence of globally competitive state enterprises like China 
Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec Group) is one of the major manifestations of their 
economic revival. Productivity growth in the state sector has also been reported.  
The central state enterprises from “pillar industries” were selected as national champions 
and have been driven to achieve global competitiveness in terms of scale and technology. 
They were consolidated into conglomerates supported by incentives to act as key players 
in China’s economy. China’s state enterprises are viewed by the state as engines of growth 
to promote innovation that facilitates the technological catch-up to the West. 
On the negative side, reforms have led to worker lay-offs and have freed state enterprises 
from social responsibility, even to the workforce that was retained.  Despite its many 
shortcomings, the end of original social role these enterprises played has left a void in the 
social safety net that has not been filled even today. Social security experiments to take 
over this redistributive role, from the rehiring of some laid-off workers and compensation 
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packages for those laid off to the establishment of the National Social Security Fund have 
helped relieve some of the hardships caused by the lay-offs but have yet to come near 
anything resembling a national social security system. 
Reform has also changed the role of enterprises in income distribution. Spatial income 
distribution has also been affected by a shift in industrial production to coastal regions. 
State enterprises, whose original mandate included construction and provision of housing 
for their employees, began to undertake the construction of residential (and commercial) 
units for profit on land owned or acquired from profits amassed through profit retention. 
To be fair, state enterprises have continued to support the government in such activities 
as disaster relief and diplomatic confidence building. Also, national champions and 
enterprises in strategic sectors’ with powerful corporate interests distributing part of their 
earnings as dividends to the government.  
For strategic state enterprises, they exercised government functions on the government’s 
behalf. Historically, the Chinese banking sector’s role was transformed from being a 
government department to supporting other state enterprises as government entities. 
However, after China’s financial liberalization, this role has diminished. Instead, under 
China’s opening up policy, the banking sector is considered to be the key institution 
executing state strategies. This is evidenced during China’s entry to WTO. Even after 
China’s entry to the WTO, this sector continued to assist the government’s “go global” 
strategy. This role notwithstanding, the government has made efforts to liberalize the 
banking sector. However, the GFC was a wake-up call to Chinese leaders of the excesses 
of financial liberalization. Hence, a major impact of the Crisis may be to slow down the 
pace of China’s financial liberalization.  
Even “commercial” state enterprises may be designated as part of “pillar industries” as 
long as they actively support government strategies. An example is ZTE Corporation, the 
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largest firm in the integrated communications manufacturing industry. From the 
government’s perspective, ZTE Corporation spearheads the country’s drive to upgrade 
national technological capability. It cooperates with China’s leading state-holding 
telecommunications services operators such as China Telecom to provide 
telecommunications products and assists other state enterprises in other industries such 
as Railway ICT construction. ZTE Corporation has put forth effort in support of the state’s 
global strategy and delivered products and services internationally on a large scale. 
Moreover, as a state instrument, it has provided assistance to third-world countries. 
7.1.3 State Enterprise Performance (Objective 3) 
During the early stages of state enterprise reform, state enterprises were criticized for their 
economic inefficiency and poor profitability, the result of bureaucratic management, 
monopoly positions, and fulfilling state objectives at any cost. However, as reforms 
progressed, this performance was progressively reversed. Recent studies have reported 
positive economic performance. Nevertheless, state favor plays an important role in 
making this happen. In addition, some Chinese state enterprises have made great efforts 
in technology catch-up with the West in line with the state policies and national strategies 
in the presence of R&D funding from the state. As a result, some were even in the 
forefront of innovation and comparable to firms in developed countries. At the same time, 
non-strategic state enterprises were facing intense competition created as much by other 
state enterprises as by non-state sectors and foreign firms. The competitive conditions 
between these different enterprises were converging. Thus, government preferential 
treatment comes with intense competition. These companies have also gone international 
and have faced even more fierce competition.  
In the reform process, different routines have resulted in different corporate entities. As a 
result, some were successful while some were not. Successful entities might be criticized 
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due to state favoritism. The number of successful entities is not known and may be a small 
proportion of the total, but in terms of size and share of industrial output, they are likely 
to be significant. The reason for this is that they are typically listed companies and 
national champions. The results may not permit categorization of the Chinese state 
enterprise sector as profitable, innovative, and competitive, but the argument that the state 
sector is inefficient can be decisively rejected. The notion that there is a clear distinction 
between private and state enterprise also cannot be applied.  
For strategic state enterprises, the overall performance was considered good. Nevertheless, 
it had to be linked to the government policies such as for the banking sector which is to a 
great extent attributable to transfers of bad assets to Assets Management Companies, loan 
growth, recapitalization, write-offs, and China’s strong economy. Listings on stock 
exchanges and international competition have mandated these banks to conform to 
international corporate governance benchmarks. Moreover, the GFC had propelled them 
up the global rankings. While unfavorable comparisons of these institutions with fully 
private financial institutions continue to be made and have some merit, the sub-optimal 
performance of these Chinese banks could be a matter of conscious choice made by 
Chinese state, which is prepared to bear the costs to maintain its prime objectives. Efforts 
to strengthen efficiency of banks represent the state’s efforts to minimize these costs. 
These statements are likely to be true of state enterprises in general, given they are vital 
instruments of the model of state capitalism that China has embraced. 
ZTE Corporation, as a representative of the group of “commercial” state-holding 
enterprises, has sustained profitability thanks to its ability to take advantage of the 
government’s drive for indigenous innovation. Its record of accomplishment for 
innovation is reflected by the number of patent applications as well as by its leading role 
in various products and services technology innovations. By innovating domestically and 
introducing international technologies, it was recognized and rewarded by the Chinese 
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government and other countries. Facing a domestic competitive environment, the 
enterprise has used a combination of “insiders” who are familiar with the enterprise and 
the employment of professional management that has ensured acceptable governance 
standards. In addition to professionalism in management, links with the state have brought 
the Corporation a range of benefits from preferential access to business opportunities that 
have also played an important role in improving its efficiency. 
7.2 Implications 
7.2.1 The Applicability of Extant Theories 
The specific context of China means that even if partially valid, Western theories of public 
enterprise must be modified to consider the unique nature of the Chinese state and society. 
This means many arguments based on prevailing theories must be revisited and judgments 
revised. For instance, the assumption is that state enterprises are run by bureaucrats is 
invalid because many Chinese state enterprises, especially those listed on stock exchanges 
are not run differently from private enterprises, and actually pay better and attract the best 
talent. 
The assumption that state enterprises are monopolies is also invalid. In China, many state 
enterprises compete fiercely among themselves and with the non-state sector. The result 
has been management professionalism and innovation capabilities for an increasing 
number of state enterprises, which contradicts the stereotype perception of uncompetitive 
state enterprises. 
Even more fundamental has been the assumption that the state and private sectors are 
distinct. For China, the boundaries are not distinct. The non-state sector is not all private, 
and includes Town and Village Enterprises and collectives. The state sector has ownership 
interests in enterprises to different degrees, and also been given large doses of private 
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sector management. To make things even more opaque is the de facto separation between 
ownership and control, with the former declining and the latter in the hands of 
professional management for the most important enterprises. This is producing, in effect, 
a system, many characteristics of which are not that different from Western models. 
This lack of a clear partition between public and private enterprises has produced apparent 
paradoxes that Western economic theories, such as agency, public choice, property rights, 
have been unable to explain. However, while alternative theories, such as economic 
embeddedness, market socialism, and developmental state, have relevance, they are also 
not wholly applicable. This is likely because these alternative theories have also been 
developed to explain situations at variance with what exists in China. The most obvious 
example is that of the developmental state. Applied initially to Japan and then to Korea, 
it envisages extensive state intervention to shape the competitiveness of the private sector, 
which is envisaged to be the driver of economic growth. In China’s case, despite 
expectations by many for a greater private sector role, it remains the state that is in the 
driver’s seat. More fundamentally, none of these theories has accommodated a situation 
in which the state is at the apex of an orderly hierarchy in which layers of society make 
up the rest of the pyramid. Nor do any of these models envisage a role of the state as 
expansive as that of the Chinese state throughout its history. 
However, what is indisputable is that with its millennia of history providing lessons for 
the state’s decision-making processes in general and state enterprises in particular, total 
reliance on economic arguments can provide only partial explanations of the behavior of 
the Chinese state and its enterprises. For instance, decisions made to keep the banks under 
state control have as many historical antecedents and strategic priorities as any economic 
considerations of rationality and efficiency. It may well be that with this complexity, with 
a wide span of ownership and control, developing a theoretical framework for all Chinese 
state enterprises is a herculean task. It is even unclear if such an endeavor is a meaningful 
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pursuit, given the limited applicability of such a framework outside China. A more 
meaningful academic pursuit may be to seek greater in-depth understanding of key 
enterprises like telecommunications or key areas like innovation that are likely to impact 
economies well beyond China’s shores. 
7.2.2 Policy Implications 
Even if China’s historical trajectory cannot be emulated, China’s experience has 
implications for other countries. The Chinese state is still the key agent that cares for the 
macro economy and its institutions and has a vital role to play in this regard. This is also 
the case in developing countries where information and other asymmetries create all 
manner of negative externalities that the state must overcome. However, the China 
experience shows that the emphasis on ownership may be misplaced. The essence of the 
state’s role is control. In this sense, the importance attached to privatization may be 
exaggerated on the one hand while resistance to its implementation may likewise be 
overdone on the other. 
Second, a number of ways exist to improve performance of state enterprises of all shapes 
and sizes. One way adopted by China is listing on foreign stock markets. This imposes 
market discipline on the listed enterprises, while the fact that listing is done overseas 
removes the ability of the state to interfere in the enterprises’ governance. Another is to 
emulate the Korean example of setting mandatory performance benchmarks as conditions 
for state favor. 
Third, the Chinese experience offers lessons on how state enterprises can share if not take 
the lead in technological innovation. Chinese enterprises that innovate are rewarded by 
various benefits. Although outside the scope of this study, that ability rests on the growing 
depth of China’s human resource pool. Emulating China would require considerable 
effort towards augmenting human resources. 
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7.2.3 Research Implications – Limitations of this Study 
This study, by abandoning any effort to achieve representativeness, clearly suffers from 
lack of it as an obvious disadvantage. Few case studies and focus on one strategic sector 
cannot fully describe the entire state enterprise sector. In addition to national-level state 
enterprises, there are sub-national enterprises which belong to provincial and local 
governments as well as urban collectives and township and village enterprises. However, 
it is argued here that achieving representativeness is impossible for a variety of reasons. 
Including definitional boundaries that are ill-defined. Further, the current situation is 
rapidly evolving and any snapshot at any one time will soon be outdated.  
At the same time, this study has not covered major areas of state enterprise roles and 
impact. These include the shedding of social obligations that state enterprises used to 
shoulder, and their role in the housing market, in which they have the advantage of land 
banks that they can use to readily develop. Yet another area is the relationship between 
central and local state enterprises, and the impact of their collaboration, competition, or 
even conflict on the economy and stakeholders. A third area for study relates to the role 
of relationship (“Guanxi”) governance. In short, there is no shortage of topics for further 
study. Studying China’s state enterprises is a dynamic never-ending endeavor and rightly 
has engaged many scholars. Future studies will open up even more areas for research. If 
there one area future research can improve on today’s work, it is to integrate multiple 
relevant disciplines to arrive at more holistic analyses than the mono-disciplinary (mainly 
economics) and value-based (mainly Western) research that is in vogue today. 
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